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Municipal enterprise was an innovation born of necessity in the 
hinterland regions of Europe and North America. In an era of rapid 
industrial and population growth, urban governments struggled during the 
late Victorian period to respond to enormous pressure to establish and 
expand urban services. The nature of this reponse was determined 
primarily by the ability of private enterprise to satisfy public demand for 
running water, natural gas, electric generation, electric lights, a street 
railway and telephone service. Consequently, the greatest manifestation 
of municipal enterprise was in aspiring hinterland towns and cities where 
private enterprise had failed to provide these urban services. 
Port Arthur (a small frontier town at the ‘head’ of Lake Superior) was 
a pioneer of municipal ownership in North America. While the scarcity of 
finance capital in the region prevented utility entrepreneurs from 
providing urban services, the sense of urgency generated by inter-urban 
rivalry led to indirect municipal intervention (bonuses), and eventually to 
municipal enterprise. This process was greatly facilitated by an 
atmosphere of inter-class cooperation conducive to collective action, and 
to public confidence in the municipal administration. A false dichotomy 
has been created between the municipal ownership of urban services and 
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private enterprise because historical interpretation respecting utility 
organization and regulation In large metropolitan cities have been applied 
to all urban centres. This thesis reconsiders this assumption and 
responds to several fundamental questions which have yet to be explored. 
Why did Port Arthur pioneer municipal enterprise in North America? How 
did the legal environment Influence the scope of municipal activity? Was 
the municipal administration controlled by a booster-orientated economic 
elite? How did the municipal ownership of urban services differ from 
private ownership? 
I would like to acknowledge the many people whose valuable 
assistance and encouragement enabled me to complete this Master’s 
thesis. Without the guidance of Dr. Patricia Jasen, completion of this 
thesis would not have been possible. It was a pleasure to have had the 
opportunity to work with Dr. Jasen-her dedication to the MA program 
greatly facilitated the process of writing my thesis. Special appreciation 
is also extended to Professor Victor Smith with whom I studied the 
international context of the organization and regulation of urban services. 
Our discussions inspired many of the ideas explored in the first two 
chapters of this thesis. Valuable advice from Dr. Donald Davis at the 
University of Ottawa with respect to the relationship between the legal 
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environment and municipal acitivity, and Dr. Thorold Tronrud (who was 
also the second reader) regarding the effects of boosterism in Thunder Bay 
greatly influenced my approach. I would also like to thank Dr. Gilbert 
Stelter for agreeing to be my third reader. In the course of my research, I 
was fortunate to have had the invaluable assistance from the archivists 
and staff of the Thunder Bay Archives (Jo-Anne Anderson, Richard 
Hargraves, Maggie Lesparents, and Alex Ross), Thunder Bay Historical 
Museum Society (Jeff Sumner), Lakehead University’s Northern Resource 
Centre (Dennis Sawyer and Louise Wuorinen), Bell Telephone Archives 
(France Jutras), Ontario Archives, Public Archives of Canada, and the 
National Library. I would be remiss If I did not thank my comrades in the 
History MA program at Lakehead University who made my studies in 
Thunder Bay an extrordinarlly enriching experience. David Black who acted 
as a sounding board for my ideas (drawing my attention to the colourful 
article in The Reader repeatedly cited in this thesis) especially 
contributed to this work. Finally, I want to express gratitude to my 
parents whose support and patience kept me going over the course of the 
past year-this thesis is dedicated to you. 
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THE BASIS OF MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISE IN PORT ARTHUR 
“When we take into consideration the fact that we are giving the people a 
15 minute service, in our Town, to and through Fort William, in 
comfortable cars, at a rate of fare as low as any in the Province, our 
Electric Lights are equal to any found elsewhere, our schedule of rates is 
as low as consistent with good service, our Telephone service is equal to 
any in America, considering the population and extent of territory we 
cover, it may be readily seen that the people of Port Arthur are enjoying 
advantages that are the lot of but few municipalities...” 
-James McTeigue, July 25, 1905 
The extent of municipal ownership In Port Arthur prior to 1914 was 
unequalled anywhere else in North AmericaJ The municipality operated 
Its own street railway, electric lights, hydro-electric power development, 
water and sewerage works, and a telephone exchange. Several of these 
municipal franchises were Important innovations which were 
subsequently emulated by other municipalities in Canada and the United 
States. While the completion of the Port Arthur Electric Street Railway 
in 1892 was the first of its kind in the world, the inauguration of a 
municipal telephone service in 1902 gave the town the first publicly 
owned telephones on the continent.2 As a result, according to the 
statistics provided by the Bureau of Labour, no other town or city in 
Ontario invested more public capital, before 1911, into municipal 
enterprise than Port Arthur when the waterworks franchise is excluded.3 
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Port Arthur distinguished itself from Fort William, the second most 
active municipality in the province (in the field of municipal ownership), 
by pioneering municipal enterprise. Fort William, on the other hand, 
emulated its rival after the turn of the century. 
Port Arthur’s standing as a municipal ownership town was reflected by 
the international attention the town received prior to 1914. The minutes 
of the Port Arthur council reveal that municipal leaders were inundated by 
inquiries from other municipalities, newspapers and curious individuals 
from across the United States and Canada. These letters ranged from 
university students interested In the operation of the street railway to 
other municipalities contemplating municipalization. People also 
travelled great distances in order to see Port Arthur’s municipal 
enterprises in action. One such example was a Chicago-based 
correspondent for The Reader who travelled to the Lakehead in 1907 
because it was widely assumed that municipal ownership in the two cities 
“had reached its greatest development on the American continent.”4 J. O. 
Curwood then went on to suggest that he saw municipal ownership 
“flourishing as it flourishes no-where else” in North America.s The 
international attention Port Arthur received supports the contention that 
no other municipality on the continent could match the scope of municipal 
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activity at the Lakehead, and of Port Arthur in particular. 
This chapter investigates why an opportunity for municipal enterprise 
existed in Port Arthur and how this might have differed from other towns 
and cities. It will establish that an opportunity for municipal enterprise 
to flourish resulted from three factors: an atmosphere of inter-class 
cooperation, a collective sense of urgency generated by inter-urban 
rivalry, and the failure of private enterprise to respond adequately to 
public demands for urban services. The translation of this opportunity 
into reality will be explored in chapter two, In which municipal 
administration and finance are examined more closely. 
Historiography 
The rapid growth of urban centres during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries placed tremendous pressure upon municipalities to 
respond to demands for urban services. Canadian urban historians have, 
over the past twenty years, published detailed studies on the organization 
and regulation of utilities. With very few exceptions, these works have 
focused upon large urban centres and have been usually limited to the 
study of a single utility in isolation. As a consequence, the historiography 
consists of works on streetcars in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Regina and 
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Edmonton; waterworks in Vancouver; lighting in Victoria; hydro-electric 
power in Toronto, Montreal and Quebec City; and telephones in Kingston. 
Only a handful of historians have attempted to investigate utility 
organization and regulation on a larger scale. 
One such study is Monopoly’s Moment by Christopher Armstrong and 
H.V.Nelles, who sought out to analyze “the problems of technology 
transfer, company promotion, industrial organization, and public choice in 
regulation within a regional or local context.”6 While this is clearly the 
most significant work written In the field, the authors were obviously 
hampered by the absence of research in all but the largest urban centres. 
As a result, while the authors attempted to remain sensitive to the 
regional or local context, the work concentrates primarily upon the 
organization and regulation of utilities In Montreal and Toronto. This was 
reflected by the focus of Armstrong and Nelles on the struggle between 
private utility companies and the municipal governments of the two 
cities, while they ignored, the absence of private utility companies in 
most smaller urban centres. This illustrates the need for more research 
into the organization and regulation of utilities in these smaller 
hinterland towns and cities. 
One of the few Canadian historians to explore the organization and 
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regulation of utilities within the boundaries of a single municipality is 
Paul-Andre Linteau, whose comprehensive study of Maissoneuve, a working- 
class suburb of Montreal, is in many respects the inspiration of this 
thesis. Linteau illustrates how a set of local circumstances such as the 
rate of population growth, the nature of economic development and the 
cultural expectations of the population determined the physical growth of 
the city and shaped the nature of utility organization and regulation.7 
This recognition of the intimate relationship between the urban 
environment and utility regulation is perhaps Linteau’s greatest 
contribution to the field. In the case of Maissoneuve, Linteau identifies 
four stages in land development and demonstrates how property relations 
shaped the socio-economic development of the town. The land area of the 
future urban centre was initially farmland before being unified into even 
larger tracts by speculators as the potential for urban growth became 
apparent. This land was subsequently “Improved” by real estate 
developers who subdivided the land and sold it to small and medium sized 
landowners.8 Land development differed in Port Arthur due to its rugged 
landscape. As a consequence, instead of farmers controlling the land base 
during the Initial phase of development, mining companies were involved. 
The importance of property relations in the determination of social 
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relations and the nature of municipal activity has been explored by British 
historians. A recent study by Avner Offer, a British historian, explores 
the relationship between the distribution of property and the nature of 
social relations, economic activity and political power. According to 
Offer, property relations represent the foundation of the urban centre and 
determines how members of the community interact with one another.9 
Offer defines property as “a bundle of rights, comprising claims 
enforceable In law,” thus making property essentially a legal construct. 
Property relations in Great Britain contributed towards the emergence of 
municipal enterprise, according to Offer, because property relations 
alienated private capital from the urban interest. Large property owners 
did everything within their power to minimize their property tax burden, 
creating enemies, in the process, on the municipal council.The 
character of social relations, economic activity, political power and, I 
would hasten to add, the role of the municipality within the community, 
were largely determined by property relations. The politics of property 
must therefore be considered when dealing with the organization and 
regulation of utilities. 
Canadian urban historian, Thorold J Tronrud, has written extensively 
about boosters and boosterism at the Lakehead prior to World War One. In 
Guardians of Progress. Tronrud makes a major contribution to the 
understanding of property relations in the two towns when he observes 
that “(l)and was developed in each community in similar but not identical 
fashions.”12 The nature of ownership over the land base of the two 
communities had already been determined by 1875 when the government 
decided to locate the terminus of the transcontinental railway along the 
Kaministiquia River. Residents of Prince Arthur’s Landing (Port Arthur), 
who had purchased much of the land up for auction in Port Arthur in 1872, 
did not have as much influence with Ottawa politicians as had the handful 
of speculators from outside the region who controlled the land base of 
what would become Fort William (including the “town plot” in West Fort 
William). These absentee landowners, Tronrud discovered, included such 
prominent men as Featherston Osier, a future judge, and Conservative 
Member of Parliament George Alexander Drew. 13 The decision to locate 
the terminus in West Fort William and the subsequent transfer of Canadian 
Pacific Railway operations onto Hudson Bay Company land in the East End 
ensured that the community of Fort William would develop distinctly 
working-class sections of town. The physical growth of Port Arthur, on 
the other hand, was much more densely concentrated as a result of local 
land ownership and the physical barriers to urban sprawl including the hill 
to the west and McVicar’s Creek to the north (see appendix I). 
While Tronrud admits that property relations differed between Port 
Arthur and Fort William, he does not consider whether this may have 
produced distinctive social relations as well. The potential Impact of the 
domination of absentee landlords to social relations and municipal 
governance was explored by Melvin Baker in his study of property relations 
in St. John’s, Newfoundland. Baker found that absentee landlords, who 
controlled the land base of the city, obstructed the expansion of municipal 
activity, with the help of their local agents, in order to discourage 
increased taxation.in due course, the relationship between local 
tenants and landowners, who were based in Great Britain, was 
characterized by bitter conflict. The absentee landowners were 
successful, however, In forcing the municipality to franchise out to 
private enterprise the provision of urban services. 
There is some evidence which indicates that absentee landowners in 
Port Arthur and Fort William likewise attempted to constrain the activity 
of the two municipalities. For example, an editorial In the Daily Sentinel 
observed in 1883 that absentee landlords had tried unsuccessfully to 
block the incorporation of Port Arthur into a town. 16 The preponderance of 
absentee landowners in Fort William would suggest, however, that the 
constraining effect was much more pronounced in that community. It 
seems likely, then, that the differing property relations at the Lakehead 
acted to constrain municipal enterprise in Fort William, at least before 
the turn of the century, while the local landownership in Port Arthur may 
have acted to facilitate municipal activity. I base this suggestion on the 
possibility that local landowners were swayed by the sense of urgency 
generated by inter-urban rivalry and were therefore more willing to risk 
municipal enterprise. 
In addition to property relations, British historians have recognized 
the profound importance of socio-economic factors in the evolution of 
municipal government. Several of them have argued the impossibility of 
drawing sweeping conclusions about the nature of this experience, which 
varied enormously from city to city. This obstacle was overcome by Asa 
Briggs who found that the nature of economic growth in an urban centre 
determined class relations and consequently shaped the scope of 
municipal activity. The response to industrialization therefore varied 
between the five cities chosen by Briggs in his Victorian Cities. A brief 
comparison between two of these, Manchester and Birmingham, illustrates 
this point fully and contributes to a broader understanding of the nature of 
the urban environment in Port Arthur prior to 1914. 
The giant cotton mills of Manchester dominated that city’s economy 
and resulted in the existence of a relatively small middle-class and an 
enormous working-class. Inter-class relations in Manchester were 
characterized by the alienation and conflict inherent in the large 
industrial workplaces of this era. The middle-class stubbornly clung on to 
laissez-faire liberalism while working people turned to radical working- 
class movements. In this polarized atmosphere, it was hardly surprising 
that the municipal government remained largely inconsequential.The 
“class imprint,” as Briggs so aptly phrases It, on Manchester was entirely 
different than that which existed in Birmingham during the mid- 
nineteenth century. 
Birmingham was a city of small workplaces and a large skilled 
workforce. Inter-class cooperation was fostered by the non-conformist 
faith of the middle class who channelled their religious fervour Into the 
“civic gospel.”18 The civic gospel was characterized by a conception of 
community wherein the municipal government was expected to respond to 
the problems associated with urban life. Under the dynamic leadership of 
Joseph Chamberlain and the Birmingham Liberal Association, the 
municipality undertook an ambitious program of local improvement and 
municipal enterprise which earned the city a world-wide reputation for 
good government. Briggs establishes that a connection existed between 
class relations and the nature of municipal activity. In an atmosphere of 
class conflict Manchester’s municipal government was unable to overcome 
the sense of alienation in the community to respond effectively to the 
problems of rapid urban growth and industrialization, while in 
Birmingham, a remarkable degree of inter-class cooperation acted to 
facilitate the development of municipal enterprise. It is therefore not 
altogether an exaggeration when Briggs observes that, had Frederick 
Engels chosen to live in Birmingham instead of Manchester, Marxism may 
have evolved somewhat differently. 
These secondary sources clearly establish a close relationship between 
the nature of the urban environment of a particular city and the scope of 
municipal activity. It would appear that class conflict worked to impede 
the emergence of municipal enterprise while inter-class cooperation 
acted to facilitate it. Property relations and the nature of economic 
growth are identified by these historians as the most significant factors 
in the determination of social relations. The conflict or cooperation 
which characterized social relations would Inevitably be reflected In the 
operation of the municipal government and shape the ways in which 
different social classes perceived their municipal government and its role 
within the community. It is therefore essential that the nature of the 
urban environment in Port Arthur be established in order to comprehend 
why municipal ownership took hold, to the degree it did, prior to 1914. 
An Atmosphere of Inter-Class Cooperation in Port Arthur 
The historical literature has suffered from a marked tendency to treat 
Port Arthur and Fort William as though they were one “Lakehead” 
community. This has resulted In misleading and often inaccurate 
generalizations by a succession of historians which have distorted the 
nature of socio-economic relations in Port Arthur. In order to disentangle 
this research I will explore social relations in Fort William as well as 
Port Arthur, but will conclude that the urban environment of Port Arthur, 
similar to that of Birmingham, created an atmosphere of inter-class 
cooperation conducive to municipal enterprise. 
Firstly, the myth of “community and conflict” created by Jean 
Morrison must be dispelled. According to Morrison, the relationship 
between the working and middle classes “changed from one of amity in 
1903 to one of hostility in 1913.”19 This interpretation depends almost 
exclusively upon newspaper accounts of labour disputes during this period. 
In investigating the labour disputes, she treats the Lakehead as though it 
were a single homogeneous community, and mistakes a deterioration of 
inter-class relations with distinctive sets of social relations in Port 
Arthur and Fort William. Whereas social relations in Fort William were 
characterized by class conflict throughout this period, I would argue that 
a remarkable degree of inter-class cooperation existed in Port Arthur. 
Secondly, Morrison argued that the response of workers to the growing 
conflict at the Lakehead was determined by the ethnic background of the 
strikers as expressed during the various labour disputes between 1903 
and 1913. She suggests that the nature of these responses was 
transplanted with the immigrants to the Lakehead. As a consequence, 
Italian and Greek Immigrants responded with violence , workers of British 
origin formed trade unions, and Finnish immigrants turned to socialism.20 
While I do not discount altogether that old world traditions helped shape 
social relations at the Lakehead, in suggesting this, however, Morrison has 
resorted to stereotypical assumptions to bolster her case. Had she taken 
account of the urban environment in Fort William and Port Arthur during 
this period, she might have reconsidered some of her observations. 
Strikes and lockouts were much more frequent In Fort William than 
they were in Port Arthur between 1900 and 1914. The nature of the 
strikes also differed between the two urban centres as Port Arthur 
strikers were overwhelmingly non-industrial unlike their Fort William 
counterparts. The second appendix indicates that between 1900 and 1914 
(earlier records were not compiled by the federal government) there were 
at least thirty-three strikes or lockouts, twenty of which were located 
exclusively in Fort William, five extended to both cities and only eight 
were located in Port Arthur.21 Nearly fifty percent of the strikes 
exclusive to or extending into Port Arthur involved the operations of the 
Canadian Northern Railway. The remainder involved strikes of carpenters, 
painters and plumbers, construction labourers, street railway motormen 
and conductors thus indicating the non-industrial character of Port 
Arthur’s economy. The strike data indicates a much greater level of 
industrial conflict in Fort William where at least eight strikes involved 
the Canadian Pacific Railway, and others extended to carpenters, 
plumbers, painters, moulders, iron workers, machinists, dock labourers, 
boilermakers, grain elevator workers, factory workers and municipal 
employees. This evidence suggests not only that labour conflict was much 
more pronounced in Fort William than Port Arthur, but that, the strikes in 
Port Arthur involved essentially non-industrial workers. 
The scale of these strikes also differed considerably between Port 
Arthur and Fort William. The labour disputes which occurred in Fort 
William, as far as I could determine, involved larger numbers of strikers 
then the corresponding strikes in Port Arthur. Among the ten Fort William 
strikes where the number of strikers was identified, three involved more 
than four hundred workers, four others involved from one hundred to four 
hundred strikers, and three were small disputes involving less than one 
hundred people. In comparison, all five of the strikes identified in Port 
Arthur involved less than three hundred strikers. When the total number 
of strikers involved in labour disputes is considered, Fort William 
accounted for three-quarters. The average number of strikers in any given 
dispute involved 350.3 in Fort William, 225 in strikes extending to both 
cities, and 207.2 in Port Arthur. The workplace In Port Arthur was 
therefore smaller, on average, than that of Fort William. When the number 
of strikers is broken down into occupational groups, railway workers 
represented over seventy-five percent of the total number in both 
communities. The composition of the remainder reveals significant 
differences, however, between Port Arthur and Fort William.22 The 
importance of the industrial sector in Fort William and the building trades 
in Port Arthur suggests class relations in the two towns differed 
substantially. 
The nature of the labour disputes strongly suggests that violence was 
not an expression of ethnic background, but rather the product of class 
relations in Fort William. The proportion of strikes ending in success for 
the workers was much higher in Port Arthur than in Fort William, 
indicating a lower level of conflict between employers and their 
employees. This may have been the result of greater employer hostility to 
the demands of the strikers in that city. The 1910 carpenters’ strike 
serves as a convenient example of this distinction. Striking for an 
increase in the minimum wage paid to carpenters and for the ten hour 
work day. Port Arthur contractors settled with the strikers long before 
their Fort William counterparts were forced back to the negotiating 
table.23 The expressed reasons for the strikes also differed as they 
centred on demands for wage increases, shorter working hours, and 
reinstatement of union members in Port Arthur, whereas strikes in Fort 
William also broke out over the failure of the employer to recognize the 
union, the employer’s insistence on an open shop, questionable 
timekeeping practices, the appointment of out-of-town managers in lieu 
of local people, and the breach of the municipality’s fair wage clause.(See 
Table I) The only lockout at the Lakehead also occurred in Fort William 
when the structural iron workers employed by the Canadian Bridge 
Company based in Walkerville Ontario were prevented from working In 
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1909, and replaced by strike breakers imported from the United States and 
Eastern Canada, due to outstanding grievances over working conditions, 
wages and union recognition.24 
Table I 
The Nature of Labour Disputes at the Lakehead, 1903-1913 











TOTAL 1 9 
All of the outbreaks of strike related violence which Morrison identifies 
In her article were, with only one exception, confined to the Fort William 
Coal Docks area. The exception was during the Port Arthur Coal Handlers 
Strike of 1912 when a picket line scuffle got out of hand and a worker of 
Italian origin was shot. This single incident of violence in Port Arthur 
was in no way comparable to the large-scale riots which broke out in Fort 
William during the freight handlers strikes of 1907, and 1909 and during 
the street railway strike in 1913. In the case of the later, a mob 
overturned and smashed up a streetcar and then proceeded to storm a 
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police station in the vain attempt to free an arrested colleague.25 The 
reaction of the mainly Port Arthur striking motormen and conductors (as 
expressed in the Daily Newsi who condemned the violence In Fort William 
and called on citizens to peacefully apply pressure on the municipalities 
reveals a greater willingness on the part of Port Arthur working people to 
play by the rules. The only community which appeared to be in conflict 
was Fort William, and the strike-related violence probably had more to do 
with the antagonistic social relations of that city then with the ethnic 
background of the strikers. 
The strike data suggests that the economic functions of Port Arthur 
and Fort William differed prior to 1914, resulting in distinctive class 
imprints, as Asa Briggs found in Victorian cities in Britain. Economist, 
Livio Di Matteo has written extensively about the wheat boom era at the 
Lakehead between 1900 and 1914.26 in adopting the staples theory, Di 
Matteo Indicates that the economic development of the Lakehead centred 
on its role as a trans-shipment point for the east-west trading axis 
inaugurated by the National Policy of Sir John A. MacDonald. The 
exploitation of the region’s natural resources also figured highly in the 
economic development of the Lakehead.27 The failure to distinguish 
between the economic development of Port Arthur and Fort William 
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distorts these observations, to some degree, as the two towns developed 
specialized economic functions. 
The economies in Port Arthur and Fort William evolved quite 
differently. While Fort William acted as a major trans-shipment point, 
first for the North West Company, then for the Hudson’s Bay Company and 
subsequently for the Canadian Pacific Railway, Port Arthur acted as the 
commercial and administrative centre for the mining and lumber camps 
north and west of the Lakehead. As a result. Fort William was much more 
dependent upon large companies based outside the region. In his study of 
frontier social structure at the Lakehead as revealed In the censuses of 
1871 and 1881, Thorold J Tronrud makes a rare distinction between the 
two communities. He describes Fort William as “almost egalitarian” 
because the social structure consisted of an immense lower strata and 
“an upper class of government officials, Hudson’s Bay Company managers, 
and Catholic clergy imposed upon it from outside.”28 Conversely, Port 
Arthur is portrayed as a more hierarchical environment as it “had a 
larger, more entrenched elite of professionals and men of commerce...”29 
This description of the social structure of these two frontier towns 
confirm my hypothesis that Port Arthur was primarily a non-industrial 
centre. Even after the turn of the century, industrialization in Port Arthur 
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lagged behind Fort William due to a critical shortage of electricity in Port 
Arthur between 1906 and 1910. 
The consumption of electricity can be used as an accurate guide to the 
nature of Port Arthur’s economy prior to 1914. Using the consumption 
figures for the Electrical Department of the City of Port Arthur for 1913 
we can investigate the degree of industrialization at the end of the period 
under review.3o This can be assumed to be an accurate reflection because 
industry required electric power and, with the exception of a steam power 
plant which met the needs of the Canadian Northern Railway, the city 
provided all of the electricity for Port Arthur power consumers. The data 
indicates that in 1913 there were only eight customers which required in 
excess of one hundred horse power. Including three city departments, 
three grain elevators, the dry dock and a hotel. The non-industrial nature 
of Port Arthur is even more clearly established when the total of 6489 HP 
consumed by customers of more than a single horse power is proportioned 
to the various economic sectors. The single largest consumer of 
electricity was the municipality itself which required 3740 HP, or 57.6% 
of the total electrical output. These figures illustrate the Importance of 
municipal enterprise to the community. This was followed by grain 
elevators which consumed 1804 HP, or 27.8%, commercial and industrial 
enterprises which required 1074 HP or 16.6%, and finally, an assortment 
of hotels, churches and newspaper offices which consumed the remaining 
1.9% or 123 HP. These figures indicate that there was relatively little 
industrial activity in Port Arthur during 1913 and that the municipality 
was the single largest consumer of electricity. Unfortunately, similar 
figures are unavailable for Fort William during the same time period; the 
municipality in Fort William likely trailed the grain elevators and 
industry as consumers of electrical power. 
The census figures for Port Arthur and Fort William indicate that the 
religious and ethnic background of the residents of the two towns differed 
substantially prior to 1914. Until the turn of the century nearly three of 
every four residents of Port Arthur were of British origin.31 The non- 
British population consisted of French, Finns, Germans, and Italians 
respectively. The proportion of the population in Fort William of British 
origin was somewhat smaller and the ethnic minorities included French, 
Amerindians, Ruthenians, Italians, Finns, Germans and Scandinavians. 
Over the course of the next ten years, however, an influx of new 
immigrants resulted in the rapid growth of the non-British population. 
According to the 1911 census, 62.4 percent of the residents were of 
British origin, 12.7 percent were Finns, and the remainder included people 
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of French, Polish, Italian, Scandinavian and German origin. In Fort 
William, on the other hand, 59.1 percent of the population were of British 
origin, the Ruthenian population represented 14.7 percent of the 
population and the remainder included, in order of importance, French, 
Italians, Finns, Germans and Scandinavians. 
The character of immigration exaggerated class conflict in Fort 
William, while It acted to bridge class differences in Port Arthur. 
Canada’s immigration policy was based on a racial hierarchy, according to 
Donald Avery; British and Northern European immigrants had “preferred” 
status, followed by the French, East Europeans, South Europeans, and 
finally, at the bottom of the list, were non-white immigrants.32 The 
nature of this policy reflected the xenophobia of the Anglo-Saxon middle 
class. As a result, inter-class relations in Fort William and Port Arthur 
were profoundly influenced by ethnicity. As an important trans-shipment 
point and industrial centre. Fort William attracted a large pool of 
unskilled labour from so-called ‘non-preferred’ nationalities. Their 
presence exaggerated class conflict by accentuating the cultural 
differences between the working and middle classes. The ethnic mosaic in 
Port Arthur, on the other hand, acted to bridge potentially divisive class 
differences because the proportion of immigrants who were not from 
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either Great Britain or Northern Europe was much smaller. This was 
demonstrated by the 1911 census which indicated that 25.9 percent of the 
population of Fort William claimed ethnicity of a non-preferred status; 
non-preferred immigrants comprised only 12.6 percent in Port Arthur. The 
absence of large employers of unskilled workers in Port Arthur resulted In 
a community where ethnicity and the Protestant religion united the social 
classes. 
The religious convictions of the Inhabitants contributed to an 
atmosphere of cooperation in Port Arthur much more than in Fort William. 
In his Masters Thesis on the Protestant reaction to non-British 
immigration to the Lakehead, Marvin MacDonald illustrates that a much 
greater degree of Inter-religious cooperation existed in Port Arthur during 
this period. MacDonald cited several examples of how Baptist, 
Presbyterian and Church of England congregations in Port Arthur reached 
out to the Scandinavian community. While the Baptists sent the Reverend 
Fred Palmberg to preach among the large number of Finns and Swedes who 
settled in the town, the Church of England went so far as to sponsor the 
construction of St. Ansgarius Church in April 1910.33 The Reverend S.C. 
Murray, the Presbyterian Minister of St. Paul’s, was “keenly interested in 
the social problems at the Lakehead, in labour struggles, in civic 
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responsibility...” and was largely responsible for a close relationship 
between the Presbyterian and Evangelical Lutheran Churches.34 The 
congregation at St Paul’s, in an expression of inter-denominational 
cooperation, subsidized the activity of the Lutherans by donating four 
dollars per week. St. Paul’s was the centre of social gospel activity at 
the Lakehead after the turn of the century through the activity of the 
Brotherhood which allowed working and middle class men to work 
together on a campaign against municipal corruption.35 The memoirs of 
the Reverend Murray reveal that he had emigrated directly from 
Birmingham, England, where he was undoubtedly influenced by the “civic 
gospel,” which may account for his keen appreciation for inter-class 
cooperation in Port Arthur.36 MacDonald observes that the social gospel 
did not take hold in Fort William until much later, as Presbyterians in that 
city were primarily attracted instead to evangelicalism. The greater 
degree of religious cooperation suggests that the middle class in Port 
Arthur were more inclined to inter-class cooperation then their Fort 
William counterparts. 
The physical environment fostered inter-class cooperation in Port 
Arthur and class conflict in Fort William. Tronrud is mistaken when he 
suggests that the working-class at the Lakehead “lived a segregated 
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existence-residentially separated into squalid ‘foreign quarters’...”37 The 
Finnish and Italian immigrant enclaves in Port Arthur were not physically 
segregated from the rest of the town, as were the working-class ghettos 
of Fort William. In fact, Jean Morrison observed that relatively speaking 
working people were much more dispersed throughout Port Arthur.38 This 
was possible because of the virtual absence of large employers (until 
after the turn of the century) which would have obligated working people 
to live in close proximity to their place of employment and created 
segregated working-class neighbourhoods. It was only after the turn of 
the century that a handful of large employers such as the Canadian 
Northern Railway, the Pigeon River Lumber Company, and a dry dock were 
located in Port Arthur. The existence of a street railway in the town 
prevented the creation of segregated working class areas. The high 
density of the town also facilitated inter-class contact. As Bryce M. 
Stewart observed in his social survey of Port Arthur in 1913, twelve 
thousand of the sixteen thousand residents of the town lived just below 
the hill.39 Even this level of dispersal beyond the confines of the area 
south of McVicar's Creek, North of John Street and East of the Hill was 
only possible after 1910 when the electric street railway was finally 
extended up the hill and a belt line built north of the creek. The physical 
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growth of the city promoted by these extensions inextricably altered 
social relations, as the middle class gradually migrated out of the 
downtown core. Inter-class relations in Port Arthur, at least until the 
outbreak of World War I, reflected the degree of cooperation possible in a 
small, non-industrial, frontier community. If class “is a relationship, and 
not a thing” as E.P.Thompson argues, the daily contact between people of 
all walks of life in Port Arthur may very well have created a sense of 
community which bridged socio-economic status.The provision of 
municipal services would have been perceived by the working-class in a 
better light as waterworks, sewers, street lighting and telephones were 
not confined to exclusively middle class areas of the city as they were in 
Fort William. The urban environment facilitated municipal enterprise 
because inter-class cooperation, like in Birmingham, created an 
environment conducive to collective action. 
In ter-Ur ban Rivalry 
The connection between rivalry and the nature of state Intervention 
has been explored by Hugh G.J. Aitken, who argued in the 1960s that the 
perceived threat of American expansionism created a sense of urgency 
which led the federal government to escalate its Intervention in the 
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economy. This interpretation has since received widespread acceptance 
among Canadian historians when applied to the emergence of the National 
Policy.41 The rivalry between the United States of America and the 
fledgling Dominion of Canada for control of the West forced the Canadian 
government to advocate an aggressive policy which would people the 
Western plains, build a transcontinental railway and promote industrial 
growth through tariff protection. This international rivalry certainly had 
an important affect on the growth of urban centres and on public 
ownership. Robert Babcock’s comparative study of Portland, Maine and 
Saint John, New Brunswick illustrates how this rivalry contributed 
towards state intervention.42 Urban historians have adapted Aitken’s 
approach in order to study the impact of Inter-urban rivalry, commonly 
referred to as “boosterism”. A handful of urban historians, In turn, have 
suggested that boosterism was the genesis of municipal enterprise. 
Alan F.J. Artibise imported the concept of boosterism from the United 
States where American historian Richard Wade had developed it. 
Boosterism is defined by Artibise as a philosophy of growth shared by the 
commercial classes of prairie towns and cities.43 “Urban boosterism,” 
observes Artibise, 
was something more than a compendium of super salesmanship or 
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mindless rhetoric, and something less than a precise ideology. It 
was a broad, general conception that had as its central theme the 
need for growth, the idea that for a city to become ‘better’ it had to 
become bigger^4 
Artibise argues that boosterism was a product of the Prairie experience. 
However in his investigation of the ‘Metropolitan Thesis’, Donald Davis 
dismisses boosterism as the expression of “incipient western separatism, 
at least among historians.”45 He also believes that booster historians 
have fallen into the trap of celebrating urban elites and their inter-urban 
struggles. “One would not expect scholars,” Davis observes scornfully, 
“who spent their days reading promotional literature churned out by ever- 
optimistic town boosters to evolve a pessimistic view of the world.”46 
This Is an important word of caution to historians interested in exploring 
the booster phenomenon. 
Historians of boosterism have focused almost entirely upon the 
bonusing of private enterprise through cash grants, loan guarantees, tax 
exemptions and various other means, while ignoring almost altogether the 
direct intervention of the municipality through municipal enterprise. 
Artibise and LInteau admit as much in their comprehensive review of 
urban historiography when they suggested that municipal administration 
and enterprise “has not received the attention it deserves from urban 
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historians.”47 The absence of research into municipal enterprise has 
prevented historians from recognizing the possibility that municipal 
bonusing of private enterprise and municipal enterprise were two possible 
instruments available to the booster. One of the few urban historians to 
investigate the relationship between boosterism and municipal enterprise 
has been John C. Weaver, who suggests that boosters understood at the 
turn of the century the relationship between municipal enterprise and 
industrial growth.48 Inter-urban rivalry was therefore responsible for the 
creation of an atmosphere conducive to risk-taking and innovation. 
Municipal enterprise was one such innovation. 
A theory of inter-urban rivalry has been frequently applied to the 
Lakehead in order to explain economic and urban growth. Elizabeth Arthur 
was the first historian to make the connection between this particularly 
intensive rivalry and the formation of a municipal street railway in 
1892.49 Arthur believed that the rivalry between the two urban centres 
was unique, in Canada, due to their close proximity to one another. Since 
this early research, Thorold Tronrud has published extensively on boosters 
and boosterism at the Lakehead. Tronrud discovered that the intensity of 
inter-urban rivalry was such that almost every private enterprise in the 
area prior to 1914 received some form of public financing. He estimates 
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that between 1885 and 1914 the two municipalities together paid out two 
million four hundred thousand dollars in bonuses, representing twelve 
times the expenditure of the average for Southern Ontario cities during 
the same period.so Even though boosterism was a by-product of the inter- 
urban rivalry between the two cities, Tronrud makes no apparent 
distinction between boosters and boosterism in Port Arthur and Fort 
William, whereas a comparative analysis between the two towns might 
capture the overwhelming sense of urgency which produced much of the 
excesses that Tronrud illustrates. 
Boosterism has been portrayed as a destructive force by Tronrud, who 
argues that boosterism failed, at enormous expense, to promote what it 
set out to achieve, namely industrial growth. While I tend to agree that 
boosterism failed, in large part, to Influence urban and industrial growth, 
I would suggest, that boosterism contributed to the emergence of 
municipal enterprise in frontier towns like Port Arthur. Municipal leaders 
and ratepayers were more willing to experiment with municipal 
enterprise because of the profound sense of urgency generated by inter- 
urban rivalry and the empowering effect of booster rhetoric. The citizens 
of Port Arthur convinced themselves that they could overcome all barriers 
to their dream of greatness for their city, alternately described as the 
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“Chicago of the North”, the “Geneva of Canada”, and perhaps most 
accurately of all, the “Birmingham of Canada.” 
The Failure of Private Enterprise 
The development of the staples economy in Canada, according to Harold 
Innis, required state intervention in order to overcome what he considered 
the economic backwardness of the country.si Although Innis only applies 
this theory to the actions of the federal government, it proves even more 
applicable when applied to urban centres. As a result of the fixation of 
urban historians with metropolitan centres or regional exclusiveness, the 
relationship between the availability of finance capital and the nature of 
utility organization and regulation has never been fully explored. Instead, 
John Baldwin, an economist with the now defunct Economic Council of 
Canada, has assumed that public and private capital were mutually 
antagonistic. In so doing, Baldwin portrays public ownership as the 
product of an “opportunistic” state unconstrained by the kind of 
constitutional guarantees for private property that existed in the United 
States.52 One of the first historians to grasp the connection between the 
degree of finance capital available to entrepreneurs and the emergence of 
municipal enterprises was John C. Weaver. “Public ownership caught 
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hold,” he observed, “where private enterprise could not be secure, 
retained, or where its lack of expansionist zeal frustrated important civic 
Interests.”53 The scarcity of finance capital often combined with a sense 
of urgency created by inter-urban rivalry to create an opportunity for 
municipal enterprise. 
The study of the relationship between finance availability and 
economic growth was the focus of James D. Frost’s article which explored 
the workings of the Bank of Nova Scotia. He found that the bank inhibited 
economic growth in the Maritimes, as deposited monies were regularly 
invested outside the region in order to maximize the return.54 in their 
comparative study of hydro-electric power development in and around 
Toronto and Montreal, Armstrong and Nelles discovered that in Toronto’s 
case the “capital market was not apparently large enough and impersonal 
enough to underwrite competing hydro-electric promotions” and thereby 
resulted in monopoly control.55 Surely if capitalists were unable, or 
unwilling, to promote more than one hydro-electric project in a city the 
size of Toronto, there was little chance that smaller towns and cities like 
Port Arthur could do any better without substantial outside investment. 
This was particularly true for such capital intensive utilities as street 
railways, waterworks, electric lights, and hydro-electric power. 
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American and British historians have placed far more importance on 
the availability of finance capital than has so far been the case in Canada. 
Did financial institutions contribute directly towards industrialization? 
How did the scarcity of finance capital affect economic growth? What 
was the role of the state in banking? These are some of the substantive 
questions Rondo Cameron explores in his study of the relationship between 
banking and industrialization in Europe. While bankers were supposed to 
lend, in theory, only on a short-term basis, Cameron found that, in most 
European countries, banking facilitated Industrial growth through the 
provision of long-term loans. Competition between Scottish banks, for 
example, resulted in tremendous economic growth as finance capital was 
freed up and put at the disposal of entrepreneurs.se However, Cameron 
argues that when the state chose to intervene In order to control banking, 
as was the case in France, economic growth was retarded due to the 
resulting scarcity of finance capital.57 The existence of an unsatisfied 
demand for capital financing sometimes resulted, as was the case in 
Russia, In the emergence of such non-traditional financial Institutions as 
municipal banks and mutual credit societies. 
The United States, in comparison, adopted a “free banking” model due 
to the exaggerated demand for finance capital. American historian Brand 
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Hammond establishes that while banking practices varied from state to 
state, the adoption of free banking by Michigan in 1837 and New York in 
the following year resulted in a free-for-all as banks opened their doors 
without regard for the stability of the concern.ss While the new policy 
seemed to work reasonably well in New York, it proved disastrous for 
Michigan and other mid-western states. Somewhat ironically, it was the 
scarcity of finance capital, which was the reason why free banking was 
adopted in the first place, which caused the collapse of dozens of these 
unincorporated banks. The Canadian banking system, on the other hand, 
was a model of conservative management according to Hammond. Canadian 
bankers even preferred the security of incorporation after a free banking 
law was adopted in 1870 than the uncertainty of cut-throat competition. 
Only a mere handful of private banks were therefore organized under the 
Act. 
Assuming Hammond to be correct, the opening of two private banks in 
Port Arthur during the 1880’s indicate that the scarcity of finance capital 
was such that citizens were willing to take a greater risk than their 
Southern Ontario counterparts. The appearance of the Ray, Street and 
Company and the British-American Bank indicate that the demand for 
credit was greater than that which the branch of the Ontario Bank, the 
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only incorporated bank in the area, was willing or able to satisfy.59 
Ambitious local entrepreneurs were obviously unable to acquire what they 
considered to be adequate financing from the Ontario Bank, at least during 
the early years. The distance of the branch from its head office in Toronto 
would certainly have contributed to this scarcity. The relatively 
insignificant deposits and securities of these local financial institutions 
would certainly have limited their ability to lend out large sums of money 
and prevented them from providing long-term loans. The rapid 
disappearance of the British-American Bank and the failure of Ray, Street 
and Company during the real estate collapse of 1913 illustrate the kind of 
drawbacks associated with private banking in hinterland areas. 
While banks were probably the most obvious potential source of 
finance capital to entrepreneurs, insurance companies represented an 
important alternative In many places, but not in Port Arthur. Insurance 
companies were second only to banks as a source of finance capital for 
American entrepreneurs, according to Philip L. Merkel. Unlike banks, 
however, Merkel discovered that insurance companies were extremely 
centralized institutions, which made it difficult for entrepreneurs outside 
the major financial centres to access the immense wealth of some of 
these companies.60 A survey of the annual reports of the Bureau of 
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Insurance Companies of the Ontario government indicates that not a single 
insurance company was based in Northwestern Ontario prior to World War 
One. Advertisements in Port Arthur newspapers suggest that premiums 
paid for fire and life insurance went to companies based in Southern 
Ontario, Great Britain and the United States. In any case, it was not until 
1899 that security restrictions on life insurance companies were lifted 
thereby freeing up millions of dollars for investment.61 It does not 
appear, however, that the Lakehead benefitted much from this change, as I 
could only find one case where a substantial loan was made by an 
insurance company to finance a scheme in the area. The exception was a 
promised one hundred thousand dollar loan to Edward S. Jenison in 1900 to 
finance his scheme to harness the waterpower of the Kaministiquia 
River.62 Jenison’s scheme ironically failed to materialize, partially 
because of inadequate financing. Consequently, instead of providing a 
source of finance capital to Port Arthur entrepreneurs, insurance 
companies exaggerated the scarcity of finance capital by siphoning money 
out of the region through premiums. 
The potential sources of capital financing in large urban centres such 
as Toronto far outnumbered those in small frontier communities like Port 
Arthur, thereby contributing to the failure of private enterprise to 
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respond to demands for urban services. A private utility entrepreneur in 
Toronto, at the turn of the century, could expect to raise capital financing 
from any number of banks, insurance companies, investment banks, and 
capitalists within what remained a close-knit business community. The 
Toronto based promoter had the added advantage of extensive personal 
contacts. These opened doors that were otherwise closed to those from 
the outside. The Port Arthur entrepreneur was, in comparison, isolated 
from the major sources of finance capital, as there were only a handful of 
banks, no insurance companies, no investment banks and few indigenous 
capitalists in any position to invest large sums of their own money into a 
private utility company. The failure of the Port Arthur Water, Light and 
Power Company to fulfil its promise to build a waterworks, a hydro- 
electric project and an extensive system of electric lights during the late 
1880s and early 1890s attests to the obstacles Port Arthur utility 
entrepreneurs faced. 
Utility companies based outside Northwestern Ontario, with the 
exception of the Canadian Northern Railway and the Bell Telephone 
Company, were not interested or incapable of locating In Port Arthur prior 
to 1914. This is hardly surpising for, as business historian Douglas 
McCalla has established, business organizations were relatively small 
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during this period. 
It was a world of growing specialization and complexity of business 
institutions and, increasingly, an urban business world in which 
fewer and larger centres dominated in most areas of economic 
activity. But not until virtually the end of the period, in 1914, could 
the modern bureaucratic, multi-branch, multi-product company be 
said in any sense to have typified Canadian business.63 
It was therefore the exceptional case where a company based in the United 
States or Eastern Canada could consider providing urban services in the 
region. The Bell Telephone Company was able to exploit its patent 
licences, its control of long-distance telephone lines, and its sheer size 
to buy out or eliminate local rivals. Important studies of Bell Telephone 
operations in the United States and Canada by Gerald Brock and Graham 
Taylor have established that the company set out to to maximize profits. 
This resulted in anger and frustration in many places, including the 
Lakehead, and ultimately, in the organization of municipal telephone 
exchanges In Port Arthur, Fort William and Kenora. In more ways then one, 
the organization and regulation of telephones in Port Arthur proved an 
exception to much of what has been discussed in this chapter because a 
private company did, in fact, establish itself. The basis of municipal 
ownership in this field, at least, resembles patterns of utility 
organization and regulation in Toronto or Montreal. 
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A direct correlation between the scarcity of finance capital and the 
emergence of municipal enterprise is established by statistics compiled 
by the Ontario Bureau of Labour which suggest small hinterland cities 
were far more inclined to experiment with municipal enterprise than large 
urban centres before 1911.(See Table II) As the table indicates, when 
waterworks are excluded from the calculations, the top five municipal 
ownership towns, as reflected by the capital invested in municipal 
enterprise, were in order of importance. Port Arthur, Fort William, Guelph, 
Kenora and Berlin. These communities share three things in common: they 
were all small or medium-sized urban centres, they were all enthusiastic 
boosters of urban and industrial growth prior to 1914, and none of the five 
were substantial financial centres. The fact that three of the five were 
Table II — 
Total Investment in Municipal Enterprise in Ontario up to 1911 
Municipality Total Value Excluding Waten^orks 
Port Arthur 972 700 572 700 
Fort William 1 255 824 553 985 
Guelph 829 560 505 595 
Kenora 633 775 456 724 
Berlin 656 548 449 969 
Ottawa 2 580 000 330 000 
St. Thomas 600 000 325 000 
Orillia 440 000 325 000 
Kingston 614 437 314 437 
Wingham 670 000 300 000 
Owen Sound 430 331 204 431 
Brockville 441 000 175 000 
Niagara Falls 325 000 125 000 
Statistics compiled from Bureau of Labour, Sessional Papers, 1911 
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located in Northwestern Ontario seems to confirm my argument that there 
existed a scarcity of finance capital within the region. The ability of 
private utility companies to raise finance capital in Toronto, Ottawa, 
Hamilton and Windsor made municipal enterprise not only unnecessary but 
undesirable from the point of view of the economic elite. The scope of 
municipal enterprise in Fort William was partially the result of the 
pioneering efforts of Port Arthur. While Fort William’s street railway 
was actually owned and operated by Port Arthur until 1908, the 
construction of two municipal steam power plants in Fort William were in 
response to municipal power projects in Port Arthur. 
The perceived role of the municipality in promoting economic growth 
depended upon the availability of private enterprise to raise finance 
capital. In large urban centres like Toronto, Montreal and Hamilton, the 
municipality failed to bonus, to any great extent, not because they lacked 
a philosophy of growth, as Artibise would have It, but rather because 
there were plenty of other sources of finance capital. There was 
therefore little pressure on the municipality to finance private 
enterprise, and even less desire on the part of ratepayers to foot the bill. 
In addition, it was virtually impossible to get out a sufficient vote to 
pass a bonus by-law in a large urban centre. Among hinterland towns like 
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Port Arthur, on the other hand, there was great difficulty raising 
sufficient financing for private schemes. As a consequence, there existed 
enormous pressure on municipal councillors to provide financial support 
to entrepreneurs frustrated by the scarcity of finance capital. It is 
reasonable to assume that municipal politicians and ratepayers recognized 
this obstacle to economic growth and were therefore much more willing 
to use public finances in support of private initiative. In this context, the 
distinction between “public” and “private” enterprise, which is so evident 
in the historical literature, loses much of its meaning. The real choice 
with respect to utilities was really between bonusing private enterprise, 
municipal enterprise, or simply going without. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the existing historical literature has suffered from its 
focus upon utility organization and regulation in large urban centres. This 
has created a distorted image which does little to explain why municipal 
enterprise seemed to flourish the most in smaller hinterland towns. It 
has also resulted in an unfortunate assumption by some historians that 
“public” and “private” enterprise were mutually antagonistic. This 
chapter has established that, prior to 1914, a real opportunity existed in 
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hinterland towns like Port Arthur for the emergence of municipal 
enterprise. The basis of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur was the 
combination of an atmosphere of inter-class cooperation which 
facilitated collective action through the municipal government, a profound 
sense of urgency generated by the particularly intensive inter-urban 
rivalry with Fort William, and the failure of private enterprise to respond 
to demands for urban services due to the scarcity of finance capital. 
While the opportunity for municipal enterprise existed during this period 
in many towns and cities across Canada and the United States, Port 
Arthur emerged as a pioneer in municipal enterprise because its citizens 
had confidence in their municipal government. The next chapter will 
explore how this confidence led ratepayers to turn away from the bonusing 
of private utility companies and towards municipal enterprise. There is 
little question that Port Arthur truly was “a municipal ownership town” 
prior to 1914. 
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MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE 
“In entering upon the consideration of municipal affairs, so vast is the subject in its 
comprehensiveness, and so diversified the subject matter, that the stoutest heart might 
reasonably feel overwhelmed whilst contemplating the extent of the scope afforded for the 
exercise of thought, and the application of one man’s limited experience/’ 
-William Powis, Municipal Finance and Accounts. 1889 
The inability of private enterprise to respond adequately to the 
growing demands for urban services in Port Arthur created an opportunity 
for the municipality to expand the scope of its activity. The extent to 
which this opportunity resulted in experimentation with municipal 
enterprise largely depended upon how people perceived their municipal 
government and its role within the community. Was the municipality 
capable of managing a cheap and reliable service at a reasonable cost to 
the ratepayer? A prerequisite for the emergence of municipal enterprise 
was, therefore, public confidence in the honesty and efficiency of the 
municipal administration. It was the this public confidence which enabled 
the town of Port Arthur to experiment so extensively with municipal 
enterprise, differentiating it from other hinterland towns where the 
opportunity for municipal enterprise never translated into the expansion 
of municipal activity. 
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This chapter will explore the inner workings of municipal 
administration and finance in Port Arthur in order to discover why 
ratepayers believed the municipality was capable of managing urban 
services. It will establish that public confidence in the municipal 
government originated from a combination of the following: a legal 
environment which promoted rather than obstructed the adoption of 
municipal enterprise in Ontario, the municipality’s access to sufficient 
finance capital to consider expanding the scope of its activity, a non- 
partisan tradition among elected municipal officials, the rise of a 
professional municipal bureaucracy, and external forces at work within 
the community in favour of municipal enterprise. By Investigating the 
dynamic between municipal politicians, managers and employees in 
relation to the decision making process, I will illustrate that the widely 
held assumption that municipal governments during this era were under 
the complete domination of the economic elite is an over-simplification 
which ignores the growing complexities of municipal activity. 
Whereas municipal governance had earned the reputation for 
corruption and incompetence, especially In the United States, the 
municipality of Port Arthur was viewed within the community and 
elsewhere as an exceptional case where municipal ownership seemed to 
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result in good government. An indication of this perceived singularity was 
reflected in an editorial in The Financial Post in August 1908 which 
expressed grudging admiration for the city. “Public ownership schemes,” 
the Post observed 
have been generally condemned In the columns of The Post. The 
sentiment of investors is rightly opposed to a city or state 
undertaking to own and control enterprises which the traditions of 
the past have recognized as private corporations. The Post 
mentioned Port Arthur as one of the exceptional cases where 
public ownership schemes have been operated by the city without 
loss. It seems, however, that even though intrinsically their 
schemes may be sound and able to earn a profit, yet the credit of 
the city has suffered on account of the mere fact that it is a 
public ownership city. Where one city like Port Arthur might 
successfully manage its electric light, telephone and street 
railway systems, there are a dozen others who would fail In the 
attempt.1 
This is a remarkable admission on the part of a newspaper which was 
ideologically opposed to municipal ownership. It confirms that the nature 
of municipal enterprise In Port Arthur differed from that of other so- 
called municipal ownership towns. 
Less scrupulous opponents of municipal enterprise attempted to cast 
Port Arthur in a negative light In order to defeat attempts at 
municipalization in cities like Ottawa. In this instance the Ottawa- 
Journal. a vocal opponent of the proposed organization of a local municipal 
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telephone exchange, sent a correspondent all the way to Port Arthur and 
Fort William in order to evaluate the municipal telephone systems of 
these cities. The resulting series of articles which appeared in the 
newspaper portrayed the cities as incapable of managing local telephone 
exchanges. In response, the town councils condemned the articles and 
accused the correspondent of being in league with the Bell Telephone 
Company. Witnesses claimed that the correspondent had been seen on 
several occasions in the company of a Bell Telephone manager and that the 
two had even travelled to and from Port Arthur together.2 While it is 
practically impossible to know for certain whether or not these 
accusations were accurate, there can be little doubt that the reputation of 
the Lakehead for the efficient management of municipal enterprise was 
such that opponents of the innovation found it necessary to go to great 
lengths to undermine its reputation. Why did Port Arthur ratepayers have 
confidence in their municipal government despite the negative reputation 
of municipal ownership In the United States? What differentiated Port 
Arthur’s experiment with municipal ownership of urban services from the 
vast majority of others who failed, according to the Post, in the attempt? 
Advocates of municipal enterprise were just as quick to exploit Port 
Arthur’s reputation for good government as were its opponents. J.O. 
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Curwood of The Reader observed upon visiting the Lakehead that “[t]hey 
have been revealing heretofore unsuspected virtue of municipal enterprise- 
-a virtue that means more than anything else the uplifting of the people of 
a city or a nation.”3 This association of municipal ownership with honesty 
at the Lakehead was seized upon by the correspondent in order to respond 
to critics who argued that municipal politics was too corrupted to manage 
urban services effectively. J. O. Curwood relates how, after he boarded 
the streetcar upon his arrival, he got into a friendly conversation with the 
conductor who would from time to time jump off the car to pick up 
parcels waiting on the side of the road. When asked by the curious 
correspondent why people didn’t steal these parcels, the man was startled 
at the mere suggestion. This inspired Curwood to write that “my 
experience on that short ride had brought me into surprisingly close touch 
with two of the most interesting concomitants of municipal ownership in 
Port Arthur and Fort William-morality in general and honesty in 
particular.”4 Any unhappiness which did exist among the inhabitants of 
the two cities about their municipal enterprises were discounted as the 
by-product of the ambition which municipal enterprise inspires in people.s 
He even went so far as to suggest, albeit somewhat sheepishly, that “the 
day is coming when Port Arthur and Fort William will be taxless towns.”6 
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These articles illustrate how opponents and advocates of municipal 
enterprise in the United States and Canada recognized the positive 
reputation of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur and Fort William. The 
emergence of municipal enterprise in Canada, however, depended upon a 
sympathetic provincial government. 
The Legal Environment and Municipal Enterprise 
An exploration into the evolution of statutory law in Ontario is 
essential to our understanding of the nature of municipal administration 
and finance. Statutory law determined the legal basis of municipal 
enterprise because, unlike the United States, there was never any 
constitutional recognition of private property In Canada. In Regulatory 
Failure and Renewal. John Baldwin Indicates that Canada turned to public 
ownership because the “opportunism” of the state was unconstrained by 
the courtsT The British North America Act failed, according to J.G. 
Bourinot, to recognize municipal governments as anything more than 
entirely subordinate to the provinces.8 Their legal status as “ corporate 
bodies” was therefore determined by provincial statutes as interpreted by 
the courts. The emergence of municipal enterprise required the 
cooperation of the provincial government in order to ensure that the 
municipality had the legal right to own and operate urban services. 
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Failure to do so risked legal action against the municipality and the very 
real possibility that the enterprise would be declared ultra vires, or 
outside the jurisdiction of the municipal government. Armstrong and 
Nelles discovered as much in their comparative study of hydro-electric 
development in Montreal and Toronto where the Ontario government’s 
sympathy towards municipal enterprise led to public ownership, while 
Quebec’s hostility obstructed similar efforts in that province.9 Did the 
Ontario government act, as Armstrong and Nelles suggest, to facilitate the 
emergence of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur? 
The early development of local government was of an extremely 
limited nature. On the centenary of the Municipal Corporations Act, J.H. 
Aitchison wrote an article which explored the early development of local 
government in Upper Canada which culminated in the adoption of this Act 
in 1849. Commonly referred to as the Baldwin Act, the Municipal 
Corporations Act served as the legal basis of municipal governance in 
Ontario until the 1960s.io Prior to its adoption, Aitchison found that local 
government had a long but limited existence from the days of New France. 
After the American Revolution, British authorities were loath to 
recognize local institutions, as New England town hall meetings were 
blamed for fomenting revolutionary ideas.Political scientists C.R. and S. 
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Moves Tindal found that it was not until the demands of the Loyalists had 
grown too loud to be ignored any longer that the Parish and Town Officers 
Act was adopted in 1793.12 While this legislation permitted local 
meetings, decision making continued to be centralized. The rebellion of 
1837 further retarded the growth of local governance in Upper Canada as 
its leader was William Lyon Mackenzie, who had been elected York’s first 
Mayor in 1835.13 There was little local autonomy even after district 
councils were established in 1841, as the district officers were all 
appointed by the governor. Modern municipal administration was born in 
1849 with the Baldwin Act. The Baldwin Act replaced the inadequate 
district councils with a new nomenclature of local institutions. Counties, 
cities, towns, villages and townships were created with a particular set 
of responsibilities and taxing powers. 
A closer inspection of the Consolidated Municipal Act of 1883, which 
was essentially an amended version of the Baldwin Act, is necessary in 
order to understand the legal standing of Port Arthur during this period. 
This Act set out in detail the various aspects of municipal administration 
and finance, including minimum qualification standards for candidates and 
electors for municipal elections, which were to be held the first Monday 
of each January. Permitted to vote were those men and single or widowed 
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women over twenty-one years of age who met the minimum property 
ownership requirements established for Northern Ontario.while this Act 
excluded almost all women and unskilled male workers, skilled workers 
usually owned enough property to qualify. The town of Port Arthur, also 
incorporated in 1883, was eligible to elect a Mayor, and three councillors 
from each of the three wards. Once elections had taken place, the Council 
was required by the Act to appoint a clerk, treasurer, assessors, tax 
collectors and two auditors and such other officials “as are necessary.s 
This gave individual municipal councils a carte blanche as to the size and 
shape of their municipal bureaucracy. Perhaps the single most important 
aspect of the Act, however, was the legal requirement that all money by- 
laws and franchise agreements be voted upon by the ratepayers.As a 
consequence, the actions of the municipal government were held 
accountable to the will of the ratepayers. Ratepayers were those electors 
who were substantial property holders in the community. Any experiment 
with municipal enterprise therefore needed the approval of a simple 
majority of the ratepayers, thereby emphasizing the importance of public 
confidence In the decision-making process. 
The financial provisions In the Municipal Act enabled Ontario 
municipalities to consider municipal enterprise. The primary means of 
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financing municipal activity, including municipal enterprise, was through 
the issue of debentures to investors for a period of fifteen or twenty 
years, depending upon its purpose, during which the investors received 
annual interest payments of a maximum of five percent on their loan to 
the municipality.17 The principal would subsequently be paid back to the 
debenture holder at the end of the term. The municipality was constrained 
to a certain extent by the Act, for it set maximum debt loads and tax 
rates, and required the municipality to meet the annual interest and 
sinking fund payments, sufficient to pay off the principle due on the 
expiry of the debenture. A fair degree of investor confidence in the 
municipal government was necessary to raise sufficient finance capital in 
order to meet the expenditures for the proposed activity. The emergence 
of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur therefore occurred, ironically, only 
with the financial assistance of Eastern capitalists who were more 
willing to invest in the municipality of Port Arthur than they were private 
enterprise in the region. This was due to the conservativism of the 
Canadian investor, who preferred the security of municipal debentures 
over bonds or stock in private companies or loans to entrepreneurs. 
The Consolidated Municipal Act of 1883 also prohibited municipal 
councils from granting an exclusive privilege for any trade or calling, 
62 
including urban utilities.is While this effectively precluded any 
municipality from enforcing a private utility monopoly, private utility 
companies still needed the approval of the municipality to conduct 
business within its boundaries. The exception was The Bell Telephone 
Company, which had been granted a special clause in its Federal charter 
which stated that its operations were “for the general benefit of Canada,” 
thus permitting the company to escape municipal regulation.19 The council 
was empowered, on the other hand, to operate its own waterworks, 
gasworks and sewerage facilities.20 There was no explicit indication, 
however, that an Ontario municipality could operate its own street 
railway, electric lights, waterpower or telephone exchange. I do not 
believe that this represented a conscious effort on the part of provincial 
politicians to limit the scope of municipal enterprise, but rather that it 
reflects the technological infancy of these urban services. The 
Consolidated Municipal Act therefore facilitated rather than obstructed 
the growth of municipal enterprise by enabling municipalities to issue 
debentures and through the explicit recognition of the municipal 
ownership of some urban services. 
Amendments to the Municipal Act , which occurred on an almost 
annual basis until the outbreak of World War I, acted to further encourage 
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the development of municipal enterprise. An early example of the 
willingness of legislators to facilitate municipal enterprise occurred in 
1890 when the Act was amended to extend the duration of debentures to 
thirty years for the purposes of railway, gas, waterworks, parks, sewers 
and school expenditures.21 The effect of this amendment was to lessen 
the financial barriers to municipal enterprise by spreading out the period 
in which the ratepayers made payments into a sinking fund. A second 
amendment explicitly empowered municipalities to operate municipal 
street railways in such instance that no private one already existed.22 The 
adoption of legislation in 1892 respecting the Town of Port Arthur 
endorsed the municipality’s efforts to construct a municipal street 
railway.23 The only amendment to the Act which constrained municipal 
enterprise was the so-called “Conmee Amendment” adopted in 1899. 
Named after James Conmee, the Member of Provincial Parliament for 
Algoma District, the amendment required that municipalities offer to buy- 
out existing private companies, at a price determined through arbitration, 
before a municipality could proceed with the municipal ownership of an 
urban utility.24 That this amendment should originate from the MPP from 
Port Arthur indicates that support for municipal ownership was not 
universal. The amendment did not obstruct, however, the continued 
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extension of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur largely because of the 
failure of private enterprise to raise sufficient finance capital in order to 
represent a realistic alternative to the municipality. 
The year before the Conmee amendment was adopted, the Municipal 
Act was amended to permit the election of councillors at-large.25 The 
swift adoption of this change by the town of Port Arthur can be used as 
evidence that the economic elite feared the growing power of working- 
class voters. This is unlikely, however, as an atmosphere of inter-class 
cooperation and the lack of militancy on the part of the working-class 
provided little basis for this kind of reaction. Class dispersal and the 
concentration of the urban centre would also have prevented any kind of 
popular identification with a particular ward. In Fort William, on the 
other hand, the ward system reflected genuine socio-economic divisions 
within the community, thereby making the elimination of the ward system 
extremely difficult. Another factor which may have contributed to the 
adoption of an at-large system of voting was the growing proportion of 
council business which was city-wide in nature such as the street railway 
and, after 1898, electric lights. Strictly localized issues such as streets, 
sidewalks, sewers and water mains were removed from the purview of the 
municipal council by the Ontario Frontage Act. 
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The Frontage Act contributed to the emergence of municipal enterprise 
by reducing the workload of councillors freeing them to consider 
experimentation. Jon Teaford’s study of American municipal governance 
illustrates that the most hotly contested and potentially divisive Issue 
facing local councillors were “neighbourhood” or “ward” issues.26 These 
purely local Issues introduced conflict among ward councillors, who were 
elected to get as much as possible for their wards. “Ward politics” which 
became synonymous with corruption, contributed to the poor reputation of 
American municipal governments. Ontario municipalities, in contrast, 
were governed by the Frontage Act, which required that those property 
owners who directly benefitted from local improvements paid for the 
sewer, water main, sidewalk, or other works themselves through a special 
assessment on their property.27 The municipal government, upon reception 
of a petition from the property holders of a given block who represented 
two-thirds of the owners and at least fifty percent of the total assessed 
value of the property, was compelled to build the proposed works. 
Municipal councillors were therefore by-passed, freeing the council to 
consider issues which were of city-wide importance. The weakness of the 
Act, however, was that local Improvements only occurred in those parts of 
the municipality able to afford the financial burden of a special 
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assessment. 
Public demands for changes to the Frontage Act in Port Arthur began 
when unsuccessful Mayoral candidate R.E. Mitchell called for the 
amendment of the Act in 1885 in order to improve the sanitary conditions 
of poorer neighbourhoods.28 The town’s Medical Health Officer also 
demanded changes in his annual report to the Provincial Board of Health in 
1889. Dr T.S.T. Smellie declared : 
...that as many sanitary improvements may be impeded by the 
operations of the Frontage Act, under which the town groans, 
some additional power should be given Boards of Health to 
enable them to carry out necessary improvements, such as the 
construction of drains and sewers, when the cupidity of owners 
of property on the streets requiring such improvements render 
futile the efforts of the Board to improve the sanitary condition 
of the town.29 
Mitchell and Smellie must not have been the only voices calling for 
changes to the Frontage Act, as It was amended in April 1890 to allow a 
two-thirds majority of a municipal council to construct sewers paid for 
by general revenue.so While this amendment undoubtedly resulted In the 
improvement in the sanitary conditions of urban Ontario, the Frontage Act 
allowed councillors to channel their energies into municipal enterprise 
and enhanced their own reputations as local improvements were perceived 
to be free of “ward politics.” 
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This brief review of the evolution of statutory law in Ontario as it 
relates to municipal enterprise prior to 1914 indicates that the provincial 
government actively promoted the municipal ownership of urban services. 
The legal basis for municipal enterprise was consequently not simply the 
product of the absence of constitutional protection for private property in 
Canada, but rather the product of a conscious effort on the part of 
provincial legislators. Enforcement of statutory law by the province and 
the courts was such that historian John Taylor suggests that “urban 
centres were left free in the last part of the nineteenth century to pursue 
their policies of growth and physical and social amelioration.”3i The 
nature of this supervision was therefore important in determining the 
extent to which municipalities abided by statutory law. 
Provincial supervision of municipal activity prior to 1906 consisted 
of the requirement that money by-laws be ratified by the legislature 
before coming Into effect. While in theory this veto kept municipalities in 
check, the burgeoning workload of the legislature and its committees 
ensured that in practice the province bowed to the will of the 
municipality.32 After 1906, the formation of the Ontario Railway and 
Municipal Board substantially increased the Province’s ability to 
supervise the actions of municipalities. The Board served a semi-judicial 
68 
function through the arbitration of disputes between municipalities and 
ensured municipal by-laws were not ultra vires. The annual reports of the 
Board indicate that, on several occasions, the operations of the Port 
Arthur street railway came under provincial scrutiny. It did not act to 
constrain, in any way, however, the ability of Port Arthur to own and 
operate urban services. 
The courts proved unable to constrain the actions of the municipality 
of Port Arthur due to the intervention of the Province in order to assuage 
legal doubt as to the legality of the municipal street railway. In the court 
case of Dwyer vs Port Arthur, the municipality’s ability to construct a 
municipally owned and operated street railway came into question as the 
courts granted an injunction.33 By the time it went before Judge Osier and 
the Ontario Court of Appeal a provincial statute had hurriedly been 
adopted which accorded Port Arthur the right to construct its street 
railway, forcing the Court of Appeal to dismiss the suit permitting the 
town to proceed with construction. This example illustrates how the will 
of the provincial legislature overcame potential legal obstacles to 
municipal enterprise. Subsequent court cases involving the municipal 
ownership of electric lights, hydro-electric power, and legal action 
undertaken by The Bell Telephone Company in retaliation for the 
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organization of a rival municipal telephone system all ended with the 
affirmation of municipal enterprise. 
The political dominance of the economic elite in Port Arthur, while 
substantial, was constrained by the growing scope and complexity of 
municipal enterprise. In the opinion of urban historian John C. Weaver, 
municipal government was little more than an instrument of the ambition 
of the local elite.34 This assumption has also been applied to the 
Lakehead. “Government was simple in both structure and design,” 
Tronrud suggested. “It existed to serve the ends, both personal and 
collective, of those who controlled it and booster-orientated businessmen 
readily assumed that control as a natural right.”35 While it was 
undoubtedly the ambition of booster politicians to advance their private 
interests in public office, categorically declaring that they succeeded is 
an overly simplistic analysis of the decision making process in 
municipalities such as Port Arthur. While this observation may have been 
accurate with respect to the municipal administration of Port Arthur in 
1880, it fails to take into account the growing scope and complexity of 
municipal activity after the turn of the century. Municipal administration 
comprised not only elected municipal councillors and the mayor, but it 
also included managers, municipal employees and ratepayers. Booster 
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politicians had little alternative but to share power with new groups 
within and without the municipal administration. 
The approach taken towards municipal administration and finance in 
this chapter was profoundly influenced by John Garrard’s investigation 
into the nature of municipal administration in the British towns of 
Salford, Bolton and Rochdale. While Garrard agreed that the economic 
elite of these three towns dominated the municipal councils, he found 
that, in doing so, they still failed to control the municipal government. 
Their power was constrained by the central government, growing 
managerial influence, time consuming ritual and routine, the increasing 
complexity of municipal activity, and the greater popular intervention in 
local governance.36 The decision-making process was therefore not 
limited to municipal politicians, as Canadian urban historians have 
sometimes been quick to assume, but increasingly extended to a wide 
variety of individuals and organizations. For instance, Garrard observes 
that elected officials had less and less to do with decision-making as the 
increasing scope and complexity of municipal activity accelerated their 
dependency upon the expertise of municipal managers.37 | found Garrard’s 
holistic approach to municipal administration compelling enough to apply 
it to Port Arthur. In the remainder of this chapter, the changing 
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relationship between municipal politicians, managers and employees in 
the decision-making process will be explored as the scope and complexity 
of municipal activity expanded. In addition, the effect of ‘external’ 
forces within the community on decision-making will also be discussed. 
Municipal Politicians 
The social background of elected officials in Port Arthur between 
1884 and 1914 was almost exclusively middle class. Seventy-one percent 
of the municipal politicians, whose occupations were Identified, were 
either merchants, professionals or officials of the provincial or federal 
governments. Of the remainder, less than ten percent can be identified as 
‘industrialists’ although most of these were, like the Woodside brothers, 
small-scale and locally based. These findings must be Interpreted 
cautiously as the business interests of many of these local politicians 
seldom conformed to one specific classification. This was reflected by 
Thorold Tronrud’s extensive research into the individuals behind land 
development. He concluded that over one-third of all the elected 
councillors and mayors of both cities during this period were in one way 
or another involved in land promotion.38 What can be safely concluded from 
the breakdown of at least the principal occupations of municipal 
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politicians was that it was the non-industrial middle-class which was 
elected. This distinction is important because the non-industrial middle 
class would have been more likely to have earned the confidence of all 
social classes within the community. 
Only a few representatives of the working class were elected to the 
Port Arthur council, contrasted with Fort William, which regularly elected 
working class representatives from Ward One and in 1909 elected L.L. 
Peltier, a railway conductor, as mayor. This distinction could indicate one 
of two things; either working people were systematically excluded from 
the Port Arthur council, or the working class was generally satisfied with 
their middle-class representatives. Indeed, it may very well have been a 
combination of the two. The defeat of Finnish socialist municipal slates 
In 1905 and 1911 seems to suggest that the middle-class, and probably 
the Anglo-Saxon working-class as well, were unwilling to vote for a 
change. Public attitudes towards working-class political involvement 
was reflected by the Trades and Labor Council which put forward two 
Anglo-Saxon candidates in 1911 who not only won, but received an 
endorsement from the normally conservative Daily News. 
It Is quite just and proper that the labour organization should 
take such a step, it may be construed by some as the thin edge 
of the wedge by which party politics would be introduced into 
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municipal affairs, but there is more reason to believe otherwise.39 
The election of Frederick Urry and W.G. Woodside indicates that middle 
class voters were not necessarily opposed to the representatives of 
organized labour. While there does not appear to have been a concerted 
effort on the part of the middle-class to exclude working-class 
representatives from the municipal council, there likewise does not 
appear to be much dissatisfaction on the part of the Anglo-Saxon working- 
class and organized labour with the middle-class dominated Council. 
The ethnic and religious background of municipal politicians indicate 
that there was a fair degree of homogeneity among councillors on this 
basis. The overwhelming majority were of British origin, but as one 
visitor remarked, the Irish enjoyed prominence within the economic and 
political life of the community. As far as can be determined by a simple 
analysis of the names of elected officials, there have been only a handful 
of non Anglo-Saxons elected during this thirty year period between 1884 
and 1914. The exceptions were primarily councillors of French or 
Scandinavian ancestry. In the case of religion, there does not appear to be 
any evidence of overt anti-Catholicism in Port Arthur. If the local 
newspapers are any Indication, religion only became an issue during the 
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1885 municipal election when the Daily Sentinel accused Mayoral 
candidate James Conmee of exploiting his own Catholicism in order to 
defeat his Protestant opponent.4o The victory of Conmee and his 
subsequent election as the area’s provincial and federal representative 
suggests very strongly that religious tensions were muted if not entirely 
non-existent. The ethnic and religious background of municipal politicians 
was not a divisive force on the Council prior to World War I. 
The high rate of turnover among elected officials in Port Arthur 
contributed to the decline of Council’s control over municipal 
administration.41 The duration of public office for the ninety-five 
persons who sat on the municipal council between 1883 and 1914 was 
extremely short lived, with 43.2% serving only a one year term and fully 
77.9% serving for three years or less. As a consequence, only twenty-one 
elected officials, representing a modest 22.1% of the total number, were 
elected for longer periods of time. This extremely high rate of turnover, 
somewhat surprising in a community as small as Port Arthur, made it even 
more difficult for the Council to manage the expanding scope and 
complexity of municipal activity. With the exception of a handful of 
veteran politicians, Port Arthur struggled every year with a new batch of 
inexperienced councillors. By the time that these elected officials had 
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enough experience to allow them to participate fully in the business of 
Council it was election time again, and the cycle would repeat itself. The 
duration of service among elected officials did not appear to alter 
substantially throughout the thirty year period. It was therefore 
Inevitable that these one-time councillors depended heavily upon the 
handful of long-serving councillors like W.P. Cooke, who sat on council for 
fifteen years during this period, on the Mayor, and on the expertise of 
professional managers for guidance. 
The growing scope and complexity of municipal activity demanded 
Increasing specialization among the councillors. As the council meeting 
could no longer adequately handle the growing volume of business, more 
and more authority was delegated to standing committees and even sub- 
committees. For example, the number of standing committees doubled 
between 1885 and 1902; the management of Port Arthur’s municipal 
enterprises also became the responsibility of the Electric Railway and 
Light Commission.42 Specialization even occurred among the 
Commissioners, who divided their responsibilities between the two 
/ 
franchises.43 Responsibility for the town’s new municipal telephone 
exchange was added to the Commission’s workload in 1906.44 
The evolution of management structures relating to the municipal 
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enterprises in Port Arthur followed a common pattern for each of the 
urban services. The first step of the council when considering the 
provision of a new urban service was to establish a sub-committee of 
council to properly investigate the proposition. This sub-committee 
reported back after one or two months with a concrete proposal for the 
Council to consider. The council, if favourable to the proposal, then 
proceeded to draft a by-law and set a date for a vote of the ratepayers. 
Once adopted by the ratepayers, the town usually sent a delegation to 
Toronto in the Spring to ensure the passage of enabling legislation. A 
standing committee usually supervised the new municipal enterprise for 
the first couple of years before authority was shifted to the Commission 
or to another standing committee, as was the case with the waterworks. 
This progression of events accurately reflects the evolution of the 
management of the street railway, electric light, hydro-electric power 
and telephone franchises. 
The Mayor exercised considerable Influence among the councillors, as 
he usually had years of previous experience on the Council. Port Arthur 
elected thirteen different mayors prior to 1914, with the period of 
greatest stability being the eighteen year period between 1893 and 1910 
when three mayors dominated the council for all but two years.^5 George 
77 
T. Marks enjoyed the distinction of being the longest serving Mayor of Port 
Arthur of the era as he was elected seven consecutive times during the 
depression years of the 1890s. The municipal council during the first 
decade of the twentieth century was dominated by Mayors G.O.P. Clavet and 
I.L. Matthews, who had both previously served as councillors. The 
extensive experience of most Port Arthur mayors allowed them to provide 
the kind of municipal leadership which was found to be lacking in 
municipalities south of the border. There was hence no perceived need to 
organize political machines in order to provide direction in municipal 
politics. 
Corruption and inefficiency seemed to be an inherent part of municipal 
administration In the United States. American historian Bradley Robert 
Rice blamed the lack of strong municipal leadership in the mayor-council 
system for the development of formal political formations.46 Political 
‘bosses’ achieved a measure of central control in many cities, but it 
usually came at the cost of partisan conflict and corruption. The 
professionalism of the municipal bureaucracy suffered as partisan 
supporters were awarded employment with the municipality. In some 
cases, the existence of two competing municipal political parties further 
obstructed the emergence of a professional bureaucracy because an 
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exchange of power between the two or more parlies resulted in the 
purging of the ranks of the bureaucracy. It was therefore extremely 
difficult for a professional bureaucracy to establish itself in an 
atmosphere of partisan strife. Consequently, I believe that the 
partisanship of American municipal politics lies at the heart of why 
municipal enterprise failed to take hold in the United States. The petty 
bickering associated with party politics combined with the inability of a 
professional bureaucracy to establish itself would have seriously 
impaired public confidence in the municipality. 
One of the products of this dissatisfaction with machine politics was 
the municipal reform movement which swept American and some Canadian 
cities between 1890 and 1920. Rice explores the flirtation with 
commission government by dozens of American municipalities, replacing 
the traditional mayor-council structure with a small five-member paid 
commission, elected at-large, each of whom was responsible for the 
operations of a specific municipal department.47 Commonly referred to as 
the Galveston-Des Moines plan, commission government also featured 
provisions for referendum, recall, nonpartisanship and civil service 
exams. Despite the criticism of commission government as essentially 
anti-democratic. Rice found that those municipalities which adopted the 
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new administrative structure proved to be more efficient than their mayor- 
council counterparts, and just as likely to implement social reform.48 
Why did Port Arthur ratepayers narrowly pass a plebescite in favour 
of commission government in 1911? Thorold Tronrud argues in Guardians 
of Progress that boosters turned to paid commissions when their 
hegemony was challenged by working-class voters.49 why then had the 
first foray by the Trades and Labor Council into municipal politics the 
year before been greeted with open arms by such middle-class 
institutions as the Daily News? The election of the two candidates 
undermines the contention that middle-class support for commission 
government was inspired by class considerations. The decision to scrap 
the Electric Railway, Light and Telephone Commission in 1911 and return 
the management of utilities to the municipal council further indicates 
that Tronrud’s explanation is unsatisfactory.so in any case, the plebescite 
was never acted upon, because it was carried only by a small majority and 
because the Provincial government refused to amend the Municipal Act.si 
Yet, despite the apparent failure of commission government to take hold in 
Port Arthur, a commission managed the town’s municipal enterprises 
between 1895 and 1911. 
The Electric Railway and Light Commission was created in 1895 in 
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order to avoid, according to Mayor George T. Marks, “ward politics” and 
the political in-fighting on the Council.^2 it is not circumstantial that 
this lack of confidence in the Council to manage the street railway 
effectively came after the most protracted and bitter political conflict of 
the era. The Commission was created to better manage the town’s 
municipal enterprises. The Council’s continued committment to 
democracy was reflected by the fact that the Commissioners were 
elected, although admittedly under a more restricted franchise. The 
formation of a joint street railway board in 1908 after the sale to Fort 
William of its share of the operation, reveals very different conceptions 
of commission government in the two cities. It is noteworthy that among 
the five members on the Board, the two Port Arthur positions were 
elective, while the two Fort William representatives were appointed.S3 
Port Arthur’s consistent commitment to elective commissions suggests 
that it was primarily a managerial innovation in response to the growing 
scope of municipal activity. 
Commission government was less a product of inter-class conflict 
than it was an administrative innovation by municipal ownership towns 
whose scope and complexity of activity was such that the mayor-council 
structure was considered by many to be unable to manage the urban 
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services efficiently. While Rice recognized that commission government 
only took hold in small and medium-sized urban centres, he believed that 
this was due to working class opposition in metropolitan cities.54 | would 
suggest, however, that innovation in municipal administration tended to 
occur in those towns which had a larger scope of municipal activity. In 
Ontario, two of the three municipalities (Port Arthur, Guelph and Windsor) 
which lobbied the Provincial government to allow commission government 
were also among the top five municipal ownership towns in 1911.55 
Commission government was attractive to the citizens of Port Arthur and 
Guelph because the high turnover of elected officials, who were also part- 
time and unpaid, was ill-suited to managing urban services. If elected 
officials in these two towns were having less and less influence over 
decision-making, would not the creation of a full-time elective 
commission have acted to re-establish a measure of democratic control 
over the operation of the municipal enterprises? 
Non-partisanship characterized municipal politics in Port Arthur for 
the period prior to World War I except for a brief period of polarization 
from 1892 to 1894. The absence of partisan strife was made possible by 
the atmosphere of inter-class cooperation within the community as a 
whole. Liberated from the incessant turmoil associated with party 
82 
politics, Port Arthur’s council was free to consider undertaking an 
expanded role for itself. Certainly, the ratepayers had more confidence in 
a municipal government undivided by partisan loyalties. Informal 
coalitions did emerge from time to time, however, over specific issues, 
but were invariably short-lived, and there is every indication that 
partisan differences between Liberals, Conservatives and Independent 
Labour supporters did not extend to any great degree into municipal 
politics. 
The negative affect of partisanship and factionalism on municipal 
administration was illustrated during the period of political turmoil 
between 1891 and 1894 when the Town of Port Arthur was polarized 
between the Civic Party and supporters of J.F. Ruttan, who were labelled 
the ‘electrics’ by their opponents.56 The issue which precipitated this 
confrontation was Ruttan’s fight for the construction of an electric street 
railway owned and operated by the municipality. He met heavy resistance 
from Port Arthur’s so-called ‘family compact,’ who preferred instead that 
private enterprise should continue to be bonused for the provision of urban 
services. While Ruttan overcame the opposition in 1892, and his dream of 
an electric street railway became a reality, he narrowly lost the 
Mayoralty race of 1893 to George T. Marks.57 The election resulted in an 
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equal number of candidates being elected from each camp thereby grinding 
to a halt the business of council until the following year, when the Civic 
Party emerged victorious. The immediate result of the 1894 election was 
the purge of the nascent municipal bureaucracy and Its replacement with 
supporters of the Civic Party. The atmosphere of retribution also resulted 
in the abrupt termination of the town’s insurance policy with J.F. 
Ruttan.58 After taking a closer look at this brief period of partisan 
conflict in Port Arthur, one can quickly appreciate the importance of a non- 
partisan political culture to the emergence of municipal enterprise. 
Public confidence in the municipality of Port Arthur was fostered by 
the apparent honesty of its municipal politicians, an honesty which was 
only seriously questioned by the public between 1906 and 1910. In this 
instance, charges of corruption were voiced by the Reverend S.C. Murray, 
who later observed in his memoirs that “[l]nto this ideal condition[of 
municipal ownership] there gradually seeped civic corruption and graft 
was not unknown.”59 Murray’s allegations caused an immediate sensation 
within the community and resulted in the formation of a special 
investigative committee of the Presbyterian Brotherhood, eventually 
leading to the defeat of all but one incumbent in the 1906 municipal 
election.50 A subsequent judicial inquiry by Judge O’Leary, however, 
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uncovered no evidence of corruption in Port Arthur.ei in fact, only one 
outstanding example of outright corruption can be identified in the 
newspapers and Council minutes of the era. This case involved Mayor G.O.P. 
Clavet and Councillor Hourigan, who were discovered by the Daily News to 
have been secretly appointed directors of the Meisel Company prior to a by- 
law vote to grant the company a generous bonus.62 | would therefore have 
to agree with the correspondent for The Reader when he suggests that 
criticism of municipal politicians resulted from the aspiration “to the 
mechanical perfection of a metropolis, and because they fall short they 
are not satisfied, which speaks well for the ambition with which 
municipal ownership Inspires in people.'63 When evaluating the 
performance of the municipality of Port Arthur during this time period, 
historians must keep in mind the enormous challenges created by rapid 
urban and industrial growth. The tradition of political non-partisanship, 
combined with the relative honesty of Port Arthur politicians, generated 
public confidence in municipal enterprise and allowed a professional 
municipal bureaucracy to emerge. 
The Emergence of a Professional Municipal Bureaucracy 
The singular importance of the development of a capable municipal 
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bureaucracy was made abundantly clear by the Ontario government’s 
Select Committee on Municipal Trading, which published a selection of 
articles from the United States and Canada within its 1903 report. The 
London Times noted in 1902 that the expansion of municipal duties and 
functions was “to throw the real duties of local government more and 
more upon the permanent officials, and to create a municipal 
bureaucracy...”64 Richard T. Ely, a Professor of Political Economy at the 
University of Wisconsin at around the same time, observed that public 
enterprise needed “to secure men of talent and experience” in order to 
succeed.65 He found inspiration, like many other American advocates of 
public enterprise, in Great Britain. 
The case of England is a very clear one. If we go back fifty years 
we shall probably find that the government of English cities was 
quite as bad as ours Is now. During the past fifty years there has 
been a continuous improvement, and this has accompanied 
continual expansion of municipal activity, while at the same time 
through an extension of suffrage, English municipal government 
become Increasingly democratic in character.66 
In this citation, Ely exhibits an appreciation, which was widespread at the 
time among public ownership supporters, of the fact that municipal 
enterprise produced not only an efficient local administration but an 
honest one at that. Even James Boyle, the American consul in Liverpool, 
England, wrote in Cassiers Magazine in 1902 that “municipal government 
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in Great Britain is honest, intelligent and energetic: and as a rule, politics 
has but little to do with the engagement or retention of civic 
employees.”67 He credited the effect of municipal enterprise for good 
government. 
Americans perceived municipal administration In Port Arthur in much 
the same manner as they did British cities. The correspondent from The 
Reader suggested that the elimination of municipal politics in Port Arthur 
was the source of the success of its municipal enterprises. “They have 
killed municipal politics, and In doing this they have smothered municipal 
graft and dishonesty. There are no party lines in Port Arthur or Fort 
William.’68 is this just the rhetorical flourish of municipal ownership 
supporters, or do they have some foundation in reality? It is my 
contention that there is in fact a direct link between the scope of 
municipal activity and the quality of municipal governance. It rests on the 
fundamental difference between American municipalities, with their 
reputation for corruption and incompetence, and the solid reputations of 
British municipalities and a handful of Canadian towns like Port Arthur, 
relating to the scope of their activity. Americans expressed little 
confidence in their municipal governments because of machine politics 
and the Inability of professional managers to establish themselves firmly 
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in the decision-making process. This resulted in a lack of confidence in 
municipal enterprise which, in turn, prevented the expansion of municipal 
activity, thus making it even more difficult for managers to take hold. In 
municipal ownership towns in Great Britain and Canada, on the other hand, 
extremely influential permanent officials emerged during the late 
nineteenth century due to a tradition of non-partisanship and the early 
municipalization of water and gas works in Britain or the street railway 
in Port Arthur. The scope of municipal activity was large enough in these 
municipalities to force elected officials to delegate the day-to-day 
management of the municipal enterprises to managers. 
In The Visible Hand. Alfred Chandler discovered that during the rise of 
the modern business enterprise, decision-making authority shifted away 
from the owners and towards a new group of career managers.69 Just as 
these business managers were often more interested in the long term 
stability of the firm than the maximization of profits, their counterparts 
in the public sector were interested in the long term viability of the 
municipality. The nature of municipal administration therefore changed 
as a consequence of the extension of municipal ownership. Municipal 
managers emulated their colleagues In the private sector through such 
administrative innovations as new organizational structures, statistical 
88 
tracking and uniform accounting practices. For example, a study by James 
H. Potts establishes that municipal accountancy practices in the United 
States after 1900 were first developed by private companies.The hand 
of municipal managers was strengthened by these new accounting 
procedures as the performance of individual departments, for the first 
time, could be compared with other departments not only within the 
municipality but in other towns and cities. If Chandler’s hypothesis that 
managers were the guardians of good business in the United States is 
accurate, it is not unreasonable to suggest that municipal managers were 
likewise the guardians of good government. The ability of municipal 
managers to supplant the power of elected officials to manage the day-to 
day activity of the municipality was therefore essential to the effective 
management of municipal enterprise. 
The rise of the municipal manager in Port Arthur occurred in three 
distinctive phases. An early period prior to 1892 was characterized by a 
small, amateur staff who had almost no influence over elected officials. 
These officials were nominated annually by the incoming council and often 
included prominent citizens within the community who had close 
connections with the municipal politicians. Hired only on a casual or part- 
time basis, many of these employees, like the councillors themselves. 
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advanced their private interests through their public positions. The Town 
Clerk between 1883 and 1895 was W.H. Langworthy who also acted as the 
secretary-treasurer for the Port Arthur Water, Light and Power 
Company.71 The construction of a municipal electric street railway in 
1892 resulted in the immediate infusion of over a dozen full-time 
employees, many of whom had technological expertise which the Council 
lacked. This early municipal innovation led to the development of a local 
pool of managerial talent which provided for the smooth operation of the 
towns growing number of municipal enterprises after the turn of the 
century. Such managers as Thomas McCauley , Richard Fox and Thomas 
Delbridge began their long careers with the municipality during this 
period. The period was the golden era of managerial influence within the 
municipal administration of Port Arthur. 
The early expansion of municipal activity in Port Arthur during the 
early 1890s contributed to the success of the municipal bureaucracy. 
Unlike towns which experimented with municipal ownership after 1900, 
such as Fort William, Port Arthur did not import its municipal managers 
from outside the region. This enabled municipal employees to rise up 
through the ranks into sometimes key managerial positions. One of the 
outstanding examples of social mobility was the case of Richard Fox, who 
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started out in the early 1890s as a street railway motorman before being 
promoted to superintendent of electric lights, and subsequently to 
assistant and then general superintendent of the city’s electrical 
department by 1913.72 As a pioneer municipal ownership town, Port 
Arthur actually exported its managerial talent to other towns and cities 
when municipal ownership came into vogue around 1905. Thomas 
McCauley who had acted as the principal manager for the Port Arthur 
street railway was lured away to Calgary in 1908 to oversee the 
establishment of a municipal street railway. McCauley’s reputation was 
such that he later became the President of the New Brunswick Power 
Company during the 1920s.73 Another export was Joachim Antonisen, the 
city engineer, who left the employ of the city in 1911 for a similar 
position In Brandon, Manitoba. The prospect of career advancement, in 
turn, contributed to longevity within the civic bureaucracy. 
The extent of Port Arthur’s experimentation with municipal 
enterprise was responsible for the formation of a sizeable municipal 
bureaucracy. The municipal bureaucracy in January 1914, as revealed in 
the earliest comprehensive review of personnel for the municipality, 
consisted of one hundred and seventy-five permanent employees not 
including street railway employees and the City Clerk’s offlce.74 The 
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personnel records identified the names of the employees in each municipal 
department, their years of service, job title and their rates of pay. Among 
those employees who operated the city’s municipal enterprises the 
Engineer’s Department, which was responsible for the waterworks/ 
sewerage systems, had twenty-seven permanent employees, the Light and 
Power Department had twenty-five, the Telephone Department employed 
forty female operators and twenty-seven other employees and the 
Utilities Commissioner who replaced the Electric Railway, Light and 
Telephone Commission after it was abolished in 1911 had another eight 
employees. As a consequence, one hundred and twenty-seven permanent 
employees worked in departments responsible for the operation of the 
different franchises, representing 72.6 percent of the total municipal 
workforce. When the street railway is factored into this percentage the 
proportion of the municipal bureaucracy directly employed in the 
management of the various urban services increases still further. 
The number of permanent municipal employees, however, does not 
come close to capturing the true scale of municipal employment In Port 
Arthur. The municipality was one of the town’s single largest employers 
prior to 1914. In his monthly report to the Labour Gazette. Frederick Urry 
estimated that Port Arthur employed three hundred men in April 1910 for 
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street clearing alone.75 Another report in November 1910 suggested that 
“thousands of workmen” were employed by the two Lakehead cities.76 The 
enormous size of the municipal workforce during these years may not 
simply have been the product of normal municipal activity. Municipal 
employment served an important social welfare function within the 
community. “In view of the scarcity of work in our City,” Mayor Oliver 
declared in January 1914, 
and the large number of our citizens unemployed...some attempt 
should be made at once to arrange for some Municipal Work to 
start so that we can provide against want without having to use 
the City’s funds for purely charitable grants.77 
Oliver not only expressed the kind of concern which characterized social 
relations in Port Arthur, but in addition, the kind of solution to 
unemployment typical of the Anglo-Celtic middle class. Had Port Arthur 
not experimented extensively with municipal enterprise, the municipal 
bureaucracy would only have been a fraction of the size. 
The day-to-day operation of the town’s municipal enterprises was in 
the experienced hands of long-time managers and employees. Using the 
personnel records compiled in January 1914, the longevity of managers 
and employees within the municipal bureaucracy can be determined for at 
least the period after the turn of the century. The seniority of the twenty- 
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three municipal managers, as identified by job title and salary, was 
substantially more than that of elected officials. In January 1914, the 
average municipal manager had been in the employ of the municipality for 
seven years, four months. This level of experience which was more than 
double that of municipal politicians explains why managers were an 
integral part of municipal decision-making. The turnover of municipal 
employees was substantially more rapid than that of senior managers and 
the level of experience tended to vary between the various municipal 
departments. The highest level of turnover was among the forty telephone 
operators who worked for the city usually for just less than two years. 
Among the twenty-seven male employees of the Telephone Department the 
average duration of their employment was almost a half year longer. The 
Light and Power Department employees, on the other hand, had an average 
of three years, seven months seniority. Each municipal department 
therefore had a core group of veteran managers and employees who 
ensured that the operations of the municipality functioned smoothly. 
The relationship between managers and ordinary municipal employees 
was characterized by a special bond which reflected the remarkable 
degree of inter-class cooperation which existed within the community. 
Such a bond was displayed in a letter to the Mayor by City Engineer 
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Joachim Antonisen in December 1909. Antonisen wrote in order to 
“correct the impression wrongly created, that the estimated amount was 
exceeded on account of excessive cost of the day labour [for the Arthur 
Street railway extension]...! deem It an injustice to blame the labourers 
for something which they are not guilty of.”78 in doing so, he risked the 
wrath of the elected officials by casting the blame squarely upon the 
Council, as it had demanded additional changes to the work while It was In 
progress. Antonisen’s actions exhibited a level of self-confidence and 
independence that illustrate the growing managerial influence within the 
municipality. Perhaps the best evidence that a bond existed between local 
managers and their employees was revealed, somewhat ironically, during 
the 1913 street railway strike. Rather than work with out-of-town strike 
breakers, John Hays the assistant traffic manager and L. Lindahl another 
manager resigned.79 
As no civic employees were unionized prior to the organization of the 
street railway workers in 1908, wage schedules were drawn up in a purely 
ad-hoc manner.80 The minutes of the Electric Railway and Light 
Commission include repeated references of groups of employees or 
individuals petitioning for wage increases. These petitions were usually 
responded to by the granting of at least a proportion of the raise 
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demanded. In fact, I only found a single example of a petition being denied 
outright by the commissioners. It was, of course, not circumstantial that 
this exception should have concerned a petition from female telephone 
operators.81 The refusal to consider the grievance of the operators 
reflected the male power structure’s assumption that these women were 
not permanent employees because they were expected to be employed only 
until they got married. This is confirmed by the personnel files of January 
1914 as every female employee, without exception, was identified as 
“Miss,” therefore indicating that such a policy existed. The male utility 
commissioners and managers were therefore unlikely to have considered 
it necessary to meet their demands. Despite this, however, there was an 
apparent willingness on the part of elected officials to satisfy, at least In 
part, the wage demands of male municipal employees. 
The wages paid to municipal employees in Port Arthur reflected the 
esteem given to municipal managers and the atmosphere of inter-class 
cooperation. Frederick Urry estimated that the City of Port Arthur paid on 
average five to seven cents per hour more for labour in March 1911 than 
did Fort William.82 While this might not seem like a significant 
difference, at the time. It represented twenty-five percent of the hourly 
wage of the general labourer. This also held true for municipal electrical 
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workers in the two towns who threatened strike action in Fort William 
during 1911 in order to achieve parity in wages with Port Arthur.83 
Port Arthur also differentiated itself by its early adoption of a fair 
wage schedule in February 1909 in response to an appeal of the local 
Trades and Labor Council (TLC). According to Frederick Urry, the schedule 
established a minimum wage of twenty cents per hour, which was 
substantially higher than the going rate at the time for labourers.84 While 
this minimum wage was lower than those of Edmonton, Calgary and 
Lethbridge, it was higher than Hawkesbury, Goderich, Brandon, Westmount 
and, In any case, most towns and cities in Canada had no fair wage 
schedule whatsoever.85 The Council was swayed by the presentation by 
the TLC which stressed the need to protect the poorest citizens from 
exploitation by “unscrupulous” contractors, and promised that a fair 
wage fixed above the going rate would attract the best workers to the 
municipality.86 “What makes efficiency in workmen,” the TLC argued “is 
a good wage to enable them to have proper nourishment, reasonable time 
for rest and recreation to make them physically fit, and time for thought 
to make them mentally fit, and further, good wages and short hours are 
also conducive to increased trade and employment.”87 The nature of the 
TLC’s argument suggests that the union leadership believed, rightly as it 
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turned out, that an emotional appeal for fairness would resonate with the 
Council. This willingness on the part of middle-class councillors to 
respond to the demands of organized labour collaborates the assertion 
that inter-class cooperation continued to characterize social relations in 
Port Arthur until the outbreak of World War I. 
The nature of the relationship between municipal politicians, 
managers and employees was revealed by a single conflict which occurred 
within the waterworks department in November and December 1905. The 
transcripts of the testimony of an investigation held by the Mayor and 
Council into the cause of the friction within the department reveal the 
strength of local relations over the intrusion of outside forces.88 At the 
centre of the conflict was the importation of a new City Engineer from 
Toronto, O.J.Russell Duncan, who tried to impose managerial control over 
the operations of his department, and thereby created friction between 
himself and his walking boss Mr. Hutcheson over who would oversee the 
hiring of the foremen and work gangs. Despite the normal practice, when 
Hutcheson refused to employ Italian workers because there were several 
work gangs of Anglo-Saxon available, Duncan hired Antonio Fallin as 
foreman and Italian immigrants to construct a sewerage line on Bay 
Street anyways. This action provoked open resistance not only on the part 
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of Hutcheson but among other Anglo-Saxon workers, such as James Munn, 
who was the caulker for the Bay Street works. It was Munn’s refusal to 
work for Fallin who supposedly did not “know a valve from a hydrant” 
which precipitated the investigation. 
This episode was much more than a conflict between two strong 
personalities; it involved class, ethnicity and the solidarity of a close- 
knit frontier community. In one respect it was a fight for how decisions 
were made within the municipal administration. “[W]hen a man,” Duncan 
admitted, “ has been in a measure his own master for a time then if you 
lay down rules and make them hard and fast, he resents it...”89 His 
ambition to centralize decision-making naturally met resistance from 
workers who had hitherto enjoyed virtual autonomy on the job-sight. 
Mixed in with this resentment of an outsider, Hutcheson, Munn and the 
other Anglo-Saxon workers feared the employment of Italian immigrants 
as this would undermine their own bargaining position by creating more 
competition for municipal employment. The attitude of councillors was 
revealed to some degree by the nature of the questioning. Their hostility 
towards Antonio Fallin, suggests a level of xenophobia which reveals the 
limitations of inter-class cooperation. The councillors were intent on 
determining whether the Italians were good workers or not, and concern 
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was expressed once it was discovered that many of these workers 
actually lived in Fort William. One gets the definite impression from the 
testimony that the municipality tended to employ preferred immigrants. In 
the end, the Council responded not by disciplining the Anglo-Saxon 
workers, many of whom probably had strong roots within the community, 
but to summarily fire Duncan six months after he had arrived in Port 
Arthur.90 Solidarity among the Inhabitants of Port Arthur (excluding the 
small Italian immigrant community) even outweighed Duncan’s promise to 
transform the waterworks department Into a more efficient body. 
Popular Intervention in Municipal Governance 
Port Arthur’s municipal administration did not function in isolation 
from the outside world. As a consequence, the decision-making process 
was influenced by external forces and popular intervention. This was 
particularly true in Ontario where money by-laws and franchise 
agreements were voted upon by ratepayers. The municipality could 
therefore not ignore the opinion of such community organizations as the 
Board of Trade, the Trades and Labor Council and ratepayer associations. 
New Ideas were transmitted to the community by immigrants, newspapers 
and a growing number of provincial and federal associations. The outside 
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environment acted to reaffirm the local administration’s committment to 
municipal enterprise because these external forces and organizations 
were almost all strongly in favour of the municipal ownership of urban 
services. 
The evolution of municipal administration was Influenced by external 
ideological trends transmitted to Port Arthur through newspapers, 
specialized journals, and provincial or national federations. News of the 
municipalization of water and gas works in Great Britain during the 1870s 
and 1880s would have been conveyed to the frontier town of Port Arthur 
through the press and first-hand experience with municipal enterprise 
brought over with the immigrants who settled in the area. This acted to 
de-mystify the concept of municipal ownership of urban services, thus 
clearing the way for its emergence in Port Arthur. Similar developments 
in North America would have become known to Port Arthur ratepayers 
through the assorted questionnaires the municipality mailed out to other 
towns and cities during the mld-1880s with respect to the municipal 
ownership of waterworks and sewerage facilities. Subscriptions to such 
publications as the Canadian Health Journal, the Street Railway Journal 
and the Canadian Municipal Journal further acted to introduce new ideas of 
municipal administration. Port Arthur’s membership in the Union of 
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Canadian Municipalities, the Ontario Municipal Association, and the 
Canadian Independent Telephone Association had formalized inter- 
municipal contact by 1906. Delegates from Port Arthur began to be sent, 
at about the same time, to conventions such as the 1908 annual meeting of 
the American Public Health Association in Winnipeg.All of these 
sources shared a strong commitment in favour of municipal enterprise 
which acted to re-affirm Port Arthur’s earlier experimentation with 
municipal enterprise. 
The emergence of the modern professions was an indication of the 
insecurity of the middle-class, according to Louis Galambos.92 
Professional associations for lawyers, physicians, engineers, accountants, 
bankers. Insurance agents, etc enabled the middle class in the United 
States to achieve a greater degree of security. Through his 
“Organizational Synthesis,” Galambos suggests that people responded to 
the rapid change going on around them by forming organizations with like- 
minded people. One of the results of this trend was to accentuate 
divisions between working and middle classes who were organized In 
mutually antagonistic organizations. I would suggest, however, that 
professional associations had not yet developed a significant presence in 
frontier towns like Port Arthur prior to World War I. This contention is 
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supported by the virtual absence, in local newspapers, of any indication 
that professional associations were active in the community. The affect 
of professional associations on social relations in Port Arthur, however, 
is an avenue of research which does deserves more attention in the future. 
Likewise, the transmission of “outside” ideas through these associations 
promised to influence how the middle class perceived their municipal 
government and its role within the community. 
The Port Arthur Board of Trade, formed in 1885, functioned as though 
it were a committee of Council and met periodically with that body. 
Suggestions made by the Daily Sentinel that the Board of Trade should put 
forward a municipal slate in 1889 was roundly defeated and never again 
mentioned in the minutes of the Board.93 While the Board of Trade was 
divided like the community between supporters and opponents of the 
municipal street railway during the 1890s, it became a leading advocate 
of municipal enterprise after the turn of the century. The Board of 
Trade’s opposition to private hydro-electric power development 
contributed to the defeat of a proposal by James Conmee which would have 
privatized the municipality’s electric department, and contributed to the 
decision of ratepayers to support an agreement with the Ontario Hydro 
Electric Power Commission. The business community favoured public 
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ownership largely because it feared that a private power monopoly would 
obstruct industrial growth either by tieing up nearby sources of 
waterpower for speculative purposes or by charging an exorbitant rate. 
The consistent support of the business community for municipal 
enterprise after 1900 reinforced the municipality’s commitment to public 
ownership. 
Unlike the early organization of the business community, the Trades 
and Labor Council was not established in Port Arthur until 1906. As 
already discussed, the TLC met with considerable early success In Its 
efforts to convince the municipality to adopt a fair wage schedule. This 
initial victory was followed by protracted negotiations with the Council 
for the creation of a labour exchange which would have provided not only a 
place for workers to find employment, thus freeing them of jobbers, but 
the bureau would have compiled labour statistics for the city. The Council 
struck a special committee in August 1911 to consider the matter and a 
conference in November of that year was held between the Council, the 
Ministerial Association and the TLC.94 The conference resolved to give the 
labour bureau “a fair trial” and a by-law was to be drafted. Despite the 
lack of results in the end, the Intervention of the TLC in municipal politics 
illustrates that middle-class councillors were interested in working with 
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organized labour. The nomination of two TLC candidates, and their 
subsequent election, in the 1911 municipal election illustrates that the 
TLC influenced the decision making process. The fact that the TLC, like 
the Board of Trade, was an enthusiastic advocate of municipal enterprise 
indicates that there existed a great deal of consensus within the 
community. This consensus did not extend, however, to the bonusing of 
private enterprise as the TLC adamently opposed bonus by-laws. 
The only organized opposition to municipal enterprise came in the 
form of ratepayer associations which appeared during the early 1890s and 
again between 1906 and 1910. In the case of the later, the association 
was formed in December 1907 by “prominent citizens and property 
owners” who were unhappy with the quality of service provided by some 
of the municipal franchises.95 While the Association was active during 
the municipal campaign of that year it seems to have passed quickly out of 
existence soon thereafter. The large ratepayers who seemed to prefer the 
bonusing of private enterprise over municipal enterprise were not very 
well organized and represented the view of only a tiny minority of the 
ratepayers. The influence of other organizations like the licensed 
victuallers and the Retail Merchants Association does not appear to have 
been significant. As a consequence, the external pressure on the decision- 
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making process was, by-and-large, very much in favour of municipal 
ownership and therefore acted to reinforce municipal activity in that area. 
Conclusion 
The nature of municipal administration and finance in Port Arthur 
enabled the public to have confidence in municipal enterprise as a 
practical alternative to the inability of private enterprise to respond to 
the demands for urban services. The legal environment acted to facilitate 
the emergence of municipal enterprise through the actions of the 
Provincial legislature. The access of the municipality to finance capital 
through the assessment and debentures made municipal enterprise 
feasible. Public confidence in the municipal government was based on the 
non-partisanship of elected officials, the early experimentation with a 
municipal street railway, and the emergence of a professional bureaucracy 
which facilitated the expansion of the scope of municipal activity. The 
influence of external organizations, publications and meetings all tended 
to re-affirm the town’s commitment to municipal ownership. As a 
consequence, the opportunity which existed for municipal ownership to 
flourish in Port Arthur was translated Into reality. 
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Chapter 3 
THE ^BOODLERS’ AND THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE, 1875-1889 
“There was a time when Port Arthur and Fort William begged for some 
one to buy their franchises. In those days the pioneers of Thunder Bay 
were not thinking of municipal ownership. No outside investor would risk 
a cent in the wilderness towns. It was then that they were forced into 
doing it for themselves.“ 
-J. O. Curwood, The Reader, 1905 
Private enterprise failed miserably In its efforts to satisfy public 
demands for urban services in Port Arthur prior to 1890. The scarcity of 
finance capital forced utility entrepreneurs to rely on municipal bonuses 
in order to finance their schemes. Considerable resentment was generated 
within the community as a result of these so-called “boodlers” who 
personally profitted from municipal bonusing arrrangements. In the case 
of the Bell Telephone Company, which succeeded in establishing an 
exchange in Port Arthur, the tactics used to crush a local rival and the 
exhorbitant rates charged to Its telephone subscribers alienated 
ratepayers. As a consequence, the repeated failure of entrepreneurs to 
provide urban services undermined public confidence in private enterprise, 
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and contributed to the emergence of municipal enterprise. This chapter 
will explore the nature of this failure to satisfy public demands for a 
branch railway, water and sewerage works, telephone service, and 
illumination. 
Inter-Urban Rivalry—Demands for a Branch Railway 
The decision to locate the terminus of the new transcontinental 
railway alongside the Kaministiquia River at the Town Plot’ in West Fort 
William instead of at Prince Arthur’s Landing (renamed Port Arthur in 
1883) had a profound impact upon the evolution of utility organization and 
regulation. The uncertainty that this announcement created in the 
Landing, and the resulting inter-urban rivalry with Fort William, inspired 
risk-taking and experimentation which eventually led to the adoption of 
municipal enterprise in Port Arthur. In the meantime, the municipality 
bonused the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Company to 
construct a branch railway from the terminus to the Landing. While the 
branch line was built and much of the trans-shipment activity was at 
least temporarily redirected to Prince Arthur’s Landing, the enterprise 
proved a failure in the eyes of ratepayers. This was due to the branch line 
being sold to the Canadian Pacific Railway and subsequently being 
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abandoned when its operations were centralized in Fort William. The 
shareholders of the local railway company were considered ‘boodlers’ by a 
growing number of ratepayers. Furthermore, private enterprise failed to 
construct a street railway during the 1880s after it became clear that 
Fort William and not Port Arthur would become the gateway to the west. 
The decision to bonus a private company to build a branch railway 
therefore cast a shadow over future developments, and eventually 
contributed to ratepayer resolve to experiment with a municipal street 
railway in 1891. 
The announcement that the terminus of the transcontinental railway 
would be located in West Fort William came as a shock to the residents of 
Prince Arthur’s Landing, who had been confident that their town would be 
the government’s natural choice. It was assumed that the Landing was the 
ideal location for the terminus because it was the largest settlement in 
the region. As a result of the decision, many people who owned land and 
businesses at the Landing faced financial ruin, as all of the railway and 
transhipment activity would by-pass the village. No citizen stood to lose 
as much from the decision as Thomas Marks, who had built a dock, 
warehouse and enlarged his store in 1872 In anticipation of the boom 
which would accompany the railway.i As the dominating personality in 
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the economic and political life of Prince Arthur’s Landing, he was 
prepared to safeguard his investment in the community. It was therefore 
the fear that the Landing would become a backwater which inspired the 
construction of a branch railway. 
The Municipality of Shuniah (which encompassed much of the north 
shore from Silver Islet to the Pigeon River) bonused a private company to 
construct the branch railway because it was generally appreciated that 
private enterprise was incapable of raising the finance capital necessary 
to carry-out the project. The sense of urgency was such that the 
municipal Council, despite the opposition of those councillors who 
represented wards in and around Fort William, agreed immediately to 
bonus a private company thirty-five thousand dollars on August 27, 1875.2 
The subsequent ratification of the money by-law by ratepayers, which 
doubled the tax rate, indicates the lack of confidence in private 
enterprise. This was an enormous expenditure on the part of the 
ratepayers who were burdened with seven percent interest payments on 
the municipal debentures until these expired in 1895.3 The debt load was 
such that the municipality had to appeal to the Provincial government for 
relief from “Its obligations In connection with the Railway Debentures.”4 
As a consequence, ratepayers agreed to bear the burden of financing the 
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construction of a branch railway because it was considered absolutely 
necessary. 
The formation of the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia 
Railway Company in 1875 took advantage of the municipal bonus and relied 
almost exclusively on public monies to construct the branch railway. The 
paper value of the company, the first incorporated company based in 
Northwestern Ontario, was the one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in 
capital stock issued to shareholders.s The promoters of the railway 
included much of the political and economic elite of the Landing. Its 
President was Thomas Marks, who was also the Reeve of the municipality. 
The shareholders included George A. Brown, A.A. Clarke and William 
Preston (who were also Shuniah councillors), and Robert Maitland (the 
municipal clerk). The capital stock represented only the paper value of 
the company as the real amount of finance capital actually probably 
invested only five percent of the total value. Assuming that this was 
equally true for the railway company, the sum total of the private 
investment in the branch railway did not exceed seven thousand dollars. 
This was a drop in the bucket compared to the fifty thousand dollars of 
public monies invested, all told, in the branch line from the bonuses of the 
Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments. The branch railway was 
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constructed by a private company with public finance capital. 
The Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway Company 
succeeded in building a branch railway which redirected, at least 
temporarily, trans-shipment activity to the Landing. The completion of 
the branch railway was obstructed, however, by the opposition of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. Thomas Marks’ application to the Dominion 
Railway Committee for a junction with the transcontinental railway was 
delayed for two years.6 Even after the seven mile long branch line was 
completed on February 27, 1878, Marks could still complain that “as yet 
the Dominion Government has refused to allow us to connect at Fort 
William.”7 The connection was essential if trans-shipment activity was 
to occur at the Landing. A temporary junction was finally granted by the 
government on April 6, 1878, but not before an illegal connection had 
been effected “under cover of darkness, by a crew from a work train sent 
out by him. Thomas Marks was thereby responsible for putting Port Arthur 
on the railway map of Canada...”8 If the municipality’s first experiment 
with the bonusing of private enterprise succeeded in its primary 
objective, why did the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway 
Company symbolize ‘boodling’ and discredit bonusing arrangements during 
the 1880s? 
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The shareholders of the railway company earned a reputation for 
doodling after the company was sold to the Canadian Pacific Railway in 
1879. Despite their small investment, the company’s shareholders 
received annual dividends on the shares issued and salaries were paid to 
the various officers of the company. It was the rumoured profits made by 
the shareholders on the sale of the branch railway, however, which 
created a great deal of resentment among those ratepayers who did not 
share in the profits of the company.9 Suspicion of the shareholders was 
reflected by a request by the municipality in August 1880 to examine the 
correspondence between the local railway company and the government 
over the controversial transaction.io Even the Daily Sentinel, which 
Thomas Marks founded in 1875, had to admit in the wake of the sale that 
there existed public hostility towards Marks within the community.“i i The 
Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway Company even became 
an issue during the 1885 municipal election after W.P. Cooke accused the 
old Shuniah Council of giving Thomas Marks the railway bonus despite the 
existence of other contractors who were willing to build the branch 
railway for only twenty-one thousand dollars. 12 The Canadian Pacific 
Railway’s decision to gradually centralize its operations In East Fort 
William, once again abandoning Port Arthur, tarnished the reputation of 
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the branch railway company and further discredited bonusing 
arrangements. 
The failure of the railway bonus to redirect trans-shipment activity to 
Port Arthur permanently undermined public confidence in bonusing 
arrangements. Elizabeth Arthur has found conclusive evidence in William 
Van Horne’s correspondence that the Canadian Pacific Railway had 
committed itself, as early as 1883, to centralizing its operations in East 
Fort William. 13 Once the intentions of the CPR became known to Port 
Arthur ratepayers, the bonusing arrangement with the Prince Arthur’s 
Landing and Kaministiquia Railway Company looked like a mistake because 
it allowed the company to hand over the branch line to the Canadian 
Pacific Railway. There were three principal responses to the loss of the 
CPR: the promotion of a second railway between Port Arthur and Winnipeg, 
the provision of additional bonuses to the CPR in order to entice it back, 
and the promotion of a street railway. Public opposition to the bonusing 
of private enterprise was reflected by the inability of James Conmee and 
D.F. Burke to convince the town council In 1888 to bonus the Ontario and 
Rainy River Railway for more than twenty-five thousand dollars and the 
defeat of a proposed CPR bonus by-law the following year. These two 
incidences represented a major repudiation of the economic elite. The 
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rise of such municipal politicians as J.F. Ruttan and W.P. Cooke, who 
opposed the long standing practice of bonusing private enterprise, 
indicated that the Marks faction of the economic elite no longer enjoyed a 
monopoly of municipal politicsJ^ Instead, a growing number of ratepayers 
advocated the municipal ownership of urban services. 
The realization that Fort William, not Port Arthur, would become the 
centre of trans-shipment activity at the Lakehead resulted in the public 
demanding a street railway so that workers and businesses could continue 
to be concentrated in Port Arthur. However, the scarcity of finance 
capital prevented private enterprise from responding. Frederick Brent 
Scollie identified two combinations which contemplated the construction 
of an inter-urban street railway in 1884, the most serious of which was 
the Port Arthur Street Railway Company. The company was formed by 
James Conmee, D.F. Burke, and Amos Wright with capital stock of sixty 
thousand dollars. This venture failed to get off the ground. 15 The Fort 
William Street Railway Company, incorporated on July 8, 1885 by J.T. 
Horne, Donald McKellar, and John McLaurin was equally unsucessful.i® The 
inability of private enterprise to construct a street railway led Port 
Arthur merchants to bonus a stage coach service, and Thomas Marks to 
build a ferry to ply between Fort William and Port Arthur.17 
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The boodling reputation that the town’s economic elite earned when 
the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway Company sold the 
branch railway to the Canadian Pacific Railway undermined ratepayer 
confidence in bonusing arrangements. The decision to centralize CPR 
operations in Fort William forced ratepayers to consider once again how 
to prevent people and businesses moving to Fort William. The inability of 
private enterprise to construct a street railway during the 1880s, and the 
public’s refusal to bonus the railway schemes of the economic elite, 
resulted in growing support for the creation of a municipal street railway. 
Waterworks and Sewerage 
While ratepayers were coming to the realization that municipal 
ownership was the only affordable way to construct a street railway, the 
town was hotly debating whether a proposed waterworks should be 
municipally or privately owned. This section will discuss how unsanitary 
conditions, the contamination of drinking water, and the risk of fire 
created a sense of urgency in public demands for a waterworks and 
sewerage facilities. The failure of private enterprise to construct a 
waterworks and the boodling activity of the Port Arthur Water, Light and 
Power Company dashed the hopes of the public. As a result, an opportunity 
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was missed because the bleak depression years of the 1890s prevented 
the town from proceeding with a municipal waterworks until after the 
turn of the century. Port Arthur did construct, on the other hand, a 
municipally-owned sewerage system in 1887 which illustrated to 
ratepayers the potential of municipal enterprise. 
Port Arthur was a very unhealthy place to live during the 1880s. The 
rapidly growing population of the frontier town forced the municipal 
authorities to respond to the unsanitary living conditions and the 
contamination of the drinking water. The Town of Port Arthur, 
incorporated in 1884, was littered with refuse, and people regularly 
dumped night soil onto the public streets, or Into their own back yards. 18 
Drainage consisted of ditches alongside the street which were little more 
than open sewers, the smell of which was particularly vile in the early 
morning or after a rainfall.Hemmed in by the hill to the west, 
McVIcar’s Creek to the north, and swamp to the south, the nascent town 
had an extremely high density of settlement. Overcrowded conditions 
were so bad during the 1880s that Dr. T.S.T. Smellie, the local Medical 
Health Officer, found a silver lining in the disastrous fire which gutted a 
four block area in the most heavily settled part of the town In 1887. The 
devastated area, which was the most overcrowded part of the town, was 
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rebuilt with better house accommodations.20 The fire had ironically given 
the town back its lungs. The reduced congestion of the urban environment, 
however, did not end the epidemics which continued to plague the 
inhabitants of Port Arthur. 
The fear of disease contributed to the urgency of public demands for a 
waterworks and sewerage system. Epidemics of diptheria and typhoid 
usually struck the community during the springtime when six months of 
accumulated garbage and waste thawed with the snows, reducing the 
town’s streets into rivers of mud. The diary of Belle Kittredge, a young 
woman who lived with her uncle in Port Arthur from 1890 to 1893, 
Indicates the degree to which Inhabitants of Port Arthur feared disease. 
“We had some raw onions & bread & butter, diptheria is around & Birdie 
had a sore throat. Onions are supposed to be very good for diptheria or 
rather for warding it off.”21 Belle Kittredge was keenly aware, however, 
that as she lived on the side of the hill, the risk she faced was not as 
great as it was in the “lower parts” of Port Arthur.22 While the minutes 
of the Board of Health indicate that some of these epidemics originated 
outside of Port Arthur and were transmitted to the town by boat or 
railway, most of the outbreaks of diptheria and typhoid were caused by 
unsanitary living conditions and contaminated water. 
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The contamination of drinking water was a major concern to the 
inhabitants of Port Arthur throughout the 1880s. In the absence of a 
waterworks, approximately five hundred families paid fifty cents a week 
to water carriers who drew water from nearby sources of water.23 The 
Board of Health directed the town Council in July 1884 to erect a pipe or 
trough to bring pure water from McVicar’s Creek (one hundred feet above 
the Brewery) down to Court Street where water carriers filled their 
barrels from a reservoir.24 The creek froze up in the winter forcing water 
carriers to draw water from the Bay, not far from the shoreline, once ice 
had formed. The water taken from Thunder Bay was discovered by the 
Board of Health to be “wholly unfit for use” as early as January 1885, and 
a committee was formed to find alternative water sources.25 The Bay had 
become polluted by the dumpage from the ships that visited the port, the 
run-off from the town, and the tradition of piling the town’s garbage onto 
the ice in the winter months.26 As for the wells located within the town, 
which were often dug In close proximity to privy vaults, the water was 
even worse. The Daily Sentinel humorously Illustrated the poor quality of 
well water by recounting an incident which occurred at a Council meeting 
in November 1884. 
A liquid was placed on the council table last evening for their 
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refreshment, a gulp of which Councillor Kennedy took before 
his olfactories had time to warn him. The smell of the stuff, 
which came from a well somewhere in the vicinity of the police 
station, was enough to sicken a horse, and spoke little for the 
good sense of whoever placed it on the table. It was a deed that 
almost parallels Guy Fawke’s famous gunpowder plot.27 
The Board declared the wells contaminated in February 1885 and ordered 
them filled-in; however people continued to depend on well water 
throughout the decade. One of the few people in Port Arthur who seemed 
to have access to pure water was James Conmee, whose new house had a 
water cistern on the roof.2 a 
While the danger presented by unsanitary conditions and a 
contaminated water supply were compelling reasons in favour of the 
construction of a waterworks and sewerage system, the fear of fire 
provided added incentive to property owners and businessmen. Armstrong 
and Nelles suggest that the high cost of insurance premiums in towns 
without waterworks outweighed the fear of disease as the most important 
contributing factor in the decision to build a waterworks.29 Insurance 
premiums in Port Arthur were a source of discontent which escalated 
public demand for a waterworks system.so insurers added fuel to the fire 
by pressuring the Council to take action. For example, the Fire, Water and 
Light Committee of Council received a letter in March, 1887 from a 
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Toronto insurance agent who threatened to withdraw his company from 
Port Arthur if the Council did not immediately construct a brick boiler and 
pumping house for the fire department.31 As a result of the threat, the 
Council directed the Committee to investigate a fire proof pump house on 
the lakeshore. Fire insurance premiums and pressure from agents 
therefore contributed to the sense of urgency which characterized the 
waterworks debate in Port Arthur during the 1880s. 
A window of opportunity for the municipal ownership of a 
waterworks in 1885 failed to materialize due to the opposition of the 
political allies of Thomas Marks. The mayoralty contest in January 1885 
resulted in the election of James Conmee, who promised voters that his 
first priority was a municipal waterworks.32 Conmee had a profound 
influence upon the organization and regulation of utilities until 1910. He 
was born in Owen Sound and enlisted in the 8th New York Cavalry Brigade 
under General George Custer during the American Civil War.33 in search 
of further adventure, Conmee moved to the Lakehead where he established 
himself as a flamboyant populist politician and entrepreneur. His 
political career blossomed after his term as Mayor, representing the 
region in the provincial legislature from 1885 to 1904, and in the House of 
Commons from 1904 to 1911. Conmee defeated George H. Kennedy for the 
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mayoralty, but faced a hostile Council dominated by the political allies of 
Kennedy and Thomas Marks. The council obstructed his efforts to promote 
a municipal waterworks, and in August, 1885 Conmee lost a motion to 
create a water committee which would have drafted the necessary by-law- 
- even though the Canada Permanent Loan Company had already declared 
its willingness to purchase all of the municipal debentures at seven 
percent interest.34 The episode illustrates how eastern capital, largely 
unavailable to private enterprise In Port Arthur, could be tapped by the 
municipality through the issuance of debentures. 
While the municipality was seriously considering a municipal 
waterworks, a series of would-be waterworks entrepreneurs failed to 
negotiate an acceptable franchise agreement with the town council. The 
first entrepreneurs to make a proposal were William Robertson and Jno. 
Hudson, who approached the Municipality of Shuniah just prior to the 
incorporation of the town. The Council hastily agreed to draw up a by-law 
once the details of the agreement were finalized, but this did not appear 
to have occurred.35 Perhaps due to this first experience with waterworks 
promoters, the Council responded cautiously to T.H. Carman of Toronto 
when he expressed interest in the waterworks franchise in October 1884. 
After seeking expert advice as to the type of technology available, the 
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Council began negotiations with Carman in September 1886 which 
continued until the following summer. In the end, the Fire, Water and 
Light Committee decided not to recommend Carman’s proposal in July 
1887 unless he submitted the names of his financial backers, made a 
deposit of ten percent of the estimated cost of the proposed work, agreed 
to a frontage rate of only five cents per foot and service to the elevated 
portions of the town.36 These conditions illustrated the Committee’s lack 
of confidence in private enterprise and abruptly ended Carman’s interest 
in Port Arthur. 
The political impasse over the waterworks issue between supporters 
of municipal ownership and those who favoured private enterprise was 
finally overcome on April 17, 1888 when ratepayers voted in a plebescite 
to give the franchise to the Port Arthur Water, Light and Power 
Company.37 “The council’s reason for submitting the question,” the 
minutes of the council observed, 
of who should build the waterworks was decided upon from the 
fact that there is now, and always has been, since the waterworks 
were first discussed in this community, a wide difference of 
opinion as to whether the town should build the waterworks Itself 
or let the contract to a company...38 
The plebescite presented ratepayers with two options: the company 
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proposal which would cost them only $3 562 annually, and municipal 
ownership which was estimated to cost ratepayers $8 250 per year.39 
Given the difference in the estimated price tag, it was hardly surprising 
that ratepayers voted for private ownership. It does indicate, however, 
that ratepayers hadn’t completely lost faith in private enterprise to 
provide urban services in 1888. 
The Port Arthur Water, Light and Power Company, however, would fail 
to deliver on the promised waterworks but would pocket the $3562 in 
hydrant fees after building water tanks to supply the hydrants.4o The 
company was incorporated in March 1888 and included among its 
shareholders: James Conmee, Thomas Marks, D.F. Burk, George Clavet, and 
Michael Dwyer. The franchise agreement, approved by ratepayers in May 
1888, committed the company to building a gravitational waterworks, 
whereby the waters of the Current River would be diverted down 
McVicar’s Creek, and distributed through a system of at least five and a 
half miles of pipes. In exhange, the company received a de facto bonus in 
the hydrant fees and a tax exemption.41 While construction was to begin 
within thirty days and declared bona fide by November 30, 1889, delays 
resulted in the adoption of a second by-law to eliminate the forfeiture 
clause and replace it with the deposit of ten thousand dollars in 
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securities.42 James Farrand Ruttan warned ratepayers that the company 
could not raise the capital required to construct a waterworks.43 He was 
proved right when the company failed even to begin the construction of the 
waterworks by the November 1889 deadline. The agreement was 
cancelled on January 16, 1890 by ratepayers after Ruttan moved to repeal 
the contract, despite the opposition of three councillors, including James 
McTeigue who was also the Secretary of the Port Arthur Water, Light and 
Power Company.44 
While the construction of a waterworks was being delayed by the 
repeated failure of private enterprise to raise sufficient capital to 
undertake the project, there existed widespread consensus in the 
community that the municipality should proceed with the construction of 
a sewerage system. The sewerage system, which was constructed in 
1887, serviced eight streets in the heavily populated downtown core. The 
cost was fifteen thousand dollars, only two thousand of which was not 
raised by a special assessment on the benefiting property. The Board of 
Health recommended that the sewerage system be extended to another five 
blocks for reasons of public health in March 1889, but the council does not 
appear to have responded. This was probably because the Council was 
mired in political conflict and the boom years had ended. Without a 
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waterworks, the town’s sewerage system had drainage difficulties as it 
was difficult to flush out the sewers at regular intervals. The commonly- 
held assumption, at the time, was that sewers were the responsibility of 
the municipality. 
The sense of urgency within Port Arthur about unsanitary conditions, 
the contamination of drinking water, and the fear of fire, created public 
demands for the immediate construction of a waterworks and sewerage 
system. The repeated failure of private enterprise to construct a 
waterworks, and the boodling of the promoters of the Port Arthur Water, 
Light and Power Company (which managed to collect hydrant fees even 
though it had been understood by ratepayers who voted for the franchise 
agreement that these fees were to provide incentive to the company to 
construct the waterworks), discredited further private enterprise. In 
contrast, the construction of a sewerage system by the municipality in 
1887 showed ratepayers the advantages of municipal enterprise. The 
failure of private waterworks entrepreneurs to satisfy public demands 
during the 1880s represented a lost opportunity for the town. The 
citizens of Port Arthur were consequently forced to rely on water carriers 
until after the turn of the century, when prosperity returned once again. 
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David and Goliath: The Telephone Wars 
While the capitalization required to construct a waterworks was 
enormous, making it difficult for entrepreneurs to raise sufficient finance 
capital, a telephone exchange required only a relatively modest capital 
investment.45 As a result, if private ownership of urban utilities was to 
succeed in Port Arthur, it would have been in the provision of telephone 
service. Despite this, the provision of telephone service by private 
enterprise failed to satisfy public demand because of the ruthless tactics 
applied by the Bell Telephone Company to crush a local rival. In addition, 
Its subsequent policy of profit maximation prevented most ratepayers 
from having a telephone. The unwillingness of the Bell Telephone Company 
to provide affordable service created a great deal of resentment within 
the community against the private ownership of telephone service. 
The Bell Telephone Company pursued an aggressive policy of 
monopolizing telephone service In Canada and the United States. John 
Baldwin credited the company’s federal charter for Its early success as it 
allowed Bell to escape municipal regulation.46 its American parent 
achieved dominance in the field of telephone technology, according to 
Gerald W. Brock, through the control of patents, the construction of long 
distance lines, its ability to crush or buy-out its competitors, its 
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strategic alliances with telegraph companies and telephone 
manufacturers, and the United States federal government’s unwillingness 
to intervene.47 Bell Telephone’s fixation with profit maximization and its 
related refusal to extend service to less profitable hinterland areas, 
however, allowed small competitors to emerge once Bell’s major patent 
protection expired in 1885. “The failure to service small towns and rural 
areas created a reservoir of unsatisfied demand; providing a strong 
inducement for the entry of new firms once the patent protection was 
weakened.”48 The findings of Graham Taylor’s study of the Bell Telephone 
Company in Canada echoes much of what Brock concluded.49 
The citizens of Port Arthur were exposed to the new telephone 
technology at an early date. Only a year after Alexander Graham Bell 
received the patent for the telephone, two telephones were rented by Neil 
McDougal and W.P. Cooke who exchanged greetings between Prince Arthur’s 
Landing and the Town Plot in June 1877.50 A second private telephone line 
was installed in March 1884 when J. L. Meikle asked for and received 
permission to erect a line between the Post Office and the Bazaar- a 
distance of about three blocks.si Only when repeated appeals to the Bell 
Telephone Company had failed to entice it to Port Arthur did local 
entrepreneurs form a company to provide the town with telephone 
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service.52 The Port Arthur Telephone Company was incorporated on August 
25, 1884 with a paper value of ten thousand dollars divided primarily 
between James Conmee and his railway contracting partner John D. 
Maclennan; Alexander W. Thompson, George Thompson, John Henry Bartle, 
and W.H. Langworthy controlled the remaining two percent of the shares.53 
A confrontation between the Port Arthur Telephone Company and the 
Bell Telephone Company occurred because the municipality was unable to 
enforce the exclusive privilege granted to the former on May 20, 1884. 
The creation of the local company sparked the conflict with the Bell 
Telephone Company, which took a sudden interest in the Lakehead. When 
Conmee appealed to the municipal Council to enforce the franchise 
agreement after Bell announced that it too would organize a telephone 
exchange in Port Arthur, it was discovered that Bell Telephone’s federal 
charter allowed the company to escape municipal regulation. The Council, 
therefore, had no choice but to remain neutral in the telephone war.54 The 
legal environment had effectively constrained the municipality from 
regulating telephone service. 
The Bell Telephone Company crushed the local upstart by threatening 
its subscribers with litigation, offering free telephone service and 
ultimately buying-out the shareholders of the Port Arthur Telephone 
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Company. By the time that Bell Telephone opened its exchange in August 
1884, the local company had “already secured nearly all the prominent 
business houses and connection with the railroad offices.”55 Conmee’s 
subscribers were threatened, however, with litigation for patent 
infringement in advertisements in the local newspapers. “All persons 
using Telephones not licensed by this company,” Bell Telephone warned, 
“are hereby respectfully notified that they are liable to prosecution and 
for damages for infringement, and that they will be prosecuted to the full 
extent of the law.”56 These fear tactics resulted in the arrival of Richard 
Dennis and A.J. Patterson of the Telephone Manufacturing Company of 
Toronto, who promised to protect local subsribers from the threat of legal 
action by Bell Telephone.57 The Toronto company desperately needed 
customers, so they decided to come to the assistance of the Port Arthur 
Telephone Company which was using its telephones. Yet it was Bell 
Telephone’s ability to offer free telephones to potential subscribers 
which dealt the crushing blow to its rival. “I think It is not in the public 
interest,” Conmee observed after the turn of the century, 
that a company with enormous capital should be permitted to 
give free telephones and thereby destroy competition.... They 
tried it In Port Arthur. A local company put in a telephone system 
in Port Arthur and Fort William, the Bell Company came along and 
put in their system, and for three or four years everybody had free 
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telephones from both companies. The local company finding their 
bank account diminishing, gave in.ss 
The corporate records of the Port Arthur Telephone Company indicate that 
the Bell Telephone Company had purchased the independent company, along 
with the Telephone Manufacturing Company of Toronto, by the time that 
the annual report was filed on February 7, 1887. Once Bell had established 
a monopoly In Port Arthur, telephone subsribers were made to pay for the 
brief flury of competition with extremely high rates.59 In this instance, 
Goliath had soundly beaten David. 
The provision of telephone service in Port Arthur created a great deal 
of disenchantment with the private ownership of telephones. The ruthless 
tactics employed by the Bell Telephone Company to eliminate the Port 
Arthur Telephone Company and the subsequent rise in rates charged 
alienated many residents of Port Arthur. Due to its federal charter, the 
only alternative to the Bell telephone monopoly were municipally-owned 
telephones as no local entrepreneur had the resources necessary to take on 
Bell Telephone. The municipality was, however, in no position to consider 
the creation of a municipal telephone exchange in competition with Bell 
until after the turn of the century, when prosperity had returned to the 
community. 
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Illuminating Port Arthur 
The illumination of Port Arthur by either gas or electric lights 
inspired several entrepreneurs to approach the municipality for a 
franchise agreement during the 1880s. After flirting briefly with the idea 
of a municipal electric light system in 1888, the ratepayers adopted a 
franchise agreement with the Port Arthur Water, Light and Power 
Company. As a result, the town was illuminated by an extremely limited 
lighting system which failed to satisfy the growing demand for street and 
private lighting. Private enterprise also failed to harness the waterpower 
of the Current River. While private enterprise managed to construct a 
forty electric light system, they failed altogether to provide residents 
with a gas works for heating and lighting purposes. 
Although natural gas lamps lit the great cities of Europe and America 
during the nineteenth century, by the time that Port Arthur had grown 
large enough to warrant a street lighting system, electric lights had 
largely supplanted gaslight. Few technologies symbolized progress as 
much as electric lighting; gaslight appeared backwards in comparison. 
The Invention of the electric dynamo in 1870 by Werner von Siemen in 
Berlin was the technological breakthrough which ushered in two decades 
of rapid technological advancement related to electricity.so This was 
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followed by the invention of the incandescent lamp by Thomas Edison in 
October 1879, which set the stage for the replacement of gas lighting 
with electricity. Competition between Edison and Charles Van Depoel of 
Detroit accelerated the diffusion of electric lights, with salespersons 
criss-crossing the continent trying to create a market. Electricity was 
generated primarily through steam power during the 1880s, due to the 
technological limitations of electric transmission. Power plants could 
only transmit direct current over a distance of a mile, making electricity 
a purely local affair until the Invention of the alternator which permitted 
large scale hydro-electric development after the turn of the century. As a 
consequence, only those waterpowers in close proximity to urban centres 
could be developed prior to 1900.61 
Private enterprise failed to construct a gas works because of the 
scarcity of finance capital in the region. In the early 1880s, the streets 
of Port Arthur were illuminated by municipal gas lamps tended by a night 
watchman.62 There appeared to be some dissatisfaction with the 
watchman as the Council warned the watchman in September 1883 to 
repair the lamps or be prepared to be replaced.63 There was therefore an 
early precedent in Port Arthur for the municipal ownership of street 
lighting. In April 1888, the Council received an offer from A.R. Lewis to 
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construct a gas works but the matter was referred to the Fire, Water and 
Light Committee, never to be heard of again.64 A second more serious 
proposal from the Port Arthur Natural Gas Company resulted in a twenty 
year exclusive franchise agreement on September 12, 1888.65 The 
company was headed by William Murdock, the town engineer, and included 
a “gentleman,” two railway clerks and a grain inspector’s clerk.66 The 
Port Arthur Natural Gas Company failed to begin construction of the gas 
works within the ninety day stipulated by the agreement, so a second by- 
law was hurriedly adopted In November to extend the deadline to June 1, 
1889. Once again, the Company failed to raise the capital necessary to 
construct a gas works, but the ratepayers had long since turned their 
attention to electric lighting. 
The close proximity of the Current River waterpower to Port Arthur, 
which was only three miles north of the town, naturally led to this 
waterpower attracting the Interest of hydro electric entrepreneurs and 
the municipality.67 in February 1885, the Port Arthur Council officially 
requested control of the Current River from the Provincial government as 
a local combination was attempting to convince the province to lease the 
waterpower to them.68 The Port Arthur River, Light and Water Company, 
headed by James Conmee, was strongly opposed by the Council which 
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considered the proposed sale detrimental to the town’s interests.69 
Thomas Marks declared that “the water power of Current river was the 
greatest heritage the town had, and no private company should be given 
the exclusive right of having said power.”70 The hostility of the 
municipality was sufficient to thwart this attempt to control the 
waterpower. The future of the waterpower was bound-up with the 
electric light franchise. Whoever won the right to provide Port Arthur 
with illumination would also gain control of the waterpower. 
A lack of confidence in private enterprise led the town Council to 
recommend municipal ownership of the electric light franchise, but 
ratepayers defeated the by-law in 1888. Like so much of the council’s 
early experience with outside utility entrepreneurs, a proposal by W.R. 
Laird in the summer of 1884 to construct an electric light system based 
on the Van Depoele method went nowhere after councillors accepted the 
offer.7i This was followed by the Port Arthur Water, Light and Power 
Company, which was the successor to an earlier attempt by James Conmee 
to control the Current River. The company proposed to operate an electric 
light system using a steam generator located at the Port Arthur Saw and 
Planning Mill until such time that a hydro-electric development could be 
constructed on the Current River. Instead, the Fire, Water and Light 
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Committee opted in May, 1888 for the proposal of the Edison General 
Electric Company to construct a six hundred lamp system for the 
municipality at a cost of $14 212.50J2 This decision was reaffirmed 
after another proposal was received from a local combination which 
suggested using the Siemen’s patent of George E. Dorman, an electrical 
engineer who had just arrived from Great Britain.73 The Council 
considered the technology of Dorman proposal too risky even after an 
electric light demonstration successfully lit up Caleb Shera’s general 
store.74 In the end, the ratepayers decided that the cost of the Edison 
agreement was too great. 
In the aftermath of the failed Edison by-law, James Conmee finally 
succeeded in attaining the electric light franchise for Port Arthur, and 
with it the water rights of the Current River waterpower. The Port Arthur 
company only managed to operate a forty-light helsler system of electric 
lights centred in a lean-to addition to his sawmill.75 The system was an 
extremely limited one, lighting only a handful of homes and businesses in 
the downtown and therefore failing to satisfy the growing demand for 
street and private lighting in the residential areas. As well, the company 
took no action to develop the hydro-electric potential of the Current 
River, whose rights it now controlled. As a consequence, after nearly a 
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decade of negotiations with gas, electric light and hydro-electric 
entrepreneurs, the community had almost nothing to show for it. The 
ratepayers were still not convinced that municipal ownership of the 
electric lights franchise was necessary in 1888, they changed their minds 
by the early 1890s. 
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates that after fifteen years of high expectations, 
private enterprise only managed to construct a tiny forty lamp electric 
light system and a telephone exhange which charged far more that most 
ratepayers could afford. With respect to public demands for a 
waterworks, a gas works, a street railway and hydro-electric power, the 
private sector failed miserably. The outstanding example of private 
initiative, the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway, was 
only constructed by the provision of a generous municipal bonus, and in 
any case, was promptly handed over to the CPR, allowing that company to 
gradually abandon the town in the 1880s. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that a growing number of people were dissillusloned with the broken 
promises and “boodling” of the town’s economic elite. By the end of the 
decade, the ground was indeed fertile for an innovation such as municipal 
enterprise. Unfortunately, by the time that ratepayers turned towards 
municipal enterprise, the economic boom of the 1880s had turned into 
decade-long depression; the deteriorating financial position of the 
municipality made it almost too late to undertake such an Innovation. 
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Chapter 4 
THE EMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISE, 
1 890-1899 
“The municipal ownership idea was planted when the cities were mere 
villages; it has developed with the rising generation of children; it has 
become almost hereditary. The new citizen is practically compelled to 
champion municipal ownership because of popular opinion...” 
-J.O. Curwood, The Reader, 1907. 
By 1890, the repeated failure of entrepreneurs to provide the 
residents of Port Arthur with urban services had thoroughly undermined 
public confidence in private enterprise. This phenomenon combined with 
the effect of inter-urban rivalry was enough to convince a large majority 
of ratepayers to break with the past and experiment with municipal 
enterprise. The successful fight for a municipal street railway 
represented a repudiation of the boodling economic elite and set off a 
chain of events which expanded still further the scope of municipal 
activity. There is every reason to believe that the scope of municipal 
activity would have been even greater had the end of the silver mining 
boom, the centralization of Canadian Pacific Railway activity in Fort 
William, and an International recession not conspired to constrain the 
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ambition of Port Arthur’s municipal leaders. The municipality’s ability to 
undertake the municipal ownership of a waterworks, a telephone exchange 
and a hydro-electric development was seriously compromised by declining 
tax revenues and a provincial requirement that the town’s debt not 
represent more than ten percent of its annual assessment. This chapter 
will explore the successful fight for a municipal street railway in Port 
Arthur, and how the adoption of electric traction drew the municipality 
into the generation of electricity and the provision of electric lights. 
The Fight For A Municipal Street Railway 
On March 8, 1892 the first municipal streetcar rolled down 
Cumberland Street in Port Arthur to great fanfare. That day’s entry in the 
diary of Belle Kittredge observed that the “rides were all free so they had 
a great crowd. The street was lined with men to watch its movements.”^ 
The successful completion of the municipal street railway followed a 
bitter conflict within the community which pitted the town’s economic 
elite against the vast majority of ratepayers who favoured municipal 
ownership. The conflict erupted when Thomas Marks attempted to 
increase the value of property in his possession by offering to assist the 
municipality if the proposed route of the street railway was changed. 
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Rebuffed by the Council, that faction of the economic elite allied to the 
Marks family formed a private street railway company and campaigned to 
have the seventy-five thousand dollars already approved by the ratepayers 
redirected into a bonus. This section will Investigate how the 
municipality, with the assistance of the Provincial government, overcame 
the concerted opposition of a handful of prominent ratepayers to create a 
municipal street railway. 
With the exception of a handful of businessmen such as Richard 
Vigers, most people in Port Arthur agreed that a street railway to Fort 
William was an urgent necessity if the town was to retain its status as 
the regional administrative and commercial centre for Northwestern 
Ontario. It was generally agreed that, if given a choice, working people 
would prefer to live In Port Arthur because government offices, banks, 
large merchants, schools and churches were still concentrated in the 
town.2 A street railway promised to revitalize the town, as workers 
could then commute to their jobs in Fort William, and Port Arthur 
businesses would be in a position to attract customers from Fort William. 
This led to the adoption of a money by-law by ratepayers (voting 237 to 
22) designating seventy-five thousand dollars in debentures for the 
purpose of constructing a street railway between Port Arthur and Fort 
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William on February 2, 1891.3 
Although the wording of the street railway by-law was vague, it was 
generally understood that the Intent was to construct a municipally- 
owned street railway and not to bonus private enterprise. The town 
Council adopted a recommendation brought forth by the street railway 
committee on August 15, 1890 that the municipality was to be 
responsible for operating the enterprise.^ An editorial in the Daily 
Sentinel, similarly urged Its readers to support the street railway by-law 
because “[w]e would not be controlled by a railway but we could control 
[it] ourselves.”5 In fact, at a public meeting prior to the by-law vote, it 
was assumed that its adoption would signify the emergence of municipal 
enterprise in Port Arthur. The only opposition to the by-law came from 
absentee land owners, and the promoters of the Ontario and Rainy River 
Railway who feared the money by-law would hinder their efforts to 
arrange a municipal bonus for their own scheme.® The creation of a 
municipal street railway would probably have gone largely unopposed had 
municipal ownership been explicitly stated in the by-law. But once the 
seventy-five thousand dollars in debentures had been approved, a handful 
of prominent ratepayers took advantage of the vagueness of the wording to 
try to redirect the money into their own pockets. 
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The bombshell came on March 7, 1891 when Thomas Marks proposed 
to bonus the municipality if the proposed street railway route was 
changed. Marks ironically wanted the street railway to use the abandoned 
right-of-way of the Prince Arthur’s Landing and Kaministiquia Railway 
instead of Fort William Road. As incentive, he offered to lay out the 
street, build the necessary bridges over the McIntyre and Neebing Rivers, 
and give the town free use of the land.7 While the proposal would have 
saved the municipality almost ten thousand dollars, It also promised to 
open “a large tract of high land suitable for building purposes [bringing it] 
into position for residences and improvements...”8 It was openly admitted 
that this tract of high land was owned by Marks and his associates and 
would immediately jump in value had his proposal been accepted.9 As a 
consequence, land speculation inspired the subsequent actions of the 
economic elite. 
The Council’s decision to deny the proposal turned Marks against the 
municipal street railway. On March 13, 1891, the Council defeated Marks’ 
offer after the town engineer advised councillors not to accept the 
proposal. He argued that the alternate route presented construction 
difficulties and threatened the viability of the entire enterprise due to 
the potential loss of revenue on the unpopulated route. This inspired 
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W.P. Cooke to declare that “the money was voted to build a street railway 
and not a colonization road.”^i There even appeared to be some question 
as to the legality of building a street railway on the raised embankment of 
an old branch railway because the rails were not supposed to be more than 
two inches higher than the level of the street. The intensity of the 
conflict escalated still further on March 18, 1891 when Thomas Marks 
advanced a second proposal which called on the municipality to negotiate 
a street railway franchise agreement with the Port Arthur and Fort 
William Railroad Company. 12 Incorporated on May 4, 1891, the 
shareholders of the company included Thomas Marks, George H. Macdonell, 
George T. Marks and a couple of Toronto capitalists. 13 The company 
proposed to construct the street railway on the route previously 
suggested by Thomas Marks in exchange for a twenty year franchise 
agreement and a bonus of seventy-five thousand dollars. As a result, the 
consensus within the community in favour of a municipal street railway 
was broken and a bitter conflict ensued which pitted a handful of 
prominent ratepayers against the will of the overwhelming majority. 
Marks resorted to the courts in order to stop the construction of the 
street railway by the municipality. Opponents of the municipal enterprise 
exploited the failure of the street railway by-law to explicitly approve 
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the construction of a municipal street railways^ An application for an 
injunction to restrain Port Arthur from constructing a street railway was 
filed on April 27, 1891 by Michael Dwyer (the President of the Port Arthur 
Water, Light, and Power Company), Thomas Marks and George T. Marks. A 
temporary injunction was granted by Judge J. Street of the Divisional 
Court on April 30.This injunction was made perpetual on May 26 after 
the town lost its appeal. The fate of the municipal street railway 
depended on the intervention of the Provincial government on behalf of the 
municipality. 
The Provincial government of Oliver Mowat was convinced by James 
Conmee, the area’s Liberal Member of Provincial Parliament, to intervene 
to save the municipal street railway. Conmee’s own reluctance to support 
the enterprise was suppressed by political considerations as an 
overwhelming majority of the people favoured it. Even the Daily Sentinel, 
a vocal opponent of the street railway, had to admit that the reaction to 
the injunction was “a feeling of universal disappointment In the 
community.”16 Consequently, Conmee sponsored an Act to Consolidate the 
Debt of the Town of Port Arthur (Vic 54, Ch 78) wherein the street 
railway by-law was declared “legal and valid to ail intents and 
purposes.”17 This Act was adopted despite the written and personal 
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appeals of prominent Port Arthur ratepayers to defeat the bill. The 
opponents of the Act argued that a municipal street railway was “an act 
of gross folly, reckless, extravagant and ill-considered in the extreme. 
Justice Osier of the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the 
municipality on May 10, 1892 because the legislation “had the effect of 
validating and extending the provisions of their by-law.”19 Although this 
ruling was appealed and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Provincial cabinet made an Order-in-Council on May 22, 1891 
allowing construction to proceed.20 The adoption of a second street 
railway by-law on September 21 set aside once and for all the legal 
uncertainty which had delayed the completion of the municipal street 
railway. The Intervention of the Provincial government on behalf of the 
municipality was crucial to the success of the fight for a municipally 
owned and operated street railway. 
The overwhelming political support for the municipal street railway 
resulted in the defeat of the economic elite at the polls. A slate of 
municipal street railway advocates swept the by-elections held after 
three allies of Thomas Marks had resigned their positions in the summer 
of 1891. The failure of the opponents of the municipal enterprise to sway 
public opinion was again illustrated by the adoption of a second street 
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railway by-law 185 to 59. In fact, public opinion was so hostile to the 
town’s economic elite that Thomas Marks was forced to declare that he 
was not a “boodler,” and the editor of the Daily Sentinel tried to convince 
his readers that the newspaper was independent of Marks.21 “We know 
that nine-tenths of the business men of the town are opposed to it [second 
street railway by-law],” observed the Daily Sentinel, “but we also know 
that the small property owners appear to be almost solid for it.”22 Small 
property owners were no longer willing to subsidize the boodling habit of 
Port Arthur’s economic elite, resolving instead to see the completion of 
the municipal street railway. 
After overcoming local opposition, the municipal street railway faced 
an uncertain future in 1892 due to the refusal of the Municipality of 
Neebing to permit the extension of the street railway to Fort William. The 
shortcomings of an inter-urban street railway which abruptly stopped a 
mile outside of Fort William was captured in another diary entry of Belle 
KIttredge. She so disliked the stench of dry whiskey on the overcrowded 
buggies which transported people between the street railway terminus at 
the McIntyre River and Fort William that she preferred to walk. On a 
particularly muddy day, Kittredge was being slowed by the layers of mud 
which caked her shoes, and In danger of missing the streetcar, which was 
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preparing to leave a few hundred metres ahead of her, she was forced to 
take off her shoes and run bare foot through the mud, in her dress, just to 
make the connection.23 This colourful incident illustrates the 
inconvenience of the street railway in 1892, and the importance of 
extending it all the way to Fort William. Without gaining entry into the 
Municipality of Neebing, the street railway risked failing in its primary 
objective of convincing people, such as Belle Kittredge, to commute to 
their Fort William workplaces. 
The province once again intervened on behalf of Port Arthur to allow 
the extension of the street railway to Fort William. After Port Arthur 
failed to convince the Council of the Municipality of Neebing to permit an 
extension of the street railway, there was an unsuccessful attempt to 
annex East Fort William. The Liberal government ordered that the 
extension be permitted after a telegraph message from Mayor Ruttan was 
received.24 This unleashed a storm of controversy in the newly 
incorporated Town of Fort William with the Journal declaring that “the 
Ontario Legislature has perpetrated an outrage upon the town of Fort 
William In permitting Port Arthur to push its street railway into our 
corporation contrary to our wish....”25 The Order-in-Council imposed 
strict conditions on Port Arthur in return for the right to extend the 
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street railway. For example, the route, hours and frequency of service, 
and the rates charged were all fixed for the duration.26 Fort William had 
the option of becoming a joint owner within the first eight years, or at 
the end of the twenty year agreement in 1913. Port Arthur ratepayers 
demonstrated once again their commitment to the street railway when 
they voted 286 to 21 in favour of an additional forty thousand dollar 
expenditure for the extension in January 1893.27 The Provincial 
government’s willingness to intervene on behalf of Port Arthur enabled 
the completion of the inter-urban street railway. 
The emergence of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur was facilitated 
by the failure of private enterprise to raise sufficient private capital to 
respond to the public demands for a street railway. It was only after the 
ratepayers voted for a seventy-five thousand dollar expenditure that the 
boodlers made a play to build the demanded inter-urban street railway 
using the municipal street railway debentures as a bonus. The 
overwhelming majority of the population supported municipal ownership, 
and the Provincial government was called on to intervene on behalf of the 
municipality in order to side-step an Injunction and Fort William’s 
opposition to the venture. The creation of the first municipally-owned 
and operated electric street railway in the world was the innovation of 
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small land owners who were disillusioned with the town’s economic elite. 
In addition, the adoption of electric traction set off a chain of events 
which drew the Town of Port Arthur into an expanding scope of municipal 
activity. 
Electric Traction, Generation and Lights 
The construction of Canada’s first electric street railway in Port 
Arthur led the municipality into the business of electric generation.28 A 
municipal steam power plant with a capacity to generate one hundred and 
fifty horse power was built In 1891 by the Edison General Electric 
Company.29 This steam power plant was the only source of electric power 
capable of operating an electric light system when the power plant of the 
Port Arthur Water, Light and Power Company burned to the ground In 1894. 
Conditions were conducive for the municipality to take-over the franchise 
in the aftermath. In an effort to reduce the high operating costs of the 
municipal street railway and electric light franchises, the municipality 
was forced to investigate cheaper sources of power than steam 
generation. While hydro-electricity offered the municipality the potential 
for substantially lower costs, private enterprise was unable to harness 
the Current River and Kakabeka Falls/Ecarte Rapids waterpower. When the 
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economy improved after the turn of the century, the municipality took 
advantage of the favourable conditions to develop Current River. In the 
meantime, the decision to adopt electric traction resulted in the gradual 
expansion of the scope of municipal activity despite the bleak financial 
picture. 
The adoption of electric traction emerged from the development of an 
inter-urban street railway and the timing of the venture. The operation of 
a street railway with over seven miles of track required a faster means of 
traction than horses in order to convince the citizens of Port Arthur to 
commute to their workplaces in Fort William. Conversely, steam 
locomotion was ill-suited to operating on urban streets due to the 
pollution and operating costs involved. In comparison, electric traction 
was attractive to the booster mentality because it had the advantage of 
being rapid, relatively clean, and technologically innovative. The timing 
of Port Arthur’s consideration of an inter-urban street railway was 
crucial because, as John P. McKay observed, “electrification shot through 
the American street railway industry like a current through a copper 
wire” between 1890 and 1892.30 For example, the mileage of electric 
street railway trackage in the United States jumped from only 964 miles 
in 1890 to 7 320 miles In a three year period. The adoption of electric 
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traction by Port Arthur in 1891 mirrored a much larger continental trend 
and reflected the unique demands of an inter-urban street railway. 
Suggestions made by opponents of the municipal street railway that 
horse traction or steam locomotion was ‘good enough’ for a small frontier 
town like Port Arthur were met with a barrage of public criticism. The 
public fixation with electricity perplexed the editor of the Daily Sentinel 
who commented: 
...we cannot understand why an electric street railway is 
absolutely necessary to our welfare. Why will not a horse 
car road do as well? What valid objections can be urged against 
cars actuated by steam? Why is there so much placed on the word 
electric?...that the elevation of electricity with a god who is to 
deliver this town from untold evils is a mystery unexplainable to 
us.31 
The pleasure that the citizens of Port Arthur took in being at the forefront 
of technological (and regulatory) innovation was captured by the Fort 
William Journal which reported that “the Port Arthurites are as happy as 
a child with a new toy.”32 Civic pride in operating a street railway 
influenced the decision to venture Into the area of electricity. 
The failure of the Port Arthur Water, Light and Power Company to 
provide an affordable and dependable electric light service, and its 
inability to harness the water power of the Current River, generated 
public demands for direct municipal intervention after 1891. Many 
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ratepayers were dissatisfied with the quality of lighting provided by the 
company. “The system was not entirely satisfactory,” observed the News 
Chronicle, “when one lamp was broken the connection often was 
broken...and all the lights in the city went out.”33 The Council threatened 
not to pay for street lighting for those nights when the lights were not 
functioning properly.34 The company’s inability (or unwillingness) to 
develop the Current River waterpower and to expand the electric light 
system beyond a handful of lights created considerable public 
dissatisfaction during this period. The service was so bad that even 
George T. Marks, the erstwhile opponent of the municipal street railway, 
advocated the municipalization of the electric-light franchise after he 
was re-elected Mayor in January 1894. He also proposed that the 
municipality develop Current River to reduce the operating cost of an 
electric light system so everybody could afford electric lights in their 
homes instead of “the luxury it is at present.”35 Considerable public 
discussion over the possibility of the municipality’s taking over the 
company’s electric light and hydro-electric franchises had been 
thoroughly discussed In Port Arthur prior to the devastating fire on 
August 12, 1894.36 
The fire forced the company to sell its remaining assets and the 
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electric-light franchise to the municipality. Although the company was no 
longer in a position to operate an electric-light system, the municipality 
was compelled to negotiate a deal to buy the franchise due to an Act 
adopted in 1893. An Act Regarding the Town of Port Arthur, which 
received Royal Assent on May 27, 1893, granted to the municipality the 
right to sell electric power, operate an electric-light system and enter 
into a franchise agreement for a waterworks, on the condition that these 
powers were not “exercised until...an agreement [has] been entered Into 
between the corporation of the said town of Port Arthur, and the Port 
Arthur Water, Light and Power.”37 with what amounted to legislative 
protection, the company was able to negotiate a deal for seven thousand 
dollars. Although the ratepayers approved the municipalization of the 
electric light franchise in January 1895, it was not until September until 
the transaction was completed. The delay was caused by legal constraints 
on the municipality which prevented it from purchasing the shares of a 
private company.38 As a result, the company’s shares were held in trust 
by the chairpersons of the Council’s five standing committees, and the 
Council regained the water rights to the Current River waterpower.39 
The price paid for the company’s assets and franchise was considered 
excessive, angering many ratepayers. It also reinforced the boodling 
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image of the town’s economic elite. “Everyone felt that the price asked,” 
observed the Thunder Bav Sentinel, “was a great deal too much for the 
Company’s plant, yet as it got the Company out of the way, and allowed 
the town to go ahead and make money out of the general electric lighting, 
thought better to let the agreement be carried out.”4o Because the 
municipality had undertaken a study of the waterpower in 1891 by the 
City Engineer of Winnipeg, who happened to also be the brother of J.F. 
Ruttan, the water rights of the Current River were considered worth the 
price.41 Consequently, it was surprising that between December 1895 and 
April 1896 another franchise agreement with the Port Arthur Water, Light 
and Power Company was finalized. 
The deteriorating financial position of the municipality very nearly 
resulted in the privatization of the newly won electric-light, waterworks 
and hydro-electric power franchises. Verging on bankruptcy, the town of 
Port Arthur was in no position in 1895-96 to invest the capital necessary 
to harness the Current River or construct a large electric-light system. 
“Three years ago,” the Thunder Bay Sentinel recalled, 
when the bank refused to furnish the Town with money to meet 
current expenses, the Treasurer began to issue Town orders which 
were taken in payment of taxes, and for which at that time there 
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was not much difficulty in getting money. The practice of issuing 
town orders still continues, but neither the bank nor the merchants 
will now cash these orders, and it is often the case that the town 
officials, school teachers, etc, remain unpaid for several months 
together.42 
Unable to proceed with the demanded urban services, the ratepayers 
agreed in desperation to a franchise agreement with the Port Arthur 
Water, Light and Power Company to provide the community with hydro- 
electric power, electric lights and a waterworks. The company also 
promised to build a pulp mill employing at least twenty-five people.43 
While the company was to construct the promised hydro-electric power 
development, the municipality proposed to lease its own power plant. 
Despite the reminder of the Thunder Bay Sentinel that an “extortionate 
price was paid in order to get rid of the ring, and for the town to place 
itself in the power of that organization again was too foolish for 
anything,” the ratepayers voted for the contract.44 in the end. It was only 
Conmee's failure to come up with the required ten thousand dollar deposit 
which allowed the municipality to maintain control of the franchises. The 
failure of private enterprise to develop the Kakabeka Falls/ Ecarte Rapids 
waterpower during the 1890s led the town of Port Arthur to undertake the 
development of Current River after the turn of the century.(See Appendix 
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III) 
The hydro-electric development of the Kakabeka Falls/Ecarte Rapids 
waterpower was delayed by legal wrangling between Francis Hector 
Clergue and Edward Spencer Jenison for control. During the summer of 
1894, Clergue arrived in the area from New England after he bought the 
Sault Ste. Marie Water, Gas and Light Company from James Conmee.45 
When he arrived at the Lakehead, Clergue decided to purchase the Kakabeka 
Falls Land and Electric Company which had owned the water rights at the 
Falls since 1890. E. S. Jenison, a civil engineer from Chicago, arrived the 
following summer and acquired the water rights to the Ecarte Rapids only 
a few miles upstream from the Falls. The interests of Clergue and Jenison 
conflicted from the outset, and a prolonged legal battle from 1895 to 
1898 delayed construction of the proposed hydro schemes. Frustrated by 
the courts, Jenison convinced the Ontario legislature to adopt on April 13, 
1897 the first Jenison Act (60 Viet Ch 106), which freed him to legally 
carry out his scheme after compensation due Clergue was fixed in July 
1898.46 
Although ratepayers ratified an agreement between the town of Port 
Arthur and Jenison in January 1899, the Mayor refused to sign it due to the 
entrepreneur’s attempts to garner a regional power monopoly. The 
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contract itself committed Jenison to providing Port Arthur with five 
hundred horse power of electricity and five hundred thousand gallons of 
drinking water in exchange for a flat annual fee of ten thousand dollars 
over the course of the ninety-nine year agreement.47 why then did the 
Mayor refuse to sign the by-law after the majority of ratepayers had 
voted in favour? Marc Lavoie suggests that municipal ownership 
ambitions played a part in the decision.48 While this is undoubtedly true, 
it does not explain why public opinion turned against Jenison after the by- 
law was adopted. Port Arthur thwarted Jenison’s efforts after the 
entrepreneur began to purchase land north of the Red River Road for the 
proposed canal. This more indirect route threatened the municipality’s 
water rights on the Current River as the canal would slice through the 
tributary waters, allowing Jenison to divert the water for his own 
purposes.49 As a result, there was a real possibility that Jenison would 
achieve a regional power monopoly, thus threatening the future prosperity 
of Port Arthur. 
The sense of optimism created by the announcement that the 
Canadian Northern Railway would locate its terminus in Port Arthur acted 
to revive municipal ownership ambitions in Port Arthur. Public opinion 
swung sharply in favour of the municipality constructing a hydro-electric 
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development almost immediately after ratepayers had approved the 
Jenison agreement. A growing range of municipal activity stemming from 
the original decision to create a municipal street railway had redefined 
the role of the municipality within the community. The way was clear for 
the construction of a municipal hydro-electric development on the Current 
River. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur during the 
1890s filled the vacuum created by private enterprise’s inability to 
provide urban services without substantial municipal bonuses. The fact 
that the first experiment with municipal enterprise in Port Arthur (with 
the exception of the sewerage system) was a street railway reflected the 
sense of urgency created by the decision of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
to centralize its activities in Fort William. The fight for a municipal 
street railway pitted the small land owners against the economic elite 
which preferred a continuation of bonusing arrangements. The 
intervention of the Provincial government was crucial to the completion 
of the street railway and its extension to Fort William. Adoption of 
electric traction drew the municipality first into steam generation and 
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subsequently into the provision of electric lights. Private enterprise’s 
inability to harness the water power of the Current River and the 
Kakabeka Falls/Ecarte Rapids convinced a growing number of ratepayers 
that the municipality should develop the Current River itself once the 
economic climate improved. The scope of municipal activity would likely 
have been broader still had not the deteriorating financial position of the 
municipality not constrained the ambition of civic leaders. An explosion 
of municipal activity was just waiting to happen. 
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Chapter 5 
MUNICIPAL PROGRESS, 1900-1906 
''The municipal ownership town is in a better position to deal with 
industrial institutions, and offer inducements to secure their location, 
than the town that had its best resources and features tied up 
hopelessly.... Municipal Ownership and industrial progress go hand in hand.'' 
-Mayor of Medicine Hat, 19061 
The turn of the century marked a return to prosperity when “the 
coming of the Canadian Northern Railway infused new life Into Port 
Arthur.”2 The new century also saw a renewed interest in municipal 
enterprise with the construction of a hydro-electric power development 
commenced in 1901, a municipal telephone exchange in 1902, and a 
waterworks in 1903. The municipality was under intense pressure to 
extend urban services to a rapidly growing population. In fact, Port 
Arthur’s population grew from only 2 424 people In 1899 to 10 206 in 
1906.3 It was also a time of unrestrained optimism in Port Arthur, when 
municipal enterprise appeared to symbolize municipal and Industrial 
progress. This chapter will explore the emergence of municipal enterprise 
In the fields of hydro-electric generation, telephones, water and sewerage 
works. In doing so, I will establish that municipal enterprise In Port 
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Arthur promoted economic growth through the provision of cheap hydro- 
electricity and resulted in a fairer social diffusion of urban services. 
Hydro-Electric Power Generation and Electric Lights 
The failure of private enterprise to harness the water power of the 
region, along with the rising power demands of the municipal street 
railway and electric light franchises, convinced the municipality to 
proceed with the construction of a municipal hydro-electric development 
on the Current River. The first phase of the development was completed in 
1903 with a peak capacity to generate one thousand horse power. At once, 
the availability of cheap power promoted industrial growth in Port Arthur 
and enabled the municipality to expand its municipal enterprises. For 
example, the social diffusion of electric lights “democratized” the 
technology in that a much larger proportion of the population was able to 
afford electric lights in their homes. 
The hydro-electric power of the Ecarte Rapids was not developed by 
Edward Spencer Jenison because it was essentially a speculative 
undertaking. While Jenison may not have had the finance capital necessary 
to develop the waterpower personally, as Marc Lavoie suggests, his 
partner in the Anglo-American Company certainly did. David Spencer Wegg 
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was a prominent Chicago lawyer who earned mention in the Who Was Who 
in America. This source identified him as a railway promoter of some 
means who had access to substantial sums of finance capital.4 It would 
actually appear from the testimony of Jenison’s own lawyer before the 
Private Bills Committee of the Provincial legislature that Wegg was the 
senior partner in the Company.s A hundred thousand dollar loan from the 
Gaurantee Insurance Company to Jenison and Wegg in 1901 confirms that 
their failure to begin construction before the November 30, 1902 deadline 
was not due to an inability to raise sufficient capital.6 The evidence 
strongly supports David Black’s assessment that Jenison and Wegg were 
‘pretenders’ whose interest in the waterpower was speculative.^ 
The completion of the first phase of the Current River hydro-electric 
development in 1903 resolved for the time being the critical shortage of 
electricity in Port Arthur. Ratepayers voted 301 to 27 in favour of a 
thirty thousand dollar expenditure on February 25, 1901, and voted for an 
additional thirty thousand dollars in Octobers The urgency of the power 
development was demonstrated in 1902 when the Electric Railway and 
Light Commission was forced to turn down a request by L.A. Purcell to 
purchase ten horse power for his factory.9 After 1903, the municipality 
was in the advantageous position of being able to sell ‘reasonably steady’ 
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power to would-be industrialists at a cheaper price than was possible in 
Fort William (with only a steam power plant).The town enlarged its 
development In 1906, constructing a network of service and storage dams 
upriver In order to increase the capacity of the waterpower, and minimize 
the effect of the ‘dry’ winter months.Fort William was envious of Port 
Arthur’s municipal dam and appealed to its rival to sell it some of its 
surplus electricity. In response, a motion was adopted by the Commission 
that “should it be proved that we have the power to spare and that the 
cost is not excessive,” Fort William would be provided with electricity 
for electric light purposes only. 12 The proposed price was set at five 
dollars more than the twenty-five dollars per horse power sold to Port 
Arthur power consumers. 13 This discriminatory policy reflected the 
Intensity of inter-urban rivalry, and how municipal enterprise helped Port 
Arthur to gain an advantage over Fort William. 
Access to a cheap source of electricity resulted in rapid industrial 
growth In Port Arthur enabling the town to surpass Fort William’s total 
assessment for the first time since the early 1890s. Industrial growth in 
this era was largely determined by the availability of cheap electric 
power. Using the total assessment value of real property, personal 
property and taxable income in Port Arthur and Fort William between 1901 
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and 1906, the importance of cheap hydro-electric power to the fortune of 
the two towns can be gaged.in 1901, the total assessment in Fort 
William was 19.8 percent greater than Port Arthur. This reflected the 
fact that industrialists in both communities only had access to relatively 
expensive steam power. The following year, the assessment in Port 
Arthur was marginally larger than Fort William for the first time since 
1893. This turn of events was likely due to the completion of the 
Canadian Northern Railway terminus in Port Arthur and the prospect of a 
municipal hydro-electric development under construction on the Current 
River. By 1905, Port Arthur had an 18.2 percent advantage over its rival 
in the overall assessment which can be explained by the impact of the 
completion of the hydro project. In all, the total assessment figures in 
Port Arthur jumped 334.3 percent between 1902 and 1906. This 
unprecendented growth was largely attributable to the construction and 
extension of the Current River hydro-electric development by the 
municipality. 
The generation of cheap power from the Current River development 
resulted in the social diffusion (distribution beyond the confines of the 
business elite) of electric lights in Port Arthur. This enabled the electric 
light system to expand from 1 048 16-candle power lights and 82 street 
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lights in June 1900, to 6 335 16-candle power lights and 344 street 
lights five years laterjs jhe Council actively encouraged the rapid 
expansion of the electric light franchise by keeping the rates charged as 
low as possible. “The Electric Railway and Light Commissioners be 
requested,” the Council moved in January 1903, 
to take early steps to give our citizens an opportunity to use the 
Electric Lights by making provision to have lights installed at 
such a reasonable price that they will be within the reach of every 
householder and thus increase the revenue of the Town and the 
comfort and welfare of the people who are paying for the power 
plant.16 
This motion reveals an Important feature of municipal ownership in 
Ontario-the rapid diffusion of urban services. As ratepayer support was 
needed for continued expenditures on the electric light franchise, 
municipal politicians and managers were keenly aware that such support 
was only possible if a large majority of ratepayers shared in the benefits 
accrued. It was politically advisable that electric lights should be 
affordable to all ratepayers. As a consequence, municipal ownership acted 
to democratize new technologies; nowhere was this more apparent than in 
the field of telephone service. 
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Port Arthur vs The Bell Telephone Company 
The municipal ownership of telephone service originated in Europe 
near the end of the nineteenth century. Pioneered by the municipalities of 
Tunbridge and Glasgow in Great Britain, and Amsterdam on the continent, 
it was a variation to a strong tradition of public ownership of 
telecommunications by the central governments of Europe. 17 Although the 
Chicago Chronicle confidently predicted in April 1900 that the city would 
soon adopt municipal telephones, and John A. Fairlie suggested the 
following year that the innovation was “not far distant,” the municipal 
ownership of telephones never really got off of the ground in the United 
States. 18 The international debate extended to Canada where the Ontario 
Municipal Act was amended late in the 1890s legalizing the innovation, 
followed by an endorsement of the municipal ownership of telephones by 
the Toronto World in 1900. The first municipal telephone exchanges in 
North America were organized In 1902 when Port Arthur, Fort William and 
Rat Portage (Kenora) in Northwestern Ontario challenged the existing 
monopoly of the Bell Telephone Company. This section will investigate 
why Port Arthur established a municipal telephone exchange, and how the 
municipality overcame the frantic efforts of Bell Telephone to retain its 
monopoly. The social diffusion of telephones, an important by-product of 
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municipal ownership, will not be explored until the next section of the 
chapter. 
The inability of the municipality to regulate the activity of the Bell 
Telephone Company in order to respond to public frustration over the 
quality of service and the exorbitant rates charged was largely 
responsible for the creation of a municipal telephone exchange. The local 
grievance against Bell Telephone was longstanding. For example, the 
municipal Council had Instructed the Clerk in September 1892 to “inform 
the Bell Telephone Co. that we do not consider they have any rights 
whatsoever in our streets...”"is Ironically, it was Bell’s ability to escape 
municipal regulation through its federal charter which determined the 
nature of municipal intervention in Port Arthur. After “the years of 
useless appeals for an up-to-date system,” the minutes of the Fort 
William Council reveal that “the two towns...decided almost unanimously 
to Install similar [telephone] systems.”20 Municipal enterprise was 
essentially the only response available to the municipality. This phase of 
telephone organization and regulation In Port Arthur conforms to John 
Baldwin's regulatory failure hypothesis, which suggests that the 
emergence of public enterprise in Canada resulted from the legal 
environment in this country. The ratepayers of Port Arthur, wanting a 
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more affordable and dependable telephone service, voted overwhelmingly 
in favour of establishing a municipal telephone exchange on May 27, 1902. 
The creation of municipal telephone exhanges in Port Arthur and Fort 
William was considered a dangerous innovation which threatened Bell 
Telephone’s monopoly in Canada. The intensity of the conflict was such 
that Jean-Guy Rens felt compelled to label it “le bataille de Port Arthur 
et de Fort William.”21 Officers of the company feared that if the two 
municipalities succeeded in displacing Bell Telephone, larger (more 
important) municipalities and maybe even provinces would follow suit. In 
fact, public enterprise was the only real threat to the hegemony of the 
Bell Telephone Company In the country. Unlike the Port Arthur Telephone 
Company during the 1880s, the town of Port Arthur had considerable 
financial resources of its own with which to fight the company. By 
sending to the Lakehead the Chief of the Special Agent Division to 
coordinate the company’s efforts to retain its monopoly, Charles Sise 
expressed the seriousness with which the emergence of municipal 
enterprise at the Lakehead was taken by Bell Telephone. When Bell offered 
free telephone service in Port Arthur, however, only a handful of people 
responded. This unusual reaction reflected the public’s loyalty to 
municipal enterprise as well as public hostility towards the Bell 
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Telephone Company. 
The struggle between the municipal franchises and the Bell Telephone 
Company at the Lakehead became a cause celebre for the municipal 
ownership movement.22 The success of the municipal telephone 
exchanges resulted in emulation when, inspired by the precedent 
established at the Lakehead, Edmonton organized its own municipal 
telephone exchange two years later.23 The Prairie provinces subsequently 
formed public telephone systems which further chipped away at Bell 
Telephone’s national monopoly. The emergence of municipal telephone 
systems in Port Arthur and Fort William was communicated across the 
country in the Union of Canadian Municipalities’ journal, the Canadian 
Municipal News. Another means of publicizing the telephone struggle at 
the Lakehead was at the annual gatherings of the Union. For example, one 
of the guest speakers at the annual convention in 1905 discussed 
municipal ownership at the Lakehead.24 The institutionalization of the 
public telephone movement occurred in September of that year when the 
Canadian Independent Telephone Association was formed. As a result, the 
struggle to displace the Bell Telephone Company at the Lakehead received 
considerable nationwide attention during this period. Of particular 
importance to municipalities across the country, were the efforts of Port 
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Arthur and Fort William to dismantle the exclusive agreement between 
Bell Telephone and the Canadian Pacific Railway. 
Port Arthur and Fort William appealed to the Board of Railway 
Commissioners to gain access to the premises of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway because Bell Telephone had been given an exclusive right to 
provide telephone service to the company nationwide on May 1, 1902.25 
The two towns joined forces in January 1903 to demand access to the 
railway stations, offices, elevators and other premises, but the CPR 
refused to break its contract with Bell Telephone.26 As a consequence, the 
municipalities were forced to apply to the Board of Railway 
Commissioners for an order to compel the connections. Represented 
before the Board by municipal reform leader W.D. Lighthall, the towns 
argued that this contract was illegal and contrary to public policy.27 The 
fight was also an important one for Bell Telephone, as the testimony of 
Lewis B. Macfarlane (the General Superintendent) admitted that the 
“[pjrospect is, we will disappear if they get into the stations.”28 After 
hearing their case, a majority of the three commissioners decided that a 
monopoly did not exist, as the municipality could locate its telephones 
just outside company property. The Board ruled that the two 
municipalities would be allowed access to CPR property, only after 
187 
compensation was paid to Bell Telephone for the loss of the exclusive 
privilege.29 Bell Telephone’s lawyer demanded that this compensation be 
fixed at one hundred thousand dollars for the loss of the exclusive right 
nationwide.30 Fortunately for Port Arthur and Fort William, the Board 
fixed compensation on July 4, 1905 at five dollars per telephone operated 
by Bell Telephone in each community.31 
This decision sparked another contentious debate over the number of 
telephones operated by Bell at the Lakehead because the company had 
offered subscribers free service. Despite the assertion by Charles Sise 
that the company operated two hundred telephones at the Lakehead, ninety 
of which were supposedly in Port Arthur, the Commissioners believed that 
this number was greatly inflated.32 Sise weakened his own case when, 
under cross-examination from W.H. Langworthy, he refused to respond to a 
question asking him how many telephones Bell provided free of charge. In 
fact. Bell Telephone only had fifteen paying subscribers in Port Arthur 
“among the business men,” as compared to the three hundred and sixty- 
nine subscribers of the municipal telephone service in February 1904. 
According to the 1904 Bell Telephone directory for Port Arthur, its 
subscribers included many of the old boodlers including D.F. Burk, George 
T. Marks, F.S. Wiley, Richard Vigers, James Whalen and James Conmee.33 
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The municipal telephone system was more firmly established in Port 
Arthur than in Fort William because the Canadian Northern Railway had 
agreed to install municipal telephones in July 1903, whereas they were 
excluded from the property of the Canadian Pacific Railway until 1908. 
The emergence of municipal ownership of telephones in the Lakehead 
was of national Importance because it was the first time that the Bell 
Telephone Company was challenged by public enterprise. Bell Telephone’s 
policy of profit maximization underserviced the less profitable hinterland 
areas of Canada, giving birth to the municipal telephone systems in 
Northwestern Ontario. While few Bell Telephone subscribers In Port 
Arthur remained loyal to the company, the municipal telephone service 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly. Clinging to its exclusive privilege with the 
CPR in a desperate attempt to maintain a toe-hold in the community, it 
was only a matter of time before the Bell Telephone Company capitulated. 
This finally occurred in 1909 when the assets of Bell Telephone were sold 
to Port Arthur on the condition that the company did not return to provide 
local telephone service. Thus ended a remarkable chapter in the history of 
Port Arthur when a small frontier town defeated one of the largest 
“Eastern Monopolies” in the country. 
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The ‘Democratization’ of Teiephone Technoiogy 
Several historians and sociologists have explored the social 
distribution of telephone technology in Canada. Michele Martin argues 
that, in the hands of the Bell Telephone Company, the telephone was 
“developed mainly among the ruling classes in cities and towns.”34 The 
prohibitive rates charged by this company to subscribers prevented the 
diffusion of the telephone beyond businessmen. In an excellent study of 
the social diffusion of telephones in Kingston, Robert Pike confirms that 
business and residential telephone subscribers were drawn from the 
commercial and professional classes between 1883 and 1911.35 While 
both of these studies conclude that the telephone was an elite technology 
prior to World War I, they base this conclusion on research which is 
limited to the behaviour of the Bell Telephone Company. Did the social 
diffusion of telephone technology in the hands of a municipality follow a 
similar pattern? The social distribution of the telephone in Kingston is 
determined by Pike through the adoption of three indicators of social 
access: the absolute growth of the numbers of telephones as compared to 
the local population, the proportion of business to residential telephones, 
and changes to the socio-economic composition of telephone subscribers. 
This section will explore the diffusion of telephones under municipal 
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control in Port Arthur using the first two of Pike’s indicators, and draw 
comparisons with the Kingston experience in order to determine whether 
or not a similar pattern of telephone diffusion existed. 
Prior to the creation of Port Arthur’s municipal telephone exchange in 
1902, the telephone was an elite technology. According to the 1902 Bell 
Telephone Directory for Port Arthur, over seventy-five percent of the one 
hundred and twenty-seven telephone subscribers were for businesses, 
while the remainder were almost without exception the residences of 
these same businessmen. Unsatisfied demand for affordable telephone 
service was reflected by a petition signed by sixty-seven ratepayers, 
submitted to the Council on February 1, 1902. The petitioners included 
forty-three men involved in commerce, eleven professionals, two 
government officials and eleven unidentified people.36 The prominence of 
the petitioners, which included almost the entire economic elite, suggests 
that the initiative was conceived by disgruntled Bell subscribers. If this 
economic elite already enjoyed exclusive control of the technology, why 
did they propose the creation of a municipal telephone enterprise? Why 
did the number of telephones increase enormously over the next five 
years? 
The absolute growth of the numbers of telephones in Port Arthur after 
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1902 was significantly greater than the corresponding diffusion of 
telephones in Kingston. The Municipal Telephone Directory for 1907-08 
listed 923 telephone numbers in Port Arthur, not including the dozen or so 
subscribers to the Bell Telephone Company. This represented a 726.8 
percent increase in the number of telephones since 1902. Consequently, 
there was one telephone for every 13.59 Port Arthur residents, or one for 
every 19.6 residents when only residential lines are considered. In 
Kingston, the number of telephones rose from 512 in 1901 to 1 382 in 
1911. The degree of dispersal in Port Arthur was more than double the 
national average and surpassed that of Kingston. 
The proportion of residential subscribers in Port Arthur, in relation 
to commercial telephone use, was much greater than the corresponding 
figure in Kingston. Prior to the creation of the municipal telephone 
exchange, Port Arthur had a smaller proportion of its telephones in 
residences than Kingston. This situation abruptly reversed itself once the 
municipal system was established. While over seventy-five percent of 
telephones In Port Arthur were In residences in 1907-08, only forty-two 
percent of Kingston’s telephones were not in a commercial establishment 
in 1911. It can therefore be surmised that the nature of telephone 
distribution in the two cities differed substantially. As a result, the 
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social meaning of the telephone in Port Arthur underwent a dramatic 
redefinition as it had suddenly become an instrument of social interaction 
and not just a practical business tool. Why did the pattern of social 
diffusion of the telephone differ between Port Arthur and Kingston? 
The difference in the social diffusion in Port Arthur and Fort William 
was all the more remarkable in that there was every reason to expect that 
the social diffusion would ‘naturally’ be greater in Kingston. A city of 
eighteen thousand people in 1901, Kingston would have been expected to 
have had a much greater distribution of telephones simply because it was 
a larger urban centre with long-distance telephone connections to Toronto 
and Montreal. Port Arthur, on the other hand, was a much smaller frontier 
community with no long-distance communication beyond Fort William and 
the rural townships around the Lakehead. The greater diffusion of 
telephones in Port Arthur must therefore have been either due to the 
effect of municipal ownership and/or competition. 
While competition accelerated the diffusion of telephones In Port 
Arthur, it was the creation of a municipally-owned and operated exchange 
which democratized the telephone. This assertion contradicts Pike’s own 
contention that “neither public or private ownership of telephones in 
Canada can be neatly correlated with maximum telephone utilization.”37 
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Unfortunately, he bases this hypothesis on the research of Armstrong and 
Nelles into the degree of ‘market penetration’ by provincially owned 
telephone systems in the Prairie Provinces. Despite their finding that the 
degree of social diffusion in these provinces was almost identical with 
that of Ontario (where the Bell Telephone Company dominated), it is my 
contention that provincial and municipal ownership should not be painted 
with the same ‘public ownership’ brush. The municipal ownership of 
telephone service in Port Arthur diffused the urban service to a greater 
degree because the ratepayers had a veto over all municipal expenditures- 
they had no such power over the provincial government. To gain ratepayer 
approval for ongoing telephone expenditures, the municipal adminstration 
understood that telephone service had to be affordable to the vast 
majority of ratepayers. This was reflected by the dramatically reduced 
rates charged municipal subscribers. While the Bell Telephone Company 
charged twenty-four dollars for a residential subscriber and thirty-six 
dollars for a commercial line in 1902, the municipal rates were only 
twelve and twenty-four dollars respectively.38 This allowed municipal 
leaders to boast that theirs were the lowest telephone rates in the 
country. “II ne s’agit plus d’un service reserve aux seules elites 
economiques,” Pens suggested in relation to Port Arthur, “desormais, a la 
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faveur de la concurrence et des luttes politiques, le telephone se repond 
dans toutes les classes sociales.”39 Municipal ownership of telephones in 
Port Arthur acted to democratize the technology as most of the social 
classes were finally in a position to afford the rates charged. 
Saving the City: Water and Sewerage 
The provision of water and sewerage service differed from telephone 
in that the provincial Frontage Act required that municipalities levy a 
special local improvement assessment to pay for the works. Once the 
financial position of the municipality had improved after the turn of the 
century, a waterworks was constructed and the existing sewerage system 
extended in response to the rapidly growing population. While the local 
improvement system had an inherent bias against working-class 
neighbourhoods, the municipality reduced the special assessment burden 
by taking responsibility for a much larger proportion of the cost of the 
water and sewerage works than had previously been the case. The 
provision of these ‘modern conveniences’ to almost every neighbourhood 
had, by 1913, contributed to the overall sense of municipal progress. 
At the turn of the century, the health of the Inhabitants of Port 
Arthur suffered from the absence of a waterworks and the existence of 
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only a limited sewerage system in the downtown core. Unsanitary living 
conditions and the contamination of the drinking water drawn from 
Thunder Bay by water carriers continued to spawn epidemics of typhoid 
and diphtheria. A medical health report warned in 1906 that the water 
was drawn from the Bay in close proximity to the sewerage outlet.4o 
“Some of the upper streets of the town,” the Inspector also reported, 
“until last summer had house sewage discharging Into open street 
drains.”41 Consequently, typhoid struck one hundred and fifty-one people 
and diphtheria another twenty-four in 1906.42 Concern over public health 
led the Board of Health to pressure the town Council into building, and 
then extending, the water and sewerage systems.43 Their rapid extension 
decreased enormously the number of cases of preventable diseases in Port 
Arthur. 
The Council encouraged the rapid extension of the water and sewerage 
systems by making it more affordable. Construction did not begin until 
1903 because the municipality was legally bound to the agreement with 
Jenison and Wegg, even though the Mayor had refused to sign the by-law. 
Ratepayer approval for the construction of a waterworks and sewerage 
extensions was not received until May 19, 1903. “The water is taken from 
a point in Thunder Bay,” observed a 1905 report on the waterworks, 
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east of Current River, and is pumped by water power to a stand 
pipe erected at an elevation of 280 feet above Lake Superior, and 
gives ample fire pressure to all parts of the Town.44 
A new cost sharing arrangement was established for the construction of 
sewers in which property owners only had to pay fifty percent of the cost 
In the form of a special local improvement assessment.45 This new ratio 
substantially reduced the financial burden on property owners, thereby 
encouraging construction. As a result, the water and sewerage systems 
were rapidly extended in 1903, 1904, 1907, 1909 and 1913. With the 
notable exception of the Port Arthur Coal Docks area, there was no bias 
against any particular section of the town. 
But even though water and sewer mains ran throughout the town, 
many working people did not have access to running water or sewerage 
facilitities because they could not afford house connections. As the 
correspondent of retail prices of commodities for the Federal Department 
of Labour, Frederick Urry found that sanitary conveniences were, for the 
most part, beyond the means of the wage earner.46 Working-class housing 
with water and sewerage service were described as “practically 
unattainable” prior to 1914.47 While the water rates were comparable to 
elsewhere in Canada (ranging from nine dollars per annum for a four-room 
cottage to twelve dollars for a six-room house), the cost was sufficiently 
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high that the Daily News could lament in March 1907 that Port Arthur was 
the only city in the country “having water and sewer systems where 
water is permitted to be sold by the barrel.”48 Consequently, while the 
municipality constructed and extended quite rapidly the water in sewer 
mains In Port Arthur, there was not necessarily an immediate diffusion of 
the urban services to the working-class. Because a growing share of the 
cost of local improvements were picked up by the municipality, subject to 
the approval of ratepayers, there was new pressure on the municipal 
administration to ensure that water and sewer service was affordable to 
all property owners. 
Despite the class bias inherent in the local improvement process, the 
rapid construction of a waterworks and the extension of the sewerage 
system by the municipality contributed to the sense of optimism in the 
community. Municipal enterprise had achieved what private enterprise had 
failed to do during the previous twenty years. It is equally true that 
municipal ownership of the waterworks enabled more people to afford the 
service than would otherwise have been the case. The municipality 
subsidized the water and sewer works because of the continued fear of 
fire and disease in Port Arthur and because ratepayers ratified money by- 
laws, exercising a defacto veto over municipal activity. As the working- 
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class was dispersed throughout the community, they were more likely to 
receive these urban services than their Fort William counterparts who 
lived in segregated working-class districts. 
Conclusion 
An explosion of municipal activity after the turn of the century 
resulted In the construction of a hydro-electric power development, a 
municipal telephone exchange, a waterworks and the extension of the 
sewerage system. Municipal enterprise achieved what private enterprise 
had failed to deliver. Port Arthur’s electrical power advantage over Fort 
William prior to 1906 created the impression that industrial and 
municipal progress were one and the same. The decision to develop the 
Current River waterpower through municipal enterprise, in 1900, 
generated considerable civic pride in Port Arthur and envy in Fort William. 
“Locals took pride in the maze of overhead wires and poles that dominated 
each principal intersection...and in the electric lamps that gave their 
streets what they believed to be a sophisticated, metropolitan air.”49 
Another important by-product of municipal enterprise was the social 
diffusion of urban services beyond the economic elite. In particular, the 
democratization of the electric light and the telephone were 
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manifestations of the political power of ratepayers due to the provincial 
requirement that they approve all money by-laws and franchise 
agreements. The municipal administration was, therefore, keenly aware 
that, in order to ensure ratification, urban services had to be affordable to 
the ratepayers. While this did not necessarily enable the families of 
unskilled workers to enjoy the advantages of all of these new urban 
services, it did include skilled workers and most of organized labour. 
George Bernard Shaw wrote in 1912 that while the new technologies were 
“for a long time the toys of the rich,” municipal ownership acted to 
distribute these urban services more fairly.so This was a time of 
tremendous optimism when everything seemed possible through the 
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Chapter 6 
MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISE IN CRISIS, 1906-1913 
“Municipal ownership, on paper and in theory, is a fine thing, and if put 
into a practice on right lines and carried out thoroughly is the best asset a 
town has.... For the last few months, in the writer’s house out-of-date oil 
lamps have had to be used to supplement the electric for reading purposes, 
and indeed to find one’s way around.... Our City Fathers are very fond of 
saying in public The eyes of the world are tuned to Port Arthur,’ and quote 
municipal ownership as one of the reasons for attracting the attention of 
the whole world. If the whole world is looking at us, let us for heaven’s 
sake and for [our] own sake give the world some light by which we can be 
seen.” 
-‘Night Light,’ Daily News, Wednesday December 5, 1906. 
The public’s enthusiasm for municipal enterprise waned after 1906 
due to the critical shortage of electricity in Port Arthur. While the sense 
of urgency created by inter-urban rivalry had previously fostered 
municipal enterprise, the economic resurgence of Fort William during this 
period caused many Port Arthurites to question whether municipal 
ownership and industrial progress really did go hand in hand. By 
harnessing the water power of the Kamlnistiquia River at the Ecarte 
Rapids, private enterprise had given Fort William a clear power advantage 
over the smaller municipal hydro development in Port Arthur. The 
resulting shortage of electricity in Port Arthur undermined public 
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confidence in the street railway and electric light franchises, and 
constrained industrial growth. Unable to extend the street railway, and 
fearful that a private company might construct its own street railway, 
the City of Port Arthur decided to sell to Fort William a share of the 
street railway in 1908. Unfortunately, the antagonistic managerial 
practices of the Joint Street Railway Board culminated in a bitter strike 
which caused working people to reconsider their long-time support for 
municipal enterprise. Despite these difficulties, the intervention of the 
Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission saved Port Arthur’s municipal 
enterprises by resolving the electrical shortage In 1910. Consequently, 
the capital expended on the city’s municipal enterprises between 1910 
and 1914 actually doubled the total investment made during the 
preceeding twenty years. 1 This chapter will discuss the efforts made to 
resolve the shortage of electricity, the consequences of the shortage on 
the municipal electric light and street railway franchises, and how the 
bitter street railway strike of 1913 caused working people to reconsider 
their support for municipal enterprise. 
The Failure of Municipal Enterprise to Provide Hydro-Electricity 
The early power advantage enjoyed by Port Arthur over Fort William 
206 
was reversed when the Kaministiquia Power Company completed a large 
hydro-electric development at the Ecarte Rapids. In comparison, the 
municipal development on the Current River was unable to meet the 
growing power demands of Port Arthur. Expansion of the municipal 
development ended in disaster when one of the new service dams burst in 
1908, washing out the main dam downriver. Once it was discovered that 
the washout was due to the negligence of the municipality, public 
confidence in the municipal administration was shaken. This prompted the 
community to turn to other alternatives to resolve the electical shortage. 
The municipal ownership of the hydro-electric franchise was secured by 
the intervention of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission after 
private enterprise failed to raise the necessary finance capital to present 
a viable alternative. 
The formation of the Kaministiquia Power Company resulted in the 
completion of the Ecarte Rapids dam on December 8, 1906, and the 
promotion of industrial growth in Fort William. Unable to deliver on their 
promise to construct a hydro-electric project, Jenison and Wegg sold their 
water rights to a combination of prominent Montreal businessmen led by 
Frederick W. Thompson on December 2, 1904.2 As President, Thompson 
was interested In securing a cheap source of electricity for the huge flour 
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mill under construction in Fort William by the Olgilvie Company. The Kam 
Power Company, with a capital stock valued at two million dollars, was 
incorporated on June 13, 1905, and among its shareholders were F. W. 
Thompson, Herbert Holt (President of the Montreal Light, Heat and Power 
Company), Charles Hosmer (a director of the Canadian Pacific Railway), 
Frank H. Phippen (the solicitor for the Olgilvie Company), and Harold W. 
Norton.3 Completion of the hydro-development attracted would-be 
industrialists to Fort William with the promise of cheap and dependable 
power. “Once power was made available,” recalled the Times-Journal in 
1928j. “all the industrial concerns which Fort William now has, were later 
attracted by the definite assurance that cheap and dependable power could 
be had.”4 The newspaper also credited the directors of the Kam Power 
Company for actively searching out Industrialists to locate in the city. It 
is hardly surprising that Port Arthur ratepayers were increasingly envious 
of their rival. 
The failure of Port Arthur’s municipal hydro-electric development on 
the Current River to serve the needs of local industry prompted the town 
to ask for outside help. The inability of the municipality to meet the 
energy requirements of the Coal and Iron Docks Company symbolized, in 
the minds of ratepayers, the constraining effect of the electrical shortage 
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on industrial growth. Unable to supply the company with the requested 
five hundred horse power of electricity, the municipal administration was 
caught in a predicament. “The Town feel[s] that they should not block the 
Company from getting power from another source until it is ready to 
supply,” the city’s solicitor appealed to Adam Beck, “and at the same time 
they do not want to give any other Company any franchise over its 
streets.”5 Fear of the intentions of private enterprise inspired the city 
Council to refuse an appeal by the Kam Power Company to supply the Coal 
and Iron Docks with electricity. When the local company constructed its 
own steam power plant, ratepayers realized that outside help was needed 
if the city was to continue to grow. 
The Current River Power Company failed in its efforts to respond to 
the unsatisfied demand for hydro-electricity in Port Arthur. The Company 
was formed in April 1907 by George T. Marks, Joseph Kilgour and several 
other local investors to build a second hydro-electric power development 
on the Current River.e The municipality vigorously opposed the 
incorporation of the Company because it feared that its plans might 
negatively affect the existing municipal hydro development.^ After a long 
legal fight over the water rights at the site of the proposed waterpower, 
Port Arthur dropped its objections when the company’s charter was 
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amended to protect the interests of the municipality. In the end, the 
Current River Power Company did not have had the finance capital 
necessary to develop the waterpower; it slipped into obscurity by the end 
of 1907. 
While the majority of ratepayers in Port Arthur clearly wanted the 
municipality to negotiate an agreement with the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission after 1907, the supporters of James Conmee’s competing 
power scheme (to be discussed later In this chapter) used the courts to 
annul two by-law votes. The Hydro Commission was established by the 
Ontario legislature in 1906 to “regulate private utilities and to undertake 
the distribution of electricity to the municipalities...”8 Under the 
stewardship of Adam Beck, the Hydro Commission quickly expanded the 
scope of its activity to include the generation of hydro-electricity in 
competition with private utility companies. Adam Beck was, therefore, in 
the enviable position of regulating his competitors. After a delegation 
from Port Arthur met with Beck, a by-law approving the negotiation of an 
agreement with the Hydro Commission was ratified by ratepayers on 
January 7, 1907. The validity of the by-law was challenged in court by 
John Hourigan who asked for and received an injunction. Judge Clute ruled 
that the by-law was “invalid because It did not publish the estimates and 
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the contract so as to enable the voters to judge of that on which they 
were asked to vote...”9 A second by-law vote, which occurred on November 
4, 1909, was similarly disqualified.Therefore the proponents of the 
Conmee scheme were able to use the courts to obstruct the will of the 
majority. 
The Current River washout not only exacerbated the shortage of 
electricty in Port Arthur, it also seriously undermined public confidence 
in muncipal enterprise, convincing ratepayers that another source of hydro- 
electric power was needed. On May 28, 1908 the newly built Paquet Dam 
burst, sending a wall of water, sometimes as high as eighteen feet, 
cascading down the valley to the mouth of the Current River. The washout 
resulted in the death of a railway engineer, fireman, breakman and two 
stowaways on a westbound CPR freight train that plunged into the river 
bed after the bridge was swept away.ii During the subsequent lawsuit 
filed against the City of Port Arthur, it was disclosed that the washout 
was caused by the negligence of the municipality. The Council had 
instructed Thomas McCauley, the General Superintendant, to supervise the 
construction of the Paquet Dam, even though he was an electrical, not a 
civil engineer. 12 The design of the dam was seriously flawed as it was 
not anchored to solid rock, and a bank of gravel had been placed upstream. 
intead of downstream, thereby adding to the pressure on the dam.i3 
Although a plebescite held on July 3, 1907 resulted in a large majority 
voting in favour of the municipality developing Dog Lake, the Current River 
washout forced the municipality to consider other options. 14 After the 
Current River washout, the Kam Power Company, James Conmee and the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission vied to supply Port Arthur with 
electricity. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Current River washout, the 
municipality signed an agreement with the Kam Power Company-only to 
cancel it days later. The company had an important ally in J.J. Carrick who 
was elected Mayor of Port Arthur in January 1908.is He advocated through 
the Daily News (which he owned), a rapprochement with the Kam Power 
Company. 16 An agreement was signed on October 19, 1908, whereby the 
company agreed to build a sub-station for the transmission of four 
hundred horse power in exchange for the right to sell directly to those 
customers requiring more than five horse power, and a tax exemption.17 
After signing the ninety-nine year contract, without any public 
consultation whatsoever, the Council was forced to reconsider its action 
due to fierce public hostility and the legal advice of the town’s solicitor. 
Almost Immediately after the agreement was signed, it was discovered 
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that Kam Power had used the contract to try to convince the Provincial 
government to lease to it the water rights for Dog Lake. Similar to 
Jenison’s actions in 1899, this attempt to achieve a regional power 
monopoly by thwarting the ambition of municipal enterprise turned public 
opinion against the company. 18 This was followed by a scathing letter 
from Frank H. Keefer (the city’s solicitor), who on his return to Port 
Arthur on November 4, strongly advised the Council that the contract was 
ill-conceived because it could potentially prohibit the municipality from 
selling power altogether.19 He also informed councillors that the 
franchise agreement required the approval of ratepayers before it could 
take effect. As a result, the Port Arthur Council reversed its decision on 
November 4, 1908, cancelling the agreement. 
By nullifying Its agreement with the Kam Power Company, the 
municipality placed itself in the position of being unable to deal directly 
with the company which controlled the only other existing source of hydro- 
electric power in the region.2o in fact, Kam Power threatened the town 
with litigation if the contract was not carried out. 
We cannot admit the right of your Corporation to cancel the 
contract which we are advised has been legally entered Into... 
We feel that it is our duty furthermore to notify you at this 
time that in the event of the City failing to live up to its 
undertakings under the contract in question, the Company will 
213 
hold it responsible for all damages.21 
Port Arthur was able to stand up to the company’s threats because the 
Hydro-Commission had offered to negotiate a deal with Kam Power on 
behalf of the municipality; James Conmee also advanced a scheme to 
harness the enormous power potential of the Nipigon River. The existence 
of these alternatives permitted the Council to cancel the agreement. 
James Conmee understood the value of waterpower to a growing urban 
centre, but failed in his early efforts to incorporate a hydro-electric 
company. A federal charter designating that the enterprise “for the 
general benefit of Canada” was crucial to Conmee’s scheme. This allowed 
him to escape the supervision of the increasingly interventionist Hydro- 
Electric Power Commission, while enabling him to expropriate the 
necessary water rights. A Bill to incorporate the Port Arthur Power and 
Development Company proposed to develop the hydro-electric potential of 
the Nipigon and Black Sturgeon Rivers in order to export power to a mining 
company on Isle Royale, an island a few miles off-shore on the American 
side of the border.22 in this instance, the Board of Trade’s opposition to 
Conmee’s scheme, stemming from his demand for a bonus of two hundred 
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thousand dollars in bonds, prevented an agreement from being negotiated 
with Port Arthur.23 Instead, the Board of Trade went on record as 
supporting the public ownership of all waterpowers in the region, and 
endorsed the proposed contract with the Hydro Electric Power 
Commission.24 However the bill was not enacted by the House of Commons 
before the end of the session.25 
The Bill to incorporate the Ontario and Michigan Company (a second 
attempt by Conmee to acquire the water rights of the Nipigon 
waterpower), was adopted by the House of Commons in 1909 despite 
furious opposition. This proposal differed from the earlier one in that the 
bill proposed to develop only one site on each of the Nepigon and Pigeon 
Rivers. Inclusion of the latter, an International waterway, was an excuse 
to acquire a federal charter. Its opponents argued that the scheme was 
“an invasion and violation of the principles of provincial rights.”26 A 
resolution condemning the Bill, as just such a violation, even received all- 
party support in the Ontario legislature.27 James Conmee responded to his 
critics by arguing that the Nipigon River was also an international 
waterway, because It was navigable and regulated the waterflow of Lake 
Superior.28 This was, of course, a far fetched argument which would have 
had the effect of placing all waterways under federal jurisdiction. Even 
215 
the support of his own Liberal Party was lukewarm to his legislation. For 
example, Conmee had bitterly complained to Prime Minister Wilfrid 
Laurier the year before that the government was less than enthusiastic 
about his scheme.29 The Bill was finally adopted by the House of Commons 
and the Senate in 1909, but not before the company was stripped of 
expropriatory powers.3o While Conmee had managed to incorporate a hydro- 
electric company capable of developing the water power of the Nipigon 
River, without the power of expropriation, the company had to convince a 
hostile Provincial government to lease it the water rights. 
The critical shortage of electricity in Port Arthur was finally 
resolved in January 1910, when ratepayers overwhelmingly voted against 
James Conmee and in favour of the tentative agreement with the Hydro 
Commission. The two proposals differed in that the Hydro Commission 
promised to provide up to ten thousand horse power immediately 
(purchased from the Kam Power Company); while James Conmee needed 
two years to acquire the water rights to the Nipigon River and build the 
hydro-electric dam, transmission lines, and a sub-station at Port 
Arthur.31 The agreement with the Hydro Commission also had the distinct 
advantage of ensuring that the municipality retained complete control of 
the streets. Adam Beck warned the Mayor and Council of Port Arthur that 
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the perpetual franchise demanded by Conmee “means the end of exclusive 
municipal ownership for Port Arthur for all time to come.”32 At a public 
meeting held to discuss the two proposals, the correspondent of the Eye 
Opener reported that in mid-speech Adam Beck was confronted by James 
Whalen, Conmee’s son-in-law and close business associate. Whalen 
rushed the stage, shaking his fist in Beck’s face, offering to bet him five 
thousand dollars that Conmee did indeed have the water rights for the 
Nipigon waterpower. It was only after Beck curtly replied he had no such 
rights that Conmee admitted as much.33 “A town run by one man in his 
own interests,” chided the correspondent, “never did amount to a 
damn.”34 The ratepayers agreed, the Conmee proposal was soundly 
defeated, and a contract was entered into with the Hydro Electric Power 
Commission. 
The critical shortage of electricity In Port Arthur between 1906 and 
1910, and a sense of urgency created by inter-urban rivalry prompted the 
community to ask for outside help. While public confidence in municipal 
enterprise was shaken by the Current River washout, local entrepreneurs 
failed once again to present a viable alternative. The electricity crisis 
was finally resolved in January 1910 when Port Arthur ratepayers 
approved an agreement with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission. In so 
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doing, provincial intervention succeeded in saving the municipal electric 
light and street railway franchises from abandonment. 
The Municipal Electric Light and Street Railway in Crisis 
The shortage of electricity between 1906 and 1910 constrained 
municipal activity in Port Arthur. While the quality of electric light and 
street railway service was undermined by frequent power outages, the 
electrical shortage prevented the municipality from extending the two 
franchises. The poor service provided by the municipal electric light 
franchise resulted in public demands for a gas works. In the case of the 
street railway, the inability to extend service into the new subdivisions 
led to the formation of a private railway company, forcing Port Arthur to 
sell to Fort William its share of the street railway. This section will 
explore the effect that the shortage of electricity had on the municipal 
electric light and street railway, and how these municipal enterprises 
were able to overcome these difficulties. 
Public disatisfaction with the municipal electric light franchise 
originated from the shortage of electricity in Port Arthur. As early as 
October 1906, the Daily News warned that that the poor quality of the 
electric lights and the irregularity of the service was quickly becoming a 
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grievance among ratepayers.3s The newspaper even threatened to 
withdraw its support for public ownership if the electric light service 
continued to deteriorate.36 Because the electric plant was overloaded, the 
municipality was forced to urge power conservation and even advised 
customers to buy gas lamps in case of further difficulties.37 Allegations 
of discrimination in lighting service in 1909 surfaced with a petition 
signed by over one hundred customers, demanding to know why the so- 
called aristocratic section of the city was often left in darkness, while 
the area east of Court Street was still lighted.38 The ground was fertile 
for gas entrepreneurs to provide an alternative to the municipal electric 
light franchise. 
The critical shortage of electricity in Port Arthur revived interest 
in constructing a gas works for lighting and heating purposes. A proposal 
was received for the city’s gas franchise by the council in May 1907 from 
Cyrus S. Eaton and M.E. Springer but was almost immediately withdrawn.39 
Subsequently, the issue was set aside until 1909 when a special 
committee was formed to consider gas proposals from J. A. Little of Port 
Arthur, W. Percy Gillespie of Toronto and W.A. Backs of Chicago.40 After 
defeating a motion to accept Little’s submission, the Council decided to 
approach the Hydro Electric Power Commission “for a report of its general 
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fairness towards the city’s interests.”41 The municipal councillors seem 
to have discounted Little’s proposal, as they later responded favourably to 
a gas proposition from the International Lighting and Heating Company of 
Cleveland to construct a single gas works to service both Lakehead 
cities.42 Once again, the gas entrepreneurs were unable to carry out their 
schemes. Private enterprise had failed to take advantage of the electrical 
shortage by constructing a gas works which could have competed with 
municipal enterprise for the Illumination of the city. 
After flirting with a municipal gas works from 1910 to 1912, 
ratepayers voted in a plebescite to give a private gas company the 
franchise because the municipal electric light enterprise served the needs 
of most ratepayers. The municipality experimented with a muncipal gas 
works on September 10, 1910, when ratepayers voted for an expenditure 
of twenty-five thousand dollars for gas mains.43 Public opinion must have 
been divided on the issue as a plebescite was held on May 22, 1912 “with 
a view to discovering whether the electors would prefer a municipally 
owned gas plant in the City, or that the franchise should be granted to 
some outside company.”44 While advocates of a municipal gas works 
contended that the municipality could buy its gas from the Atikokan Iron 
Company, the majority of ratepayers voted against municipal ownership. 
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This decision reflected the diminished sense of urgency in the community 
for a gas works after the shortage of electricity was resolved in 1910. 
The Inability of the Port Arthur Electric Street Railway, Light and 
Telephone Commissioners to approve extensions led Port Arthur to sell to 
Fort William its share of the street railway after a private company 
threatened to construct a second street railway. The Mount McKay and 
Kakabeka Falls Railway Company was incorporated In April 1904 to 
construct a radial railway from Squaw Bay, south of Fort William on Lake 
Superior, to Kakabeka Falls. Backed by four ex-mayors of Fort William, 
the company took advantage of public frustration towards the operation of 
Port Arthur streetcars in their community (Joshua Dyke, C. H. Jackson, 
James Murphy and W.F. Hogarth).45 A comprehensive street railway 
franchise agreement was entered into on July 16, 1907, whereby the 
company agreed to operate a street railway in Fort William, roughly 
parallel to the existing one. The Company’s charter was consequently 
amended to permit it to operate an electric street railway in Fort William 
and Port Arthur.46 Fort William politicians supported the company’s bid 
largely because efforts to extend the Port Arthur Street Railway to the 
western limit of the burgeoning city had little success.47 “This looks to 
me,” observed George Hodder, “like a blow at Municipal Ownership.”48 To 
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thwart the ambition of the private railway company, Port Arthur sold to 
Fort William its share of the street railway for fifty thousand dollars on 
March 11, 1908. This action effectively terminated Fort William’s 
interest in the Mount McKay and Kakabeka Falls Railway Company. The 
company was left operating a steam railway between Fort William and 
Paipoonge Township (a distance of five miles), and an Industrial spur to 
the Canada Car and Foundry Company. 
The transition from a street railway, wholly owned and operated by 
the municipality of Port Arthur, into an operation jointly managed by two 
rival cities was not a smooth one. Resistance to the sale by the Port 
Arthur Electric Railway, Light and Telephone Commissioners led to an 
absurd situtation whereby the street railway was managed by two 
mutually antagonistic bodies. The five member Joint Board, composed of 
two representatives of each municipality and a neutral fifth, asked the 
Ontario Railway and Municipal Board to intervene after the Port Arthur 
Commissioners lost in the courts on November 2, 1908.^9 Because the 
street railway managment had remained loyal to the Port Arthur 
Commissioners, the sheriff was directed to hand over the car barn and the 
administrative offices to the Joint Board.so Once this was accomplished, 
the employment of Thomas McCauley was abruptly termlnated.si The 
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formation of the Joint Board was a clear break from the past. 
The electrical shortage prevented the extension of the street railway 
prior to 1910, frustrating the efforts of land developers to promote new 
subdivisions. The extent to which the shortage of electricity constrained 
muncipal street railway activity is reflected in the fact that the 
municipality expended four times as much capital from 1909 to 1914 than 
it had during the previous eighteen years.52 in 1906, the fifteen-minute 
car service had to be suspended in order to conserve electricity.53 The 
only major extension to be undertaken during this period was an 
exceptional case which reveals how land developers manipulated 
municipal activity to their own advantage. The Arthur Street railway 
extension constructed in 1909 provided service to Marlday Park, on the 
crest of the hill. The extension consisted of a branch line, up Arthur 
Street to Hill Street and through Mariday Park, a distance of only five 
thousand feet. Despite the opposition of the street railway manager, who 
believed that the grade on the hill was unsafe and represented a strain on 
the equipment, the Port Arthur Council and the Joint Board were convinced 
to undertake the extension after J.J. Carrick (who owned the subdivision) 
offered to subsidize the project.54 An agreement was signed on November 
15, 1909, whereby Carrick agreed to pay one-half of the cost of the 
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extension.55 The municipality had to take legal action, when Garrick 
refused to pay most of his share of the expenses, which finally ended in an 
out-of-court settlement for two thousand dollars in November 1919.56 
The inability of the municipality to extend the street railway frustrated 
the private ambitions of land developers who were sometimes willing to 
go to extraordinary lengths to promote their subdivisions. 
Despite the failure to extend the street railway before 1910, the 
public continued to support municipal ownership because of the extremely 
low fares charged. A ride on the street railway still cost five cents in 
1913-the same fare charged when the streetcars started rolling in 1892. 
Why did the fares remain so low? While the raison d’etre of the street 
railway was to provide an affordable means of inter-urban transportation, 
the rate remained the same because of the conditions set by the Order-in- 
Council in 1893. Henceforth changes to the fare schedule required 
provincial approval. This approval was precluded by Fort William which 
was certain to oppose an increase; any profit, or loss, was the exclusive 
responsibility of Port Arthur. Even after the Joint Board was formed, Port 
Arthur did not have to share street railway profits until 1913. By 
providing an affordable service, the municipal street railway maintained 
enough public support to counteract the criticism of land developers. 
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The municipal electric light and street railway enterprises were 
negatively affected by the shortage of electricity in Port Arthur between 
1906 and 1910. This shortage produced irregularity of service and 
prevented the municipality from responding to growing public demand for 
urban services. The electric light franchise survived the crisis largely 
because private enterprise was unable to construct a gas works in time to 
take advantage of the unsatisfied demand. In the case of the municipal 
street railway, the shortage of electricity forced the municipality to sell 
to Fort William its share of the operation or face competition from the 
Mount McKay and Kakabeka Falls Railway Company. The low street railway 
fares kept Port Arthurites loyal to the municipal enterprise in the face of 
the growing frustration of land developers until 1910, when the street 
railway was rapidly expanded. The final crisis which undermined 
municipal ownership was a bitter street railway strike in May 1913 which 
caused many working people to reconsider their support for municipal 
enterprise. 
The Street Railway Strike 
The relationship between the Joint Street Railway Board and its 
workers was rocky from the outset, culminating in a bitter strike in May 
225 
1913. Because the labour unrest extended to Fort William, the character 
of the strike did not reflect the atmosphere of inter-class cooperation in 
Port Arthur. When violence erupted in the Fort William Coal Docks 
District, the hard liners on the Joint Board won approval for a so-called 
“iron fist” strategy. The extreme tactics subsequently employed by the 
Joint Board to crush the union caused many working people to reconsider 
their longstanding support for municipal enterprise. Yet, despite the 
divisiveness of the labour dispute, cooperation rather than conflict 
continued to characterize social relations in Port Arthur. This section 
will explore the causes of the strike, and how the strike affected the 
relationship between the municipality and the working class. 
The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway 
Employees of America struck In 1913 over the deteriorating standard of 
living of its membership and the dismissal of two union members. After a 
protracted wage dispute went to arbitration, a collective agreement was 
entered into on April 3, 1912, not expiring until December 31, 1913.57 in 
the meantime, the union Informed the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board 
that the Joint Board was in violation of Provincial law because street 
workers were not supposed to work In excess of sixty hours per week. 
This led to an order directing the Joint Street Railway Board to clean up 
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its act.58 Consequently, the hours of labour of motormen and conductors 
were slashed, thus greatly reducing their overall income. Recognizing the 
hardship that this produced, the Joint Board unilaterally increased wages 
eight to ten percent in February 1913. However, this was not sufficient 
compensation in the eyes of the street railway workers. The second 
grievance revolved around the dismissal of Maurice Enright and Stephen 
Muldoon in seperate incidents. While Enright was fired in July 1912 over 
his refusal to drive a streetcar to the Coal Docks for the militia during a 
strike-related disturbance, Muldoon was fired after he blew the whistle 
on a member of the Joint Board who had overcharged the municipal 
enterprise.59 When reviewed by federal arbitrators, the dismissal of the 
two employees was deemed reasonable under the circumstances. 
The street railway strike caused organized labour to re-evaluate its 
long-term commitment to municipal ownership. The Strike Committee 
tried to redirect pro-municipal ownership sentiment into support of their 
own demands. They proclaimed that the “street cars belong to the people. 
Do as we bid you and you will regain possession of them.”6o Strikers 
presented themselves as the defenders of municipal ownership up against 
those who would destroy it. The Wage Earner charged that there was a 
conspiracy to privatize the municipal street railway. 
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Our street railway is a valuable asset. It is worth stealing. 
An incompetent manager making discontented employees will 
induce the rate-payers to vote away their franchise easily and 
even willingly when the right moment arrives, and some will 
reap a rich harvest. Moneyed men may plot, they have the time 
and leisure to do S0...61 
The strike experience destroyed any illusion that the working class held 
that the interests of municipal ownership and trade unionism were 
necessarily identical.62 
The strike commenced, good naturedly, at five o’clock in the morning 
of Saturday May 10, 1913 with strikers and managers bantering back and 
forth. “The men seemed to be in a good mood,” reported the Daily News. 
“[they] sat around in the sun and laughed and talked and joked [with] 
Secretary Wilson of the Joint Board when he came along.”63 The editorial 
opinion of the local newspapers during the first day, while critical of the 
strikers, was not altogether hostile. They criticized the employees 
contention that they were justified in striking (in violation of their 
contract), because the Joint Board had already violated the contract when 
they unilaterally Increased wages.64 The strikers resorted to gender 
imagery to bolster their case among ratepayers. They suggested that their 
status as the male breadwinners in their families was threatened by 
substandard wages. “To make ends meet,” the Strike Committee declared, 
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“many of the working men’s wives have to work hard as boarding house 
keepers.”65 Those strikers interviewed by the Daily News suggested that 
the strike would be a short-lived affair as the community would see the 
justice of their cause. This faith in their fellow citizens was a product of 
an atmosphere of inter-class cooperation. 
The strike was transformed into a bitter conflict the following day, 
when violence erupted in the Fort William Coal Docks district. A huge 
crowd ran a streetcar off the track and proceeded to break all the 
windows. After the police arrested Peter Landi during the afternoon 
incident, another mob tried to break him out of the police sub-station 
that night.66 One man was killed and another wounded when the crowd 
rushed the station. Although no striker was actually involved in the 
violence, and the street railway union condemned the hot and blamed It on 
foreigners, the labour dispute had escalated. The riot strengthened the 
position of hard liners on the Joint Board, who advocated an “iron fist” 
strategy. This strategy included the importation of strike breakers and 
armed special constables from the Thiel Detective Agency. The strike had 
become entangled in the antagonistic social relations of Fort William. 
In the aftermath of the violence, the tactics of the Joint Board and 
the union escalated rapidly. Port Arthur and Fort William soon resembled 
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armed camps with two to four special constables, equipped with 
automatic guns, riding every streetcar. Still others lined the street 
railway route, especially around the Coal Docks area. The Joint Board even 
cautioned the population not to find themselves in a hostile crowd, as the 
Thiel agents were “authorized to shoot into any crowd that attempts to 
destroy street railway property.”67 On Friday May 16, E. Salmi was 
imprisoned just for hollaring “scab” at a passing street car.es The 
escalation in the tactics of the Joint Board provoked a corresponding 
alteration in the tactics of the strikers and their working-class 
supporters. The union’s initial strategy of calling for a boycott of the 
street railway appeared to be widely respected during the first week of 
the strike.69 The importation of strike breakers, however, forced the 
strikers to re-evaluate their tactics. Their call for a plebescite on the 
issue, allowing the public to resolve the conflict, reflected once again the 
faith of the strikers in the spirit of cooperation in Port Arthur. After a 
plebescite was rejected by the municipalities, a union-operated bus line 
was established between Port Arthur and Fort William.7o Finally, on May 
18, two large public meetings endorsed a general strike after turning 
down Frederick Urry’s suggestion that the working people of the Lakehead 
line the street railway route to shame the passengers and the two cities 
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into capitulation.The “iron fist” strategy of the Joint Board had forced 
the strikers to escalate their tactics. 
The general strike slated for Wednesday June 4, 1913 was an 
embarrasing failure resulting In the collapse of the strike.^2 Only two 
unions, the Structural Ironworkers and the hoisting engineers (both based 
in Fort William) walked off the job en masse.73 According to the surviving 
minutebooks of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Local #631, and 
the Coal Handlers’ Union, there was almost no support from organized 
labour for the general strike. While the Locomotive Engineers never even 
mentioned the strike in their minutes, the Coal Handlers’ Union was forced 
to cancel a membership meeting to ratify the strike call because only a 
handful of people bothered to attend.74 The Daily News gloated that not 
one municipal employee struck in sympathy.75 why didn’t working people 
support the strikers by participating In the general strike? If this was 
the class conflict that Jean Morrison suggests, where was the working- 
class solidarity? 
The general strike failed for three reasons: it occurred too late in the 
strike, a general strike was a poor tactic under the circumstances, and the 
strikers did not have sufficient reason to violate their collective 
agreement. Originally intended for Friday May 23, the postponement of the 
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general strike was a mistake because the street railway had by June 4 
been in full operation for almost three weeks. Consequently, the general 
impression in the community was that the strikers had already lost. The 
use of the general strike was a poor tactic under the circumstances 
because it asked working people to risk losing their own jobs on behalf of 
what had become a lost cause. If the issues involved had been of 
community-wide importance, a general sympathy strike might have been 
more successful. Finally, the street railway union’s reasons for violating 
their collective agreement were relatively weak. Trade unionists may 
very well have been concerned that the street railway union broke their 
contract as it undermined the principle of collective bargaining. In any 
case, the dismal failure of the general strike suggests that the street 
railway strike of 1913 may not have, as Jean Morrison suggests, 
completely “shattered what remained of the old trade union-middle class 
alliance.”76 
Conclusion 
Municipal enterprise was in crisis between 1906 and 1913 in Port 
Arthur because it failed to deliver sufficient electrical power to operate 
the municipal street railway and electric light franchises, and supply 
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industrial power consumers. While inter-urban rivalry had previously 
acted to support municipal enterprise, it began to work against it when 
Fort William achieved a power advantage through private enterprise. The 
critical shortage of electricity was finally resolved by a combination of 
the inability of private enterprise to satisfy public demand for 
electricity, and the intervention of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission. The resolution of the electrical shortage did not come in 
time, however, to prevent the sale to Fort William of Its share of the 
street railway. Subsequently managed by a Joint Board, labour- 
management relations deteriorated to such an extent that a strike 
occurred In May 1913. The nature of the strike was transformed after 
violence erupted in the Fort William Coal Docks District. As a result, the 
strike experience caused many working people to reconsider their long 
time support for municipal enterprise. Despite all of these difficulties 
which plagued the municipal ownership of urban services in Port Arthur, 
the municipal enterprises not only survived but expanded rapidly 
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CONCLUSION 
Municipal enterprise in Port Arthur was an innovation born of 
necessity. Because of the scarcity of finance capital in the region, 
private enterprise was entirely dependent on municipal bonuses to provide 
urban services. Small property owners turned to municipal enterprise 
after they became tired of subsidizing the boodling habit of the economic 
elite. The emergence of municipal enterprise in Port Arthur was 
facilitated by a profound sense of urgency generated by Inter-urban 
rivalry, a legal environment which encouraged municipal enterprise, public 
confidence in the municipal administration, and an atmosphere of inter- 
class cooperation which was conducive to collective action. Municipal 
ownership of urban services distinguished itself from private ownership 
by a greater social diffusion of these services. The fairer distribution of 
electric light, telephone, water and sewerage services was a conscious 
effort on the part of municipal officials to secure ratepayer support for 
additional money by-laws as required by Ontario’s Municipal Act. 
Political expediency and an atmosphere of inter-class cooperation were 
the major motivational factors in the operation of Port Arthur’s municipal 
services. Municipal enterprise was not without Its problems; the critical 
shortage of electricity and the street railway strike caused many Port 
239 
Arthurites to reconsider their support. But despite bumps on the path of 




















Labour Disputes in Port Arthur and Fort William, 1903-191 3 
Date of Strike Location # of StrikersOccupation Demands Outcome 
Feb.24-27,1903 Fort William 250 Iron Workers Wages Won 
June3-20,1 903 Fort William 39 Carpenters Union Recog. Won 
Sep17-19,1904 Fort William 200 Boilermakers Wages Compromise 
Sep24-29,1904' Fort William 1 000 Rlwy.Workers Wages Compromise 
May 1-7,1905 Fort William 100 Carpenters 
and Plumbers 
Sep29-Oct4,1906 Lakehead 750 FW-450 Freight Handlers Wages Won 
May 4-6,1907 Fort William Grain Elevators Wages Won 
June 8-15,1907 Lakehead (PA-250) Freight Handlers Replacement Workers 
August21 -26,1 907 Fort William 1 4 Operators Appointment of Managt Mixed 
Sept., 1909 Fort William Freight Handlers 
June, 7-?, 1910 Lakehead 500 Carpenters Wages &Hoursi PA settled before FW 
June,15-21,1910 Port Arthur 36 Labourers Wages Lost 
1910 Port Arthur RIvyy. Workers 
Sept, 1910 Fort William Stove Moulders 
April,17-Jn,1911 Lakehead 90 Painters and Wages Mixed (Replacement 
Decorators Workers) 
July 29-7,1912 Port Arthur Coal Handlers Union Discrimination Won 
July, 1912 Port Arthur Carpenters Conditions Won 
June 1-?, 1912 Port Arthur Plumbers Holiday 
July 25,1912-lday Fort William 800 Coal Handlers Fair Timekeeping Won 
July, 1912 Fort William Rail Handlers 
Aug19-24, 1912 Port Arthur Freight Handlers Wages Won 
Aug20-24,1912 Fort William Freight Handlers Wages Lost 
Aug.7-13, 1912 Fort William 250 Dock Labourers Wages Compromise 
November, 1912 Fort William 400 CPR Offices 
May, 1913 Fort William Carriage Works Fair Wage Clause Lost 
MaylO-JnlO, 1913 Lakehead 85 Street Railway Wages&Reinstatement Lost 
Ap14-My9, 1913 Fort William Canada Car Co. Lost 
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